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The spread of civic nationalism and the push for an Australian republic became 
inextricably linked in the 1990s. Specific socio-historical and socio-political 
factors provided the impetus for both in the post-WVV II period. In the early 
1990s civic national sentiments were harnessed by public intellectuals and 
activists of the ARM in the push for an Australian republic. The push started 
with Citizens for Democracy in the 1970s and it culminated in a referendum on 
November 6th 1999. The referendum for Australia to move to a republic was 
unsuccessful — which is surprising considering the pro-republican public 
sentiments and the successful mobilization of the Australian Republican 
Movement. 
This study addresses this puzzle of the 'surprising defeat'. It proposes a 
sociological model identifying the key factors necessary for major political 
reform. The model includes three sets of conditions of success and assesses the 
presence of these conditions empirically. The conditions include conducive 
public sentiments, the programmatic articulation of these sentiments by a social 
movement organization, and a high degree of strategic and tactical consensus 
among political elites, including the leaders of the republican movement. The 
study concludes that this consensus amongst republican and political elites was 
weak or missing on the eve of the referendum. 
Acknowledgements 
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Professor Jan Pakulski, my principal 
supervisor, for his expert advice, constant support and encouragement. Jan has 
been a source of inspiration, and has the unique gift of making one want to go 
that extra distance. I also wish to thank my quantitative research supervisor Dr 
Bruce Tranter for his invaluable technical advice on statistical and analytical 
matters. His detailed criticism of chapter drafts have greatly improved the quality 
of this thesis. 
I would like to acknowledge all those who gave of their time to take part in the 
interview process. Without them this thesis would not have been possible. I 
would like to thank Jill Murphy for her interest and support especially for that 
extra push that everyone needs towards the end. 
Special thanks go to the crew of family and friends for their continual support and 
assistance — especially those friends and colleagues who have kept me going with 
promises of fine champagne and other inducements. My deepest thanks go to 
Jon, Amy, Sophie and Maria who have all supported this effort in their own 
special way and have kept the momentum going. 
iv 
Preface 
This thesis adds another volume to an already wide library of works on the 
Australian republican movement and its attempts at reforming the political 
system. A number of historians and social commentators have already analysed 
the origin, development and the current state of the republican movement — and 
their work has been acknowledged below. Perhaps one of the best known is a 
study of the republican push by one of the key actors and prominent republican 
Malcolm Turnbull. Turnbull's early book titled 'The Reluctant Republic' 
addresses issues of national identity and links Australia's changing sense of 
nationhood with the republican cause. He also discusses the constitutional 
implications of the republican reform and the political background of the 
republican campaign. His later work entitled 'Fighting for a Republic', published 
only weeks after the 1999 referendum, looks at the strategic and tactical debates 
and the behind the scene deals that accompanied the constitutional convention 
and the referendum. In a similar vein, but with a added historical bent, Tom 
Keneally presents a partly personal and partly historical account of his republican 
childhood in 'Our Republic'. He analyses the social and historical background 
of Australian republicanism and the role of the ARM in shaping the most recent 
republican debate. 
There are also a number of historians who have contributed to the analysis of the 
republican movement. They include, to name a few, John Hirst, Wayne Hudson, 
David Carter and Mark McKenna. Mark McKenna's analysis of republicanism 
titled 'The Captive Republic' stands out as one of the most comprehensive 
accounts of the history of Australian republicanism over the last 150 years. The 
study draws striking parallels between past and present arguments for a republic, 
and anchors the recent debate in history. McKenna's interpretation, especially his 
account of the contribution made by both political and republican elites to the 
latest republican push, has greatly influenced the analysis below — and it is 
acknowledged throughout. One should also mention numerous socio-historical 
and socio-political studies of Australian republicanism. For example, Donald 
Horne, a pioneer republican who lead Citizens for Democracy in the 1970s, has 
written a number of important books. His 'Ideas for a Nation' and 'Looking for 
Leadership' examine expressions of national character and link civic values with 
an Australian republic. He analyses the causes of the most recent republican 
resurgence, and makes a strong partisan claim that full independence requires 
Australia's becoming a republic. Paul Kelly, as editor-in-chief of the 'The 
Australian' in the early 1990s has also made a substantial contribution to the 
republican debate in his book 'Paradise Divided'. There he analyses the 
republican resurgence in the 1990s as a reflection of political and economic 
trends. Particular attention is paid to the changing policies of the ALP leaders 
aimed at increasing Australia's integration with the Asia-Pacific region. Kelly 
also comments on changing national identity and its dynamics in the context of 
political change. Finally, the contributions made by Ian McAllister, especially in 
'New Development in Australian Politics' should be acknowledged. Here 
McAllister interprets the republican activisation in the 1990s in the context of the 
ideological and political re-orientation of the ALP and the role of Paul Keating in 
placing the republic at the top of the new Labor's political agenda. 
There are also numerous assessments of the republican movements' weakness' 
as reflected in the referendum failure to support the minimalist option. In his 
'The Barren Years', Robert Manne predicted the demise of the referendum based 
on the 'fatal contradiction' between the 'minimalists', whom he labels 
'nationalists', and the 'populists', whom he calls 'democrats'. He argues that as 
the republican debate progressed, the proponents of the republic suffered from a 
narrowing of vision and became bogged down in legal technicalities. As a result 
the republican movement was unable to capture public enthusiasm and 
imagination. Ian McAllister (2001), in turn, attributes a weak support for the 
minimalist position to the lack of clear party-political cues. He also argues that 
the results of the referendum reflected a lack of knowledge among large sections 
of the electorate and the perception amongst ordinary voters that the push for the 
republic was predominantly an elite initiative. Higley and Chase (2000) on the 
other hand see the principal reason for the failed referendum as a failure by 
political elites to reach agreement on the shape of the future republic. The result 
also reflected a widespread distrust of political elites by the public and a strong 
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preference for a directly elected president. Higley & Chase's analysis gets to the 
heart of the central role of political leaders in instigating change. 
The analysis below critically integrates most of these arguments, and 
supplements them within a broader sociological account of the republican reform 
movement put in the context of a model of political reform. It focuses on three 
sets of conditions of success of any large-scale reformist attempt: conducive mass 
orientations, successful organization and consensual elite action. This model is 
derived from the Weberian tradition of sociological analysis supplemented by 
insights of contemporary theorists of nationalism, mass social movements and 
elites. Both the Weberian 'backbone' and the contemporary theoretical insights 
underlying the model, guide the empirical analysis of public attitudes towards the 
republic and nationhood, as well as the interpretive study of republican elites' 
views as reflected in the series of interviews. The analysis locates the recent 
republican push within a broader social landscape of a changing Australian 
society, changing forms of popular identifications and changing forms of public 
activism. The conclusions are largely in line with the suggestions of Donald 
Home concerning the centrality of civic values, and they also support Higley and 
Chase's views on the impact of elite dissensus on the outcomes of the republican 
referendum. Unlike Home, however, I see civic values as fused with popular 
nationalism, and unlike Higley and Chase, I extend the analysis of elite 
perceptions to the republican 'leadership core'. In contradiction to Manne, I 
argue that despite the failure of the 1999 referendum, the republican movement 
had largely succeeded in preparing the grounds for political change. But it failed 
to fulfill the last condition — to secure a broad elite consensus about the shape of 
the republic. 
In the final chapter I argue that the future of the republic remains open. The 
proposed model suggests that republicans face three challenges: how to revive 
civic nationalism, especially in the atmosphere of increasing concerns about 
national security; how to re-mobilize political resources and stimulate republican 
movement organizations; and how to secure elite consensus as to the strategy and 
tactic of reform. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This is a sociological study of attempted republican political reform in Australia. It 
focuses on the sources and outcomes of the pro-republican movement in the 1990s 
that culminated in the 1999 referendum. The push for a republic, I argue, reflected 
the changing form of popular nationalism as well as the organized attempts of 
political leaders to forge a political reform program and to mobilize mass support 
for this program. In spite of the fact that opinion polls indicated that there was 
strong support for an Australian republic by the majority of the population, the 
referendum failed to deliver majority support for the ARM's minimalist option. 
The simple explanation of this failure was that the pro-republican camp was 
divided. The more complex explanation, provided here, identifies the causes of 
these divisions, and poses a sociological question about the general social 
conditions for effective institutional reform. The theoretical model proposed here 
specifies three sets of conditions that must be present for the successful introduction 
of such reform. They include mass sentiments conducive to the reform, an effective 
organizational framework, and elite consensus about strategy and tactics. 
Perhaps the most controversial claim made in this study is that mass sentiments 
conducive to the republican reform were linked to and were heralded by a shift in 
popular national identities in Australia in the post-WW II period. I provide 
evidence of this shift and argue that it preceded the mobilization of the republican 
movement in the 1990s. This shift involved a spread of a new form of civic 
nationalism, mainly among the educated urban 'baby boomers'. The growing pro-
republican stance identified by social surveys conducted in the 1980s and 1990s 
coincided with and reflected this new civic form of nationalism. The socio-
historical sources of civic nationalism and republicanism are discussed in the 
empirical part of the study in the context of an analysis of survey data on public 
attitudes to the nation and the republic. Further, I argue that an Australian 
republican movement in the 1990s both reflected this change in public sentiments, 
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and provided the impetus for further proliferation of new civic national 
identifications, especially among non-British immigrants and their descendents. 
The forging of the reform program by movement activists and political leaders gave 
the republican push a clear direction and amplified its force. 
The shift in national identifications that underlined a shift in public sentiments, I 
argue, can be attributed to a number of socio-historical trends: the post-WW II 
immigration program and its aftermath, including the changing ethnic composition 
of Australian society; the reorientation of the Australian economy away from 
Europe and the UK; increased prosperity and educational opportunities; and 
political reorientation of the major political parties, especially the ALP. These 
trends combined to bring about a change in public sentiments regarding what it 
means to be truly Australian and what is the proper political form for the Australian 
nation. 
Changes in public sentiments can be indexed by attitudes towards the republic and 
the nation, as reflected in survey data and opinion polls. The social distribution of 
these sentiments is the key to the postulated causal links. The analysis of survey 
data confirms that this distribution reflects the impact of post-WW II trends, 
particularly immigration and ethnic composition, generational change, educational 
'revolution', urban and metropolitan shift in population and the ideological 
transformation of the ALP. 
As the proposed model suggests, the second set of conditions for successful 
institutional reform includes the political organization of public sentiments and the 
mobilization of the pro-reform movement. The conducive attitudes and orientations 
of the mass public became politically efficacious when forged into a reform 
program by republican intellectuals and political leaders, mainly from the ALP. 
The emergence of the Australian Republican Movement (ARM) in the 1990s 
heralded the successful forging and harnessing of mass sentiments by the pro-
republican movement leaders. The strength of the republican movement was due to 
the fact that it was coordinated by a single organizational centre — the ARM. It 
attracted high profile supporters with quite diverse political and ideological 
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leanings, but was particularly popular among the ALP leaders. The ALP placed an 
Australian republic high on the political agenda and lead the campaign for the 
reform throughout the 1990s. 
The public intellectuals and politicians who lead the pro-republican reform 
movement were both vocal and strategically placed vis-a-vis the mass media. They 
also shared formative experiences of the Australian baby-boom generation. Those 
shared experiences strengthened their integration and facilitated the formation of the 
ARM, preceded by Citizens for Democracy (CFD) in the 1970s and the 
Bicentennial celebrations in 1988. Those events precipitated the organized 
republican push for reform that led to the failed referendum in 1999. The ARM 
campaigned on a 'minimalist' platform and sought bi-partisan support for 
constitutional reform. The movement attracted high profile figures who mobilized 
republican sentiments by focusing on an Australian head of state. While an 
Australian head of state became the key symbol of the republican push, the 
underlying appeals stressed equality, cultural inclusiveness and the rights and 
responsibilities of all citizens regardless of their cultural heritage. These, I argue, 
reflected the key features of civic nationalism. 
The reform push failed to deliver majority support for the pro-republican 
'minimalist' option. The interview data reveal some causes of this failure in the 
orientations and actions of political elites in the three years preceding the 
referendum. The elites, who injected strategic consistency into the reform program, 
and provided a power push for collective action, were divided in their views on the 
strategies of reform and preferred tactics. This lack of consensus and the strong 
opposition coming from the Prime Minister and senior Coalition politicians sealed 
the fate of the republican push. 
Thus the conditions of success of the republican reform (relating to the elite) were 
missing on the eve of the 1999 republican referendum. This deficiency, however, 
was not apparent to the republican activists, partly because other conditions were 
present. Popular support for the republic was strong. The organizational centre of 
the movement, the ARM, attracted a large number of public intellectuals and 
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enjoyed support by the ALP. A significant majority of Coalition leaders, however, 
were either hostile or indifferent to 'the Labor Republic'. Moreover, even the 
republican elite — the ARM leadership — lacked tactical and strategic unity. The 
interview data also show the tentative nature of the strategic consensus within the 
ARM, and the emerging divisions as to the best tactical moves to institute the 
republic. These divisions were seized upon and highlighted by their opponents. As 
a result, the pro-republican vote was split and the referendum failed to back the 
reform. 
The sociological model of reform underlying the study is anchored in a number of 
theoretical perspectives. I start by discussing theories of nationalism, especially the 
civic form of nationalism. Mannheim's analyses of generations and generational 
succession are also evoked to explain the rise of cohorts that have similar national 
sentiments and identifications. I argue that the post-war generational change 
precipitated a shift in popular orientations and value hierarchies. The effects of this 
shift were amplified by increased levels of participation in tertiary education in the 
post-war period. Tertiary education plays a significant role in promoting attitudinal 
and value change, especially in a liberal direction. It makes participants more 
receptive to liberal views and more tolerant of cultural diversity. The analysis of 
the survey data provides clear evidence that those who are supporters of an 
Australian republic and express civic national sentiments are more likely to be 
tertiary educated, born after 1945, and to embrace libertarian postmaterialist views. 
Mass migrations in the 1950s and 1960s played a significant role in creating 
conditions conducive to the spread of civic nationalism and republicanism. Non-
British immigrants became strongly committed to Australia's legal and political 
institutions, but often shunned Australian customs and traditions. Their nationalism 
manifested itself in a loyalty to Australia's institutional (legal and political) 
framework. 
I also draw on contemporary social movement theorists to explain the significance 
of social movement organizations and the centrality of intellectuals in social 
movements, especially in elaborating goals and strategies and in forming programs 
6 
of action. While the foundations of this perspective were developed by Max Weber, 
it was later elaborated by the 'resource mobilization' and 'new movement' theorists. 
Finally, I rely on the insights of elite theorists in analysing the role of elites in 
shaping organizational strategies and instigating political reform. These insights 
help in explaining how small groups of people are able to influence the direction of 
political reforms. I concentrate on the orientations and actions of the ARM leaders 
and, to a lesser extent, on broader political elites. The neo-elite theorists add a 
further dimension by recognising the interdependence of elites and non-elites (mass 
audiences). They examine how elites are limited by the political orientations of 
mass publics. Those theories provide the basis for explaining the centrality of elites 
in the republican reform program, and the importance of unity and consensus for the 
successful realisation of institutional reform. 
The empirical part of the study utilizes quantitative and qualitative methodologies. 
It relies on the data from the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey 
which includes questions about values, identities and attitudes to the nation and the 
republic. In particular, the survey includes specific questions on the strength and 
nature of attachment to the nation, thus helping in identifying different forms of 
nationalism and their 'social locations'. 
The survey data analysis is complemented by interviews with the leaders of the 
Australian Republican Movement (ARM) conducted over a period of three and a 
half years (1996-2000). They reflect the impact of both social and political 
developments that took place during the 1990s and reveal how those developments 
shaped the ARM's elites' goals, strategies and tactics. Not only do the views of the 
ARM leaders provide an insight into their personal vision of Australia, but they also 
highlight the issues that united and divided the leaders and activists in their 
campaign for political reform. The interviews reveal elite cleavages and divisions, 
as well as the impact of these cleavages on the ARM campaign leading to the 1999 
referendum. 
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The plan of the study reflects the underlying sociological model of institutional 
reform. Chapter 2 focuses on nationalism and the question of national identity. At 
the same time it draws a distinction between identities and identification in order to 
explain the changing public (mass) sentiment. Citizenship and civic identifications 
are discussed in the context of the changing role of the state. This forms a 
springboard for a discussion of theories of nationalism and its changing forms. It 
also links the ideas on changing forms of nationalism with elements of social 
movement theory, especially the resource mobilization theory which argues that the 
most important part of movements are their organizational centres (SMOs). The 
third part of Chapter 2 covers elite theory, especially the contemporary version as 
developed by John Higley and his collaborators. They argue that elite consensus is 
essential for any effective political action. Here the focus is on broader political 
elites and a more narrow segment of ARM leaders. Although the ARM managed to 
mount a campaign and forge a reform program, the absence of elite consensus 
within the broader political elite, and strategic ambivalence within the republican 
elite, made the success of the campaign doubtful. Those three perspectives provide 
the theoretical underpinnings for my argument about the conditions of effective 
social and political reform. 
In chapter 3, I outline the methodology used in the analyses of the empirical data. I 
utilize the survey data from the referendum in order to show the dynamics of public 
orientations and the social trends that underlined the emergence of civic 
nationalism. I also use interview data in my analysis of orientations of the 
republican movement, and the discussion of the role of republican elites. 
In the next three chapters (4 — 6) I substantiate my argument. Chapter 4 analyses 
the origins of civic nationalism as an underlying public orientation that formed the 
mass basis for the republican push. The analyses concentrates on national 
sentiments and the republican vote in order to explore the relationship between civic 
nationalism and republicanism. Chapter 5 outlines the origins of the organized 
republican push and the role of public intellectuals and political leaders in the 
formation of the ARM. It focuses on the strategic significance of the core 
movement organization. Chapter 6 outlines elite orientations, and it is based on 
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interviews with the ARM leaders. I address the question of the relationship 
between the ARM activists, the major political party leaders and the Prime Minister. 
The final chapter summarizes the argument and speculates about the future of civic 
nationalism and republicanism in Australia. It focuses on the tensions between 
different forms of national identity, the role of leadership in addressing issues of 
national identification, and the conditions for the success of political reform. 
Although public intellectuals and political elites successfully articulated changes in 
popular sentiments in Australia, they failed to convince the public about the 
desirability of the 'minimalist' option. The concluding sections analyse the 
interdependence of elites and the mass publics. That functional interdependence 
has become critical in the post-referendum period. 
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CHAPTER 2 NATIONALISM, MOVEMENTS AND ELITES 
2:1 Introduction 
In the first section of this chapter the question 'what is nationalism?' is posed in 
order to prepare the grounds for the analysis of Australian republicanism as a 
reflection of rising popular civic nationalist sentiment. The section focuses on the 
question of the nature and social sources of civic nationalism, and on the reason for 
its articulation in the form of popular pro-republican attitudes. Other key concepts - 
nation, nation state, national identity, public sentiments, mass identities and popular 
identifications are also discussed. Different forms of nationalism, I argue, are not 
mutually exclusive but tend to coexist and clash with each other. The most serious 
clashes tend to occur between civic and ethnic nationalist sentiments. 
Nationalism is not just an expression of attachment to a particular category of 
people. It also carries with it a presumption that the solidarity that unites such a 
category of people is embodied in preferences for a specific political form of the 
state. This is the point made by Ernest Gellner (1983) and reiterated by Leah 
Greenfeld (1992). Both stress that nationalism links a people with the state, the 
latter considered 'the ultimate source of authority' (1992: 494). Greenfeld's 
argument is particularly relevant here because it identifies the sources of civic 
nationalism and links transformations of popular nationalism with broader historical 
and socio-political changes. These changes form a background for the mobilization 
of mass social movements that articulate national sentiments. 
The second part of the chapter outlines the theoretical background for the discussion 
of the formation of the republican movement. It focuses on the insights of resource 
mobilization (RM) theorists who emphasise the importance of social movement 
organization and leadership for the success of political reforms promoted by 
movements. The claims of RM theorists are discussed in preparation for the 
argument that the initial success of the republican movement was due not only to 
the articulation of popular civic national sentiments, but also to the effective 
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harnessing of those sentiments by the ARM, the key organization of the republican 
movement. The significance of organization and of intellectual leadership in the 
mobilization of social movements, especially in elaborating goals and strategies, 
and in forming programs of action, is also discussed. References are made to Max 
Weber's theory of charisma and mass democracy, and to the 'new movements' 
theorists, who emphasise the role of movement intellectuals in forming movement 
identities and managing movement organizations. 
The role of political leaders, intellectuals and movement activists has been 
highlighted by the classic elite theorists. They provide a framework for explaining 
the centrality of elites as agents of social change. Mosca (1923/1939) and Pareto 
(1916/1935) analysed the role of elites in instigating social and political change. 
Their analyses were supplemented by Weber's (1922/1978) socio-historical studies 
of elite action and political outcomes, especially concerning social movements (e.g. 
his study of the Protestant movement). The neo-elite theorists add a further 
dimension to this discussion by recognising the interdependence of elites and non-
elites, and by stressing the link between elite consensus and successful political 
action. They also examine how elite-led political reform programs can be limited 
by parameters set by the political orientations of mass publics. These theoretical 
insights form a springboard for my argument about the orientations of the political 
leaders and the leaders of the republican movement in Australia, and about the 
impact of those orientations on the successes and failures of the republican 
movement in initiating political reform in the 1990s. 
2:2 What is nationalism? 
In a narrow sense, nationalism is both a popular outlook circumscribing 
membership in a national community and an ideology identifying the principle of 
sovereignty. 'Nationalism defines membership of the state in terms of such 
common characteristics as language, religion or ethnicity. It is an ideology locating 
the political legitimacy of the state in self-government by co-nationals' 
(Abercrombie 1984:140). Although such a definition recognises the inter-
relatedness of nation, nation state and national identity as constituent parts of 
nationalism, it does not acknowledge the controversies that surround these concepts. 
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The interpretation of, and the meaning given to concepts such as nation, state and 
national identity endow them with the status of 'contested concepts'. They have 
been central to debates about the formation of different types of nationalism. At the 
same time those constituent and contested concepts have undergone changes in 
meaning over time. This 'semantic evolution' of concepts helps to explain the 
diversity in meanings attributed to nationalism. These meanings, however, often 
mask the fact that the components that contribute to the formation of different types 
of nationalism do not develop in isolation. It is, therefore, useful to understand 
nationalism more broadly as 'a process, a kind of sentiment or identity, a form of 
political rhetoric, an ideology, a principle or set of principles, and a kind of social-
political movement' (Beiner 1999: 56). 
At the core of nationalism lies the concept of a 'nation' typically imagined as a 
homogeneous people occupying a national territory and organized within a 
framework of a single nation state. In this sense, nationalism refers to a set of ideas 
and ideals about the nation. These ideas form collectively held thoughts and creeds, 
as well as ideologies which are more complex intellectual constructs. Gellner 
(1983: 1) describes nationalism as 
a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political 
ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state ... should not separate the power-
holders from the rest (1983:1) 
This definition reveals the importance he places on the link between the culturally 
circumscribed nation and the state. This link is an aspiration rather than an 
accomplishment. Although Gellner stresses the necessity of nation and state to 
correspond, he also recognises the fact that only a few nationalisms satisfy this 
condition. He acknowledges that 'many of the potential nations of this world live, 
or until recently have lived, not in compact territorial units but intermixed with each 
other in complex patterns' (1983: 2). Such a mix gives rise to different forms of 
nationalism in that there is a general recognition that 'a territorial political unit can 
only become an ethnically homogeneous unit ... if it either kills, or expels, or 
assimilates all non-nationals'. The most important constituent parts of nationalist 
sentiments and ideologies are, therefore, the relationship between culture and 
12 
political structure. Intense communication, industrial division of labour, and mass 
education, according to Gellner, created the pre-conditions for the emergence of 
nationalism — the ideology that links culture and the state. 
The link, we may add, is not just between the culturally/ethnically circumscribed 
'people' and the territorially circumscribed state in general, but often between 
particular aspects of ethnic culture (e.g. religion or language) and the particular 
form of the state (e.g. dictatorship or republic). The political form of the state 
becomes the issue of focus for all nationalisms because this form is closely related 
to the socio-cultural functions of the state. The state is seen as a 'natural political 
container' of nations and the principal defender of national cultures. 
In contrast Greenfeld's (1992:7) discussion of the nature, origins and forms of 
nationalism is more encompassing. She sees nationalism as a principle of social 
integration and as an 'emergent phenomenon' that is determined by specific socio-
historical circumstances, including cultural and political changes. The underlying 
feature of nationalism is a specific integrative ideology. The idea that lies at the 
core of nationalism is the idea of the 'nation' as a distinctive 'people' who form an 
'elite' and see themselves as brothers and sisters. This makes nationalism a potent 
ideological foundation for all sorts of egalitarian collectivisms. 
2:2.1 Nation 
As Greenfeld (1992) shows the concept of 'nation' has undergone a number of 
semantic transformations as its meaning has been reinterpreted and reconstructed 
over time. By tracking the origin of the word 'nation' and its correlates with 
'people' and 'country', Greenfeld traces our modern understandings to 16th century 
England. The word 'nation' (used at the Council of Lyon to mean 'an elite') was 
applied to the population of the country and became synonymous with the word 
'people'. Such a 'semantic transformation signaled the emergence of the first 
nation in the world, in the sense in which the word is understood today, and 
launched the era of nationalism' in 18 th  — 19 th century Europe. Once 'nation' lost its 
meaning as an 'elite' and was applied to the population of a country, the term 'the 
'people' lost its derogatory connotation' and 'acquired the meaning of the bearer of 
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sovereignty, the basis of political solidarity and the supreme objects of loyalty' 
(Greenfeld 1992: 6-7). Inherent in such an understanding is the fundamental 
recognition of the equality among various strata and the implicit recognition of the 
principles of democracy, sovereignty and solidarity that enable the nation to 
engender a sense of community. Nation is based on 'a collectivity and a unity, a 
present and a future' that is forged together and will only work if all the different 
voices are heard. In other words 'nation' becomes synonymous with 'sovereignty' 
and, in some ideological renditions, 'democracy' (see also Davidson 1997: 7). 
All students of nationalism agree that the concept of nation engenders a sense of 
belonging. 'Where you belong is where you are safe; and where you are safe is 
where you belong' (Ignatieff 1993: 6). The members of a nation have a strong 
sense of collective belonging; they form an inclusive community that is national - a 
community of shared sentiments that is closely related to the idea of a 'people'; that 
is, collectivities sharing a 'culture'. In other words, we have nations where there is 
a mutual recognition of a collective membership. 
National communities tend to have a number of special traits, including a strong 
link with a territory and cultural heritage. According to Kymlicka, a nation is 'a 
historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given 
territory, or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture' (in Beiner 1999: 
122). Guibernau's (1996: 47) definition also includes a social-psychological 
dimension. He describes a nation as 'a human group conscious of forming a 
community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, 
having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to 
rule itself'. Nations have the power to engender that sense of belonging or group 
consciousness, as well as the capacity to transmit an ideology of nationhood from 
generation to generation. Common culture not only forms the blueprint for the 
nation but also provides the nation with internal unity, as well as its own distinctive 
social form. Kymlicka describes such a form of culture as 'societal culture', and 
argues how societal culture is central to nation because it 
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provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, 
including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public 
and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared 
language (Kymlicka in Beiner 1999: 169). 
Cultures and cultural heritage give nations their distinctive quality. National 
cultures unite the past and present and at the same time are capable of being 
projected into the future. Therefore the images of nations evolve and adapt to 
changes within their environments. They may broaden their ethnic base, assimilate 
new groups, and acquire a multi-ethnic character. 
A common cultural heritage provides the blueprint for the re-creation of a symbolic 
order in society. That symbolic order is extremely variable but contains some 
common elements. The territory, for example, is regarded as sacred, even by 
diaspora nations; national boundaries separate one nation from another. Similarly, 
nations generally have their states, or their political forms, and states have the 
power to shape and transmit national cultures. Finally, the historical heritage 
provides a sense of identifying with a common past. Nationalisms combine these 
dimensions and shape the idea of the nation as a 'natural' entity; being 'nation less' 
is regarded as a pathological state — a form of cultural anomie. 
This is why the term 'nation' is often used jointly with 'state' as in 'nation state'. 
The correspondence between the two, however, can take many forms. Nations do 
not necessarily overlap with states. Many states today are multinational and some 
nations (often called 'nationalities') inhabit different states. In spite of this, it is 
widely assumed that modern nations are vitally dependent on the state. The state is 
an instrument of historical survival of the people, and the effectiveness of the state 
is the key factor in international relations. The state, according to Weber, is a 
nation's instrument of coercion — the bureaucratic apparatus that safeguards the 
national dominance and autonomy by monopolizing violence over national 
territories. It also safeguards national identity by regulating the claim of different 
ethnic groups to representation through the institutionalized national culture. 
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The modern nation is thus reliant on the state for the cultural transmission and 
political affirmation of national identity. Weber (1968) saw the main source of 
national identity in the language community, the primary vehicle of cultural 
expression and collective sentiments. The state, on the other hand, was also seen by 
Weber as a political force laying claim to powers (monopoly of violence) on a 
circumscribed territory. Nations needed to become nation states in order to defend 
the boundaries of the cultural community against erosion or assault by powerful 
neighbours, and in order to provide the moral foundations of internal unity (1968: 
395-98). 
This cultural-political role of the state is emphasized by Guibernau and Beiner. 
According to Guibernau, the nation state seeks to unite the people subjected to its 
rule by means of homogenization. Unity is established by creating a 'common 
culture, symbols, values, reviving traditions and myths of origins, and sometimes 
inventing them' (1996: 47). The nation state is, therefore, where the ultimate source 
of unity and authority rests. 
The state also serves in an 'expressive' capacity by actively reflecting a particular 
national identity in its symbols and institutions (Beiner 1999: 138). For many 
people a sense of belonging to a nation is an element in their 'precious fabric of 
identity'. This takes the form of 'not merely a consciousness of a continuity with 
the past, but also a will or hope for continuity into the future; and also 
consciousness of a form of cultural community that requires protection and 
expression in appropriate institutional forms'. The nation state is an expression of 
'what is ours', and 'what we have in common'; and it forms part of the national 
ideology (Beiner 1999: 200). It provides a sense of continuity, and distinctiveness, 
as well as identity and belonging. This state-enhanced national identity, as argued 
below, typically engenders a commitment to a particular form of the state. 
2:2.2 National identity 
Collective identities, reflect patterns of social bonds and collective attachments - a 
sense of belonging. They reflect a number of social categories to which we belong: 
collective identities can be attached to 'familial, territorial, class, religious, ethnic 
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and gender roles' (Smith 1991:4). Social identities tend to be organized into 
hierarchies from the most central ('master') to the more peripheral. They are 
enacted or embraced depending on the particular social situation, with 'master-
identities' enacted most frequently over a wide range of situations. 
National identity is one of the most important modern 'master identities'. It 
involves a sense of belonging and attachment to a 'nation' understood as a 
distinctive people. Poole (1999: 69) argues that 'a major source of the strength of 
national identity has been its inescapability'. Everyone is suppose to belong to a 
nation — it is like a gender identity. With progressing modernization, national 
identity has become widespread and taken for granted. The referent of this identity, 
nation, has been described as an imagined political community 'because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, 
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion' (Anderson 1983: 6). A national identity is constructed depending on 
the relationship of the individual to the collectivity. This can be based on belonging 
to a particular culture, the sharing of a particular tradition or way of life. Nativist 
national identity, a derivative of ethno-nationalism, stresses ascribed characteristics, 
such as being born in a particular country and having lived most of one's life in that 
country (Jones 1997: 294). Such forms of national identity reinforce traditions and 
see the state as a unique supporter-defender of a particular 'national culture'. In 
contrast, a 'civic national identity' refers to a sense of identification with ethnically 
'neutral' national institutions - laws, political and constitutional bodies which are 
key elements of the state. It is more in keeping with ethno-cultural diversity and it 
helps to accommodate socio-cultural difference. Civic national identification is 
characterised by a 'commitment to basic social institutions ..., the rule of law and 
equality before the law, freedom of the individual, freedom of speech, religious and 
other forms of tolerance ... and equality of opportunity'(Jones 1997: 302). 
Before discussing this distinction in more detail, it is necessary to elaborate another 
pair of concepts: identities and identification. Identities involve the entire self; 
identifications are more partial, conditional and role-specific. Attachment to the 
nation based on ethno-cultural membership typically engenders strong national 
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identity. This is because it is all-encompassing and because it is based on cultural 
attributes passed on at an early age: language, history, shared traditions and 
customs. In contrast, attachment to one's society based on voluntary commitment 
to the laws and institutional framework of that society tends to produce 
identifications. Identifications are rational-functional, partial and typically 
situational. Their referent is a functional collectivity whose membership is based on 
the economic, social, and political institutional order. Identification implies that 
what holds a group together is not 'deep' cultural 'roots' but common laws, political 
commitments and institutions. The mutual co-dependency between individuals is 
therefore strengthened by the recognition of cultural difference. The sense of 
togetherness that underlies identifications may be a shared occupational position, 
legal status or formal citizenship. 
Identities and identifications are therefore treated here as 'pair concepts' and 
referents of two types of national sentiments: ethnic nationalism and civic 
nationalism respectively. That brings us to the point of distinguishing between 
different types of nationalism and national identities/identifications. 
2:3 Types of nationalism 
Studies of nationalism as a popular outlook, focus on two opposing types of 
national sentiments — ethnic and civic (e.g. Greenfeld 1992, Nairn 1995, Zubrzycki 
2002). Although in reality they overlap, the way the characteristics and the 
nationalist spirit is expressed in each form differs substantially. While we highlight 
the differences, we also stress their ideal-typical nature; different forms of 
nationalism cannot be generalised empirically, but must be seen in context whereby 
'one conception rather than another one predominates' (Zubrzycki 2002: 287). 
Greenfeld (1992) charts the origins of nationalism and its trifurcation into distinct 
socio-historical types. Nationalism, according to her, originated in 16th  century 
England, as a response to social turmoil and civil strife. As the word 'nation' 
meaning 'a sovereign people' was applied to other populations and countries other 
than England, 'nation' changed its meaning to signify 'a unique sovereign people' 
(1992: 4-9). The two meanings 'a sovereign people' and 'a unique sovereign 
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people' tended to coexist and give rise to two radically different forms of national 
sentiments. Greenfeld's typology in fact identifies three different types of 
nationalism (see Figure 2:1). Ethnic nationalism can only be collectivistic-
authoritarian in its orientation (Type III). Civic nationalism is either individualistic 
(Type I), or collectivistic (Type H). Individualistic nationalism can only be civic, 
while a collectivistic type of nationalism may be civic in its focus but more often it 
is ethnic in its focus. 
Orientation Focus 
Civic Ethnic 
Individualistic-libertarian Type I Void 
Collectivistic-authoritarian Type II Type III 
Figure 2:1 Three types of nationalism as proposed by Greenfeld (1992) 
This, Greenfeld stresses, is an ideal-typical distinction; in reality, different types of 
nationalism coexist and mix. One predominates over the other depending on 
specific socio-historical conditions. The resulting mixes — and this is an important 
point for my argument - affect the socio-political complexion of nations. The 
important distinction between the two mixes (civic and ethnic) is in their 
relationship to democracy and the constitution of the state. 'Sovereignty of the 
people' means that the people actually exercise sovereignty as members of the 
nation; the national principle that typically emerges is, therefore, individualistic. 
That is, sovereignty of the people is the actual sovereignty of individuals — citizens 
conceived as members of a nation. 
The implication of 'a unique sovereign people' is that the uniqueness of the people 
translates into meaning that the nation-collectivity, and not individual citizens, is 
sovereign. Therefore, the national principle is collectivistic and 'collectivistic 
ideologies are inherently authoritarian, for when the collectivity is seen in unitary 
terms, it tends to assume the character of a collective individual possessed of a 
single will, and someone is bound to be its interpreter' (1992: 11). 
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Greenfeld pinpoints the characteristic tendencies within different types of 
nationalism, which assists in identifying the conditions under which they emerge 
and develop. She also points to their different socio-political correlates, especially 
different forms of the state. Civic types of national sentiments tend to coincide with 
republican preferences. This, however, is only a tendency reflected in typicality. 
2:3.1 Ethnic nationalism 
Ethnic nationalism refers to a commitment, and a sense of belonging, to a nation 
seen as an ethnically homogenous 'people'. Co-nationals share culture and 
tradition, and the state is seen as a carrier-articulator and defender of the unique 
national culture and tradition. Greenfeld (1992) refers to this type of nationalism as 
'collectivistic-authoritarian'. Such nationalism, she argues, is typically transmitted 
by indoctrination and maintained by suppression of cultural minorities. Minority 
cultures tend to be seen from the ethno-national perspective as a threat to 'national 
unity'. The state may tolerate them, but only as transitory ( to be assimilated) or as 
a historical 'imperfection' and as a residue of the past. The core mission of the 
ethno-national state is to nurture and defend the 'unique national culture and 
tradition'. 
Each nationalism represents a different set of historical circumstances associated 
with its origins. The roots of ethnic nationalism have been identified with the 
German Romantic tradition of Volksgemeinschaft, civic nationalism has been linked 
with the French Enlightenment tradition. This is reflected in the social identities 
they engender. 
The German nation, contrarily to the French, remains "closed", exclusive, since membership is 
determined by ethnic origins, thus by birth. One is born a German; one cannot become one or at 
least, only with much greater difficulty than one becomes French (Zubrzycki 2002: 279). 
In Germany, 'the cultural nation precedes political unity. Statehood must be 
attained in order to preserve the genius of the nation'. Ethnic nationalism, 
therefore, promotes and maintains the homogeneity of the nation through exclusion 
of cultural 'others' — 'Germany is for the Germans' (2002:279). 
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Greenfeld (1992) also cites Germany and Russia as examples of nation states that 
embraced ethnic nationalism. Both nations experienced significant historical 
developments that provided the conditions conducive to mobilizing collectivistic 
and ethnic principles as status-enhancing measures. The strength of an ethnic form 
of nationality is that 'collectivistic nationalism allows one to partake in the dignity 
of a far greater, stronger and more perfect being, the brilliance of whose virtues has 
the power to blind one to one's own failings' (1992:490). 
The central component in defining ethnic nationalism, as noted above, is the unique 
culture of a nation. Such a culture typically includes not only 'cultural markers' 
such as language, religion, customs and traditions, but also manners, dress, rituals, 
norms of behaviour and systems of belief (Jary & Jary 1991: 138). As the 
subjective significance of each of these attributes waxes and wanes for the members 
of a community, so does the cohesion and self-awareness of the community's 
membership. As these attributes come together and become more intense and 
salient, so does the sense of ethnic identity and, with it, an ethnic community. 
Conversely, as each of these attributes is attenuated and declines, so does the overall 
sense of ethnicity. 
Another way of expressing it is to say that ethnic nationalism engenders attachment 
to a 'people' imagined as a distinctive ethnic community. For Smith (1991: 21), 
there are six main attributes of an ethnic community: a collective proper name, a 
myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, differentiating elements of 
common culture, an association with a specific 'homeland', and a sense of solidarity 
for significant sectors of the population. The more a given community shares or 
possesses these attributes the more closely does it approximate the ideal type of an 
ethno-national community. 
Ethnic nationalism develops when the cultural and structural elements of a specific 
context promote a community of race, language, culture and history — that is the 
'idea of a native people's community'. Nationhood of the ethnic variety develops 
in peculiar political circumstances, such as from the tensions and conflicts of 
military campaigns. Zubrzycki (2002: 280) suggests that during the Napoleonic 
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Wars and the Franco Prussian War (1870/71) 'both conceptions of the nation were 
used to legitimize the antagonistic parties' respective territorial claims'. For 
Germany, in particular, the war against France fuelled particular ideologies that 
were peculiar to the German nation. The anti-French mentality infused specific 
values based on a cultural communal bond. These were forged together by the 
Romantic movement and a specific type of religious commitment. This 
commitment, according to Greenfeld (1992: 363), was based on the Lutheran 
philosophy that stressed personal piety over religious formality. What was clear 
was that 'the triumph of Germany was willed by God, and that everyone had to toil 
without rest and do his part in helping to bring this triumph about. Patriotism was 
piety'. This appealed to the Germans who could read: the educated. At the same 
time those 'Romantic ideals were "nationalized" and represented as the reality 
peculiar to the German people, language, and land'. 
The identity of the people and the formation of the nation alters as a result of 
significant changes from events such as war, exile, religious conversion, influx of 
immigrants, political intervention and the introduction of mass literacy. Political 
intervention has in some cases supported ethnic identities and in other cases has 
been able to break up or cut across ethnic associations. Mass migration can also 
have a similar effect by challenging existing national identities and disturbing the 
existing social order. It is however, as Smith illustrates (1991: 39), a state's ethnic 
core that often shapes the character and boundary of the nation. For some nations 
such as Australia, United States and Canada the national core was transplanted. The 
nation in each case was shaped by a transported form of nationalism — that is each 
was formed around a dominant ethnie and that dominant ethnie provided an already 
established cultural charter for the nation. How each nation evolved and developed 
that cultural charter over time depended on specific socio-historical influences 
which gave rise to different forms of nationalism and variants of a civic form of 
nationalism. 
2:3.2 Ethnic nationalism in Australia 
As argued in more detail in Chapter 5 below, ethnic nationalism in Australia 
developed in two parallel forms; a 'transplanted' British-derived 'Anglo-Celtic' 
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nationalism, and a nationalism that can be described as distinctly Australian — an 
'ethno-nativistic' form of nationalism. The first flourished under colonial 
conditions where Australia remained dependent economically and politically on 
Britain. The Australian colonists, unlike the American colonists, did not rebel 
against the mother country, and therefore found it much easier to accept the British 
racial and cultural heritage as the basis for their idea of nationalism. In fact, the 
British ideology made more sense in Australia than in Britain. The British 
experience was not of one people but of peoples in conflict — the English, Welsh, 
Scots and Irish retained a specific sense of belonging that incorporated their own 
homelands, languages, traditions and ways of life. 
In Australia on the other hand the transplanted migrants from the British Isles mixed together in 
their new homeland and in many respects homogenised their traditions, the English tending to 
prevail and the Irish Catholic to be the most resistant. Consequently Britishness as an idea had more 
relevance for Australia than the United Kingdom (Meaney 2000: 82). 
It is not surprising therefore, that the British nationalist ideology remained the 
dominant ideology in Australia in the early colonial period. Membership of the 
collectivity was restricted to those who embraced the 'original' culture, and at the 
same time served to exclude the indigenous populations. 
From the 1850s onwards, however, a new type of nativist nationalism developed 
based on opposition to the close identification with the colonial centre of authority. 
This took the form of a cultural rebellion that focused on an independent Australia, 
and lead to the formation of the Australian Natives Association in 1871. The 
Association helped to mobilize the natives' opposition to their status as colonials. It 
reinforced 'the ideal that Australia should be free of old world social divisions'. 
What developed was an Australian nationalism that embodied this challenge and 
promoted Australians as a distinctive people; a community. This community 'was 
to be a "better", more progressive entity than Britain itself. Britain was part of the 
"old world"; they represented the new'. At the same time Australia's membership 
of the British Empire was reconciled as 'one of a voluntary union of independent 
states, to which each would contribute on larger issues, imperial foreign policy and 
defence matters' (Birrell 1995: 90-97). 
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Citizenship supported and enhanced this type of development and acted as an 
effective mechanism for controlling entry into the Australian collectivity. It 
reinforced a particular type of cultural dominance that was predominantly white and 
Brito-Australian. An ethno-nativist form of nationalism became entrenched. It was 
able to flourish because, unlike the American experience where the constitution 
seeks to protect the individual from the state through a Bill of Rights, Australia's 
citizenship rights were decentralised and fragmented; they were, 'deliberately left to 
Commonwealth and state parliaments and governments' and not constitutionalised 
(Galligan 1998: 17-18). Australia's Aborigines were therefore able to be excluded 
on the grounds that they did not belong to Australia's family. In order to gain entry 
to the 'national family' Australia's Aborigines were required to show 'how "white" 
they had become as "proof" of civilisation', or they could also gain entry by 
showing how well they had 'learnt to play the Anglo-Celtic white man's rules of the 
game'. This meant that Aborigines had to meet at least the same sort of criteria as 
any 'alien' applying for naturalisation in Australia. In fact, 'the Aborigine was 
worse off since that citizenship could be revoked at discretion, whereas that of an 
"alien" was virtually unassailable once granted' (Davidson 1997: 206-207). 
The dominance of an ethno-nativist form of nationalism remained prominent in 
Australia up until the demise of the White Australia policy in the 1960s. This was 
in contrast to America where 'nativist sentiments were not widespread' and 
uniformity on the part of the leadership remained half hearted (Greenfeld 1992: 
483). An inclusive, well defined, form of citizenship and civic form of nationalism 
experienced in America explains in part why 'there is no debate in the USA today 
about whether an American identity does or should exist, while such discussion is 
common in Australia' (Freeman & Jupp 1992: 15). 
In the Australian context, therefore, nativist ethno-nationalism can be defined as a 
derivative of colonial ethno-nationalism. It encourages a type of identity that 
stresses the importance of being born and having lived most of one's life in a 
particular country because only such thorough 'immersion' guarantees proper 
acculturation (Jones 1997: 294). Although cultural attributes form the basis of 
ethnic nationalism, it is birth and residency which engender and reinforce the 
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cultural heritage and at the same time give a sense of legitimacy and meaning to an 
ethno-nativist form of nationalism. Civic nationalism — to which we now turn - has 
quite different socio-cultural and socio-political overtones. 
2:3.3 Civic nationalism 
Civic nationalism involves a sense of belonging and commitment to a nation 
conceived of as either a 'society', an association of citizens sharing the same 
institutions, or a libertarian 'nation state'. It marks a shift in emphasis from 
common roots to common laws as the central identifier and as a basis of a bond 
with the nation. While ethnic nationalism tends to regard cultural minorities as a 
threat, civic nationalism has the capacity to accept cultural differences and develop 
a sense of wide cultural inclusiveness. The individual's entry to the civic national 
collectivity is typically based on a shared respect for the key social and political 
institutions such as laws and political systems. For civic nationalists, membership 
in the national collectivity is, therefore, open and voluntary. Greenfeld (1992) 
refers to civic nationalism as typically 'individualistic-libertarian' since as members 
of a nation individuals have rights that even state authorities have to respect. Even 
the collectivistic forms (Type II) accept cultural pluralism as a feature of national 
collectivity. 
England, according to Greenfeld (1992) is where a civic form of nationalism 
originated. In fact, by the 17 th century, England, Greenfeld argues (1991: 480-90), 
was a nation that owed its transformation to the pervasiveness of politics that 
centred on democratic ideals; 'the right of the individual conscience, the liberty of 
man, the autonomy of the rational being' were absorbed into the culture and 
considered supreme values. They became firmly entrenched as part of the 'people's 
very identity' and were inclusive and open to all. That intense mobility of ordinary 
people was sustained over a long period of time and the continuous regrouping of 
the social structure resulted in a process whereby a particular type of national 
identity — a civic identity — became accepted as it appealed to more and more 
people. 
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English nationalism was given a substantial boost by the Protestant Reformation. 
The Reformation movement played a significant role in providing fertile grounds 
for the development of nationalism and the emergence of a civic form of 
identification. It stimulated literacy and education by making people read — reading 
'was elevated and acquired a totally new dignity'. Education 'was a great 
equalizer', it caused a general redefinition of the social hierarchy by drawing 
together people from 'very different walks of life'. Education had the capacity to 
blur 'distinctions between previously sharply distinguished strata'. It provided the 
time for English nationalism to gestate and permeate every sphere of political and 
cultural life (Greenfeld 1992: 49, 86-87. 
France, according to Greenfeld, is also an example of a nation where a civic form of 
nationalism evolved, but the form of French nationalism was collectivistic rather 
than individualistic. The socio-historical conditions in France gave rise to a model 
that exemplified a mixed heritage. Frances's national identity was first derived 
from a religious identity. Subsequently, it shifted to the royal domain and later to 
the concept'of the 'state'. It remained civic, but collectivistic and state-focused. 
The main propagators of French civic nationalism were intellectual elites who were 
drawn to nationalism in opposition to aristocratic privilege. 
In France, as in England, education played a significant role in fostering a civic but 
collectivistic and statist type of national identity. In fact, in the 18 th  century 'the 
aristocracy appropriated education as a quality peculiar to it' and redefined itself as 
a 'cultural elite' (1992: 148). As education became a necessary condition for 
success, 'the literate and semi-literate population in France, the groups that 
constituted the 'bourgeoisie' or the middle class,' realized that 'their personal 
destinies depended on the existence of the nation'. They were therefore prepared to 
take full advantage of it. 
They welcomed nationalization of identity. They were receptive to ideas of active membership in 
the political community, the guaranteed ability to exert influence on public policy which affected 
their lives, respect for themselves as individuals, liberty and equality in the English sense of these 
words. A nation defined as a unity of free and equal members both rendered legitimate these 
heretofore unthinkable bourgeois aspirations and made their realization possible (Greenfeld 1992: 
184). 
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In France, the nation was personified not just as a nation, it was 'the Great nation, la 
Grande Nation, the most national of nations' (1992: 188). In many ways, the 
primacy of the nation state over the individual imposed general uniformity in 
national identification. The French conception of nation was 'developed within a 
centralizing (national) state' whereby the political nation precedes the cultural 
unification, and the state is in charge of the communalization (Vergemeinschaften) 
of the political tie (Gesellschaft): Entry into the collectivity was relatively open 
and voluntary. It reinforced the notion that 'one could be French independently of 
his or her ethnic origins', and that 'the state was responsible for the cultural 
homogenization of the citizenry' (Zubrzycki 2002: 279). 
In France and England the idea of the nation was articulated first by social, political, 
and cultural elites. Only later was it passed on to the masses. Mass education was 
central in the transmission of these civic ideals. It acted as a liberalising force and 
played a critical role in the emergence of and changing form of nationalism 
(Greenfeld 1992, Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983). 
In Australia, however, that shift towards a civic form of nationalism took a slightly 
different path and occurred much later. One of the most important factors that 
stimulated the emergence of a civic form of nationalism in Australia was the mass 
inflow of non-British immigrants in the post-WW II period. The socio economic 
consequences of the arrival of non-British immigrants and their gradual social 
integration into the 'mainstream' population had a transformational effect on 
Australia's identity as a nation. Australian culture grew more diverse and tolerance 
of this diversity spread among urban social segments especially the younger 
generation. At the same time that shift was given a substantial boost by the 'baby-
boom' generation (those born between 1946 and 1959). The baby boomers were 
the recipients of resources provided by unprecedented economic growth during this 
period, they grew up in a rapidly diversifying culture and they benefited from an 
expansion in educational opportunities. The combined exposure to education, 
cultural diversity and prosperity, as was the case in England and France, had a 
liberalising affect. The baby boomers, as I argue later, tend to be more tolerant and 
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more secular in their outlook and more open to new ideas than their predecessors 
and followers. In Australia, therefore, immigration, generational replacement, 
educational upgrading, cultural diversification and secularization have been 
identified as central factors in the changing form of nationalism (Pakulski and 
Tranter 2000). Those factors in combination, according to Pakulski and Tranter 
(1999), have made Australia 'one of the most civic societies in the world'. In order 
to link these processes of social and cultural change with changes in political 
orientation it is necessary at this point to look more carefully at the process of 
transformation and social diffusion of popular national identities and identifications. 
2:4 Changing form of nationalism 
Nationalism changes when historical conditions change, when dominant social 
values are under question and when old identities begin to disintegrate. The 
stimulus comes typically from 'a crisis of identity within an influential group in 
society, in most cases an elite, the changes within which later affect society as a 
whole' (Greenfeld 1991: 336). Intellectuals and elites have the skills of critical 
discourse, they belong to the educated and have the ability to present ideas in such a 
way as to gain the acceptance and support of the public. Intellectuals articulate 
changes within a society. They couch those changes in language that the public can 
understand and absorb. Changes within a society occur through the intervention of 
significant events, such as those that I have already mentioned — war, exile, 
religious conversion, influx of migrants and political intervention (Smith 1991). 
Intellectuals play a central role in the change of mass identities by promoting ideas 
that create the incentive to adopt new identities — they popularize ideas and 
articulate a shift in values. Greenfeld (1992: 15-20) argues that a crisis of identity 
may arise when there is a sense of 'dissatisfaction with the traditional identity', and 
when there is 'a fundamental inconsistency between the definition of social order it 
express[es] and the experience of the involved actors'. Social action is typically 
mobilized by intellectuals and elites anchored in specific generations. Therefore the 
process of change is gradual and typically dependent on generational replacement. 
It may be violent and take the form of war, or it may be achieved by peaceful 
political interventions or reforms. As a result, the political form of the state can 
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change and take the form of a monarchy, a republic or a ethno-national 
(Volkgemeinschaftlich) dictatorship as was the case in Nazi Germany. 
Movements, typically led by intellectuals and politicians, play an important role in 
the transformation of popular national identities. They act as elite 'transmission 
belts' and carriers of generation-based mass national sentiments. As pointed out by 
Weber, such movements are dependent on intellectual leaders who articulate 
national ideas and instigate political change. They influence generations by acting 
as the key social 'carriers' of national sentiments; charismatic intellectuals are the 
key articulators of these sentiments. Social movements form the 'linkage' between 
the two. 
2:5 Generations as carriers of different types of nationalism 
As generations replace one another, they facilitate value transformations and 
changing national identities. Change is reflected in specific 'generational segments' 
— persons who have been exposed to similar formative experiences and therefore 
share similar orientations and attitudes. Generations are critical agents of change, 
including change in the nature of popular national identifications. 
For Mannheim (1972: 276-320) 'generation' was one of the key concepts in his 
sociology of knowledge and change. As Wirth (1952: xxx) states in his 
introduction to Mannheim's work, Mannheim seeks to throw light on the question 
of how the interests and purposes of certain social groups and generational 
segments come to find expression in certain theories, doctrines, and social and 
intellectual movements. He shows how ideas carried by specific classes, strata and 
generations can either maintain the status quo or challenge the existing social order. 
Nationalism, I argue after Mannheim, is a crucial element of these critical ideas, and 
generations are the key carriers of nationalist sentiments. 
Generations have to be ideologically constructed before they become 'social 
actualities'. This happens when 'a concrete bond is created between members of a 
generation by their being exposed to the social and intellectual symptoms of a 
process of dynamic de-stabilization'. Individuals constitute an actual generation 
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when they are united, when they participate in the 'social and intellectual currents 
of their society' and have 'an active or passive experience' of the forces that 
contribute to a new situation (Mannheim 1972: 303-304). Intellectuals play an 
important role in this process of generational articulation. They are instrumental in 
forming generational units. 
A generation unit is a more coherent social grouping which tends 'to impose a much 
more concrete and binding tie on its members because of the parallelism of 
responses it involves'. Members of such a unit 'see things from its particular 
"aspect", endow concepts with its particular shade of meaning, and experience 
psychological and intellectual impulses in the configuration characteristic of the 
group'. It is characterised by 'an identity of responses, a certain affinity in the way 
in which all move with and are formed by their common experiences'. At the same 
time, 'within any generation there can exist a number of differentiated, antagonistic 
generation-units'. This explains tensions that exist between different groups over 
specific social issues. Those tensions are influenced by shared experiences and 
political outlooks of each group, which in turn shape their response to different 
forms of identification (1972: 306-7). 
Some of these ideas, especially the notion of generational units and segments as 
carriers of specific value configurations was also identified by Inlgehart (1977). 
Inglehart, argues that the 'baby boom' generation in advanced Western societies 
shows a distinctive configuration of value preferences. Those preferences include a 
strong endorsement of participatory democratic practices and a high degree of 
libertarianism that contrast with the value orientations and attitudes of the war 
generations. That shift in values can be attributed to the fact that the 'baby boom' 
generation was advantaged in terms of peace, economic security and educational 
opportunities. The baby boom generation can be described as more receptive of 
liberal orientations and also more likely to become politically active and join social 
movements. 
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2:6 Nationalist movements 
National sentiments and identities are typically carried and promoted by movements 
based on generational segments. Leaders of such movements highlight particular 
aspects of nationalism through the displacement of one type of sentiment by 
another. Movement events create political platforms for public intellectuals with 
similar sensitivities and identifications. The key role in such movements, as 
recognized by Weber and Mannheim, is played by organizations ('parties') and 
their leaders. This point has been subsequently elaborated by 'resource 
mobilization' (RM) and 'new social movement' (NSM) theorists. 
The resource mobilization perspective was developed mainly in the 1960s and 
1970s by students of the civil rights movement in the US. It concentrates on the 
organizational aspects of social movements and on mustering resources to achieve 
movement goals. Successful social movements, according to RM theorists, have 
strong organizational backbones. Organizations are necessary for social movements 
to operate strategically, to be goal-orientated, to provide coherent leadership, and to 
respond to the political environment in a flexible way. Doug McAdam, Jo 
Freeman, Louise Zurcher and Russell Curtis all stress the importance of 
organizations in effectively deploying various political and social resources. They 
show how organizational activists and leaders disseminate collective identities, and 
forge goals and strategies. Social movement organizations (SMOs), they argue, 
take in the broader socio-political context as well as the constraints that impact on 
the mobilization process. Those constraints include prevailing dominant values, 
relationship to target groups, available opportunities and effects on the public. 
SMOs seize political opportunities for effective mobilization and transform protests 
into change-oriented action. They sustain pressure, translate public sentiments into 
reform programs, and give rise to new political elites. They also foster leadership 
dedicated to maintaining consensus and unity, as well as influencing policy by 
mobilizing a broad range of material and non-material resources (Pakulski 1991: 
13). 
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SMOs are linked by communication networks that aid movements in attracting new 
members. Networks are an essential resource in that they 'largely determine the 
pattern, speed and extent of movement expansion'. If the network is established 
before a movement emerges, the likelihood of the emergence of a successful social 
movement is very high because networks help in disseminating information and 
facilitating concerted action. The existence of networked groups 'ensures the 
presence of recognized leaders who can be called upon to lend their prestige and 
organizing skills'. Networks also provide consistency, persistence and intellectual 
coherence, and they are crucial to the survival of the movement (McAdam 1988: 
715-716). 
SMOs give meaning and direction to the movement by adapting a typically 
hierarchical and highly routinized structure to maximize their efficiency in 
collecting money, activating members, and mobilizing resources. Such a structure 
'highlights the importance of individual entrepreneurs in creating and directing 
these organizations. SMOs often would not exist without the initiative of a single 
individual or group of people, even though public interest in the cause may be 
longstanding' (McAdam 1988: 716). They articulate goals, forge strategies, 
mobilize resources and influence authorities. In all these tasks movement 
organizations compete with other movements and with organized pressure groups 
within the social and political environment. 
McAdam (1988) sees the role of SMOs as mediators between the larger macro-
environment and a set of micro-dynamics on which the movement depends. At the 
macro level the task of the SMO is to 'negotiate a niche for itself within the larger 
organizational environment'. This entails a complex set of relationships with actors 
representing 'the movement, the state, counter movements, the media, and the 
general public'. At the same time, SMOs continue to mobilize at the micro level. 
The way SMOs mediate these twin micro and macro challenges is by implementing 
goals and tactics. 'In effect, goals and tactics are the principal tools a SMO uses to 
shape its external environment while simultaneously attending to the ongoing 
demands of micro-mobilization' (McAdam 1988: 716). 
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Resource mobilization theorists have adopted the Weberian heritage in a rather 
selective manner. While they have elaborated the organizational conditions of 
movement success (i.e. mobilization of political resources) they have underplayed 
another key Weberian theme — the role of elites as 'articulators of ideas' and 
political leaders. This aspect has been developed by some of the 'new social 
movement' (NSM) theorists to whom we must now turn. 
2:7 Intellectuals and movement organization 
All movements, including nationalist movements, rely on public intellectuals to 
provide movements with consistent plans of action, strategy, tactics, identity and 
cohesion. Public intellectuals are those people who take an active part in the 
debates on major policy issues through the mass media. In Australia they are made 
up of key academics and politicians. Politicians usually have privileged access to 
the media but not all can be regarded as public intellectuals only those who combine 
their political role with media pronouncements and high education. Gouldner (1979) 
argues that highly-educated people have learned the culture of careful and critical 
discourse which forms a common bond between those intellectuals who use it. 
Intellectuals are recognised as being instrumental in coining the movement's 
programs and in articulating new ideas which are then filtered to the public. These 
activities, according to Eyerman & Jamison (1991) constitute 'cognitive praxis'. 
Cognitive praxis refers to 'the concepts, ideas and intellectual activities that give 
social movements their cognitive identity' (1991: 3). This is a crucial aspect of 
movement activity, and a key factor of movement success, because social 
movements 
express shifts in the consciousness of actors as they are articulated in the interactions between 
activists and their opposition(s) in historically situated political and cultural contexts. The content of 
this consciousness, what we call the cognitive praxis of a movement, is thus socially conditioned: it 
depends upon the conceptualization of a problem which is bound by the concerns of historically 
situated actors and on the reactions of their opponents. In other words, social movements are the 
result of an interactional process which centres around the articulation of a collective identity which 
occurs within the boundaries of a particular society (Eyerman & Jamison 1991:4). 
Eyerman and Jamison (1991) see movement intellectuals as 'producers of 
knowledge', strategists, tacticians, political leaders and mobilizers of popular 
support ( 1991: 94). They provide social movements with direction, strategic 
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consistency, programmatic cohesion and political leadership. Most importantly, 
movement intellectuals articulate the 'knowledge interests' of a social movements, 
that is, the movement's specific domains of concern, goals, and objectives. In 
societies permeated by the mass media, the quality of cognitive praxis is the main 
determinant of successful mobilization of resources and, ultimately, the movement's 
political success or failure. 
In modern industrial societies, movement intellectuals operate in the context of 
communication dominated by the mass media. Social movements have grown 
increasingly dependent on the media through which their goals and objectives are 
communicated to supporters and sympathisers. Not only do the media allow for 
such information to reach a greater audience, but they also help reform intellectual 
life 'as the commercial and public media discover a movement, new roles and new 
actors come to the fore' (Eyerman & Jamison 1991:100-101). 
With less direct contact between social movement supporters and leadership, the 
media have become critical in constituting a relationship between social 
movements, political opponents and the public. The media have become the 
dominant channel through which intellectuals communicate with one another and 
with the public. The media also provide the opportunity for movements to win the 
trust and support of the mass audience and to interact strategically with its 
opponents. The fact that there is less direct contact between individual social 
movement supporters and the representative leadership make elite-centred 
organizations more effective when it comes to contending with unknown and 
largely unsympathetic, and at times indifferent, mass publics. 
Intellectuals, who are typically movement leaders and activists are instrumental in 
mobilizing political resources and in seizing opportunities for effective 
mobilization. Rucht (1996: 188-90) distinguishes three dimensions of these 
opportunities: cultural, social and political. The cultural opportunities refer to 
values and their resonance amongst cultural groups in the population. Social 
opportunities refer to conditions that facilitate or restrict the forming of collective 
identity and building movement structures. The political opportunity structure 
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refers to factors such as 'access to the polity, political alignments, presence or 
absence of allies, and conflict among elites' (1996: 190). 
Public intellectuals and movement leaders also strengthen consensus through 
constructing collective action frames, that is, discursive constructs which identify 
injustice, attribute responsibility and propose solutions. Social movements direct 
their 'frames towards action, and fashion them at the intersection between a target 
population's culture and their own values and goals' (Tarrow 1994: 123). This is 
done through the process whereby appropriate culturally encoded symbols are 
selected by movement leaders. By choosing the appropriate symbols with which to 
frame its message, movement leaders set a strategic course between cultural setting, 
political opponents, the radicals and the ordinary citizens whose support it needs. 
Sidney Tarrow, Dieter Rucht and Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison bring into 
focus a key element in the movement's socio-political context including political 
elites. Movement success, they argue, depends vitally on the relationships between 
movement leaders, intellectuals, mass publics and political elites. 
2:8 Importance of elites 
The classic elite theorists (Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels) 
argued that elites were critical and an inevitable feature of all societies including 
modern mass democracies. They are also important in shaping political parties and 
mass social movements. In fact, elites are even more crucial in mass social 
movements, because movements typically rely on charismatic leadership. This 
view has been accepted by contemporary elite theorists. Elites, according to neo-
elitists, maintain their power and influence by virtue of their positions in powerful 
organizations, and social movements. These positions allow them to affect 
'national political outcomes individually, regularly, and seriously' (Burton & 
Higley 1984). 
The classic statements on the role of elites in modern democracy and in 
charismatically led mass social movements have been formulated by Max Weber 
(1978). Mass democracy enhances the power of both populists and bureaucrats. It 
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also prepares the ground for mass `plebisectarian' movements and leaders, 
including nationalist movements. They are aided by declining traditionalism and 
the associated growth of mass literacy and the popular press — all of which makes 
the 'mass' increasingly significant for modern politics. 
For Weber, mass involvement in the political process was shaped by demagogy. He 
rejected the views that massification of politics would be characterised 'by 
spasmodic and irrational [mass] intervention' unless responsible leadership 
collapsed. Massification, he added, does not aid participation. Universal suffrage, 
in fact, reinforced the centrality of what Weber refers to as the law of the small 
number', that is the centrality of elites. 
Policy is always determined by a few, who then involve others only to the extent that their support is 
judged necessary, a principle which is as true of democracies as any other form of government. The 
mass only become involved as a result of initiatives from above, never from below; their role is 
limited to that of response (Beetham 1985: 106). 
Weber and his students have pioneered the studies of movement mobilization and 
leadership. Movements (especially political and religious) are typically led by 
charismatic champions of great causes. The centrality of leadership in social 
movement organizations is also reflected in elite settlements and deals that affect 
ideological and institutional configurations in society. Therefore 'national elites' 
typically include leaders of social movements, political parties, and those who play 
a principal role in agencies such as government, the military, professional and 
religious organizations. For contemporary neo-Weberian elite theorists, the 
different configuration of elite power and the democratic competition between rival 
elite sections constitutes what is seen as the core of modern politics. 
In traditional societies charismatic leadership provided the dynamic and 
revolutionary element in mass mobilizations. This was evidenced in the 
mobilization of the Protestant movement that helped to break traditions and the 
institutional status quo. It prepared the way for rationalist capitalist development in 
Europe and the spread of nationalist sentiments (Weber 1968). In modern society, 
power is transferred from dominant status groups to increasingly bureaucratized 
organizations. Organizational power and leadership provide the impetus for 
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movement mobilization and social change. Such a process is evidenced in the rise 
of modem political and religious movements and in their subsequent `routinization' 
into regimes, parties, churches and sects. 
This is why in modern society political movements tend to be shaped by political 
parties and intellectuals have become the main charismatic political figures. Their 
organizational power and 'intellectual' charisma help in transforming public 
sentiments into a more cohesive vision that combines the solidarity of the people 
with the political form of the state. In fact, Brym (1980) in his study of left wing 
intellectuals and movements argues that intellectual charisma is increasingly based 
on knowledge and education. Similarly, Gouldner (1979) sees intellectuals as a 
'new class' with the potential for mobilizing powerful movements and attaining 
political domination. Intellectuals, according to him, become the carriers of 
progressive and emancipatory ideas, and act as reformists and instigators of change. 
Their power of persuasion is increasingly dependent on their holding positions in 
organizations (parties, pressure groups, lobbies, SMOs) and their regular access to 
the media. 
New elite theorists recognise the changed circumstances of elites in modern society. 
They contend that elites can never know with any certainty what an eventual 
outcome will do to the many groups on whose support they rely. In many instances 
non-elites shape the problems with which elites must deal. This draws our attention 
to the relationship between elites and non-elites. Elites are independent, but non-
elites have the capacity to place outer limits on their actions and non-elites depend 
on elites to carry out a program of action. The interdependent nature of elites and 
non-elites, therefore has the potential to cause division amongst elite factions 
(Burton & Higley 1984). 
2:9 Conclusion 
The theoretical streams outlined above — on popular nationalism, social movements, 
generations, elites and intellectuals — form the background for my analysis of the 
republican reform in Australia in the 1990s. They are incorporated into the tri-
partite model of effective political reform. Such reform, the model suggests, is 
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vitally dependent on appropriate mass orientations (public sentiments conducive to 
change), effective movement organization (conducting successful resource 
mobilization and seizing political opportunities) and on effective leadership 
combined with wide elite consensus. Civic nationalist sentiments in Australia, I 
argue, formed the generationally carried mass orientations that fostered the 
republican movement of the 1990s. Those sentiments were effectively captured and 
harnessed by the Australian Republican Movement, and transformed by pro-
republican intellectuals into a program of political reform. The reform program was 
negotiated with different segments of political elites at the national level. The lack 
of strategic consensus among the key sections of movement leaders (and political 
elites) resulted in the failure of the 1999 republican referendum. 
This interpretation - and the underlying model — is substantiated by empirical 
studies of popular pro-republican sentiments as expressed by the leaders and 
activists of the ARM. The causal model I am testing in chapter 4 is basically 
reflecting theories of civic nationalism as well as studies of voting behaviour. 
When analysing the ARM, I make frequent references to the points raised by 
resource mobilization theorists and students of 'political opportunity structure'. I 
show, for example, that the ARM was instrumental in the success of the national 
mobilization of public opinion. 
I also show that the key factors in the success of pro-republican movement 
mobilization was the effective leadership by public intellectuals, especially those 
related to the ALP. The importance of pro-republican intellectuals and political 
elites was apparent in Australia in the 1990s under Paul Keating's Prime 
Ministership. Keating revitalised the ALP by linking republicanism with the party 
program. This provided the ALP with a means of distinguishing itself from the 
Coalition as a 'progressive force' intent on redefining the identity and the political 
institutions of the nation. This process of re-definition was disrupted by the change 
of political leadership in March 1996. With a conservative Liberal leadership, the 
political opportunities and elite configuration changed significantly. Republican 
elites found that they were unable to maintain a high level of mobilization and 
internal strategic consensus. The ARM was perceived by some sectors of the 
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political elites as partisan. The new Coalition and the Prime Minister, openly 
opposed the republic. Moreover, the leaders of the republican movement were 
unable to secure wide elite consensus about the strategies and tactics of political 
reforms. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
The empirical part of the study involves an examination of the patterns and 
dynamics of public sentiments on 'national issues' and an analysis of elite views on 
a broad range of issues related to republican reform. Public sentiments and their 
social sources are best reflected in and studied through national social survey data. 
Such data provide a snapshot of public sentiments and attitudes towards the republic 
and the nation. They also allow for substantiating the model of political reform in 
terms of testing the link between socio-historical changes in Australia, civic 
nationalism and pro-republican attitudes. As well, the survey data help in 
identifying factors that contributed to a shift in Australia's identity as a nation in the 
post-WW II period. Factors such as increasing levels of education, immigration and 
the diversifying ethnic composition, the role of political elites and intellectuals, 
generational effects and a shift in values have been mentioned in the previous 
chapter as influencing the formation of national identities among mass publics. The 
analysis of survey data provides a confirmation of these influences thus 
strengthening the core argument of this study. 
Factors that influence popular attitudes towards the nation and the republican vote 
have been derived from studies of voting behaviour — the 'Michigan Model' in 
particular. This model gained prominence in the work of the University of 
Michigan's Survey Research Centre in the late 1950s. It specifies socio-
demographic attributes and family background characteristics as the 'base' and as a 
starting point of a 'funnel of causality'. These attributes, it is assumed, affect party 
identification and evaluation of party leaders — factors that are added to the 'base'. 
They form a 'perceptual screen' that extends through time and affects the way 
voters choose to vote on particular issues (Campbell et al 1960: 133). 
While used primarily in electoral studies, the model can be usefully applied in other 
studies of public opinion and attitudes. Here it is supplemented by Australian 
studies that draw attention to the role of occupation, subjective class identification, 
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religion and ethnicity as important influences on both voting behaviour and public 
attitudes in general (e.g. Gow and Stenner 1992: 13-14). Claims about the impact 
of these factors on attitudes to the nation, national identity and political preferences 
in general suggested by social theorists and commentators can be tested by 
including them as independent variables in the model where different types of 
nationalism and pro-republicanism are dependent variables. Regression techniques 
are used to gage the impact of 'blocks' of independent variables on these dependent 
variables. 
While public sentiments are assessed through the quantitative analysis of survey 
data, elite views are empirically examined using interview data collected for this 
study. Such qualitative data lend themselves much better to an interpretive analysis 
that covers the main aspects of meanings, motives and intentions as well as 
strategies, tactics and goals of the key actors. These actors are republican 
movement leaders and activists. Interviews with these leaders and core activists 
collected over 3 years reveal a diversity of views on the goals and strategies of the 
movement. The main hypothesis 'tested' in this part of the study concerns elite 
consensus. It is argued that a lack of strategic consensus was the key factor in the 
failure of the final part of the republican push (the referendum itself). The 
interpretive analysis substantiates this argument by following the standard 
procedures of indexing the key items, and identifying key phrases and typical 
interpretive frames. 
3:1 The survey data and the quantitative analytic model 
The survey data analysed in this research are taken from the 1999 Australian 
Constitutional Referendum Survey (ACRS). The ACRS used a disproportionate, 
stratified, probability sample drawn from the Australian electoral roll in October 
1999 1 . It was administered by mail, and collected between November 1999 and 
March 2000. As part of the Australian Election Study series, the ACRS 
investigated the Australian electorate's attitudes towards significant political issues 
The -ACRS was a disproportionate sample in terms of the relative size of the sub samples for each 
state, that is, the principal researchers 'over sampled' the smaller states, relative to population size. 
A weighting variable was included with these data to adjust the sample to be nationally 
representative. 
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surrounding the 1999 constitutional referendum. Those issues incorporated patterns 
of public identification, the republic and its specific features (Gow, Bean & 
McAllister 2000). The sample included 3431 respondents with at least 500 
respondents from each of the six Australian states 2 . The sampling strategy adopted 
by the ACRS researchers resulted in over-sampling of the smaller states and 
territories with respect to the larger states. They therefore included a weighting 
variable with these data to adjust the sample to be representative of Australia as a 
whole. The weighted sample has 2311 cases and all analyses that follow are 
calculated with weighted data. 
The regression models estimated for the purpose of multivariate analysis are of two 
types and, as different types of dependent variables are analysed, different 
regression techniques are required. Firstly, a series of models are estimated to 
examine the social and political bases of two forms of national identity. These two 
forms and their historical dynamics are central in my argument about the changing 
sentiments of the Australian public in the direction of wider acceptance of 
republicanism. 
In the initial stages of the multivariate analyses the 'ethno-nativist' variables (i.e. 
Tables 4:1; 4:2) and the 'civic' variables (i.e. Tables 4:3; 4:4) are treated as 
'dependent' variables in regression analyses. This is in order to 'test' the argument 
about their socio-historical sources. As these are continuous variables they are 
analysed using OLS regression. 3 Secondly, support for the republic as expressed in 
referendum voting (i.e. Republic voting 'Yes' contrasted with 'No') is modelled, 
and the results presented in Table 4:5. This is done in order to 'test' the argument 
about the impact of all factors, including the national sentiments, on pro-republican 
2 The sample were administered as follows: 1000 questionnaires sent to each of the six states, 100 
sent to the Australian Capital Territory, and 50 to the Northern Territory with the following 
responses NSW 507, Vic. 557, Old. 517, WA 548, SA 607, Tas. 588, ACT 57, NT 22 (Gow, Bean & 
McAllister 2000: viii). 
3 All dependent variables in the OLS regression models (i.e. in Tables 4:1 to 4:4) are scored to range 
between 0 and 100. Therefore the regression coefficients (b's) for each independent variable are 
interpretable as a percentage change on the dependent variable. 
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attitudes. As the republic vote variable is dichotomous,4 OLS regression is an 
inappropriate method, therefore logistic regression is utilized (see Agresti 1996). 
In the second voting regression models it must be stressed, the national identity 
variables are included, but on this occasion they are treated as independent 
variables, as I seek to model the association between background factors, identity 
types and referendum pro-republican voting. 
Perhaps the most problematic, and therefore deserving a separate comment, are the 
dependent variables constructed for the purpose of the analysis of different forms of 
national identity. They represent an ethno-nativist form and a civic form of national 
identity. I describe these variables in sections below. In the final stage of the 
analysis, national identity variables are included as independent variables to model 
referendum voting. 
The independent variables in the regression models reflect the theoretical claims 
discussed in chapter 2 as well as those identified by voting behaviour studies. They 
include levels of education, occupation, gender, respondent's country of birth, 
respondent's political party identification, religious denomination, and income as 
impacting on attitude formation. Moreover, background variables have been 
constructed to represent subjective social class, `postmaterialist values' and political 
ideology (left — right) as these aspects of social location are important influences 
upon national sentiments and voting behaviour. Predictor variables measure 
attitudes and feelings relating to political leaders in recognition of hypotheses that 
link forms of nationalism with elite views. Indeed, public attitudes towards the 
republic and identifications with the nation have been shown to have strong links 
with political party identifications and political leadership (McAllister 2001, Tranter 
2003). 
As mentioned, the analysis of survey data is derived from analyses of voting 
behaviour in the 'Michigan Model'. The strength of the model is that it facilitates 
causal analysis by introducing 'blocks' of independent variables and monitors their 
Voting is scored as a dummy variable for the logistic regression analyses. That is: Yes for a 
republic = 1; No = O. 
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impact in a systematic and controlled fashion (Campbell et al 1960: 14). The 
changes in the size of regression coefficients (or odds ratios) and the R 2 values help 
in assessing the relative impact of particular independent variables on key 
dependent variables. In order to draw causal conclusions, one needs to assume a 
time sequence (i.e. causes logically precede effects). This assumption is more 
justified in the case of background variables than, for example, attitudes to political 
leaders. While most observers suggest that elite persuasion and action affect public 
perception of republicanism and national sentiments, it may be the other way 
around. I signal this difficulty here and comment on it later. 
The model also allows for an assessment of the role of political elites in influencing 
public views on the republic. It is worth remembering that the ALP, particularly 
under the leadership of Paul Keating, was not only supportive of an Australian 
republic but paved the way for its introduction. 
3:2 The key variables and scales 
Two types of dependent variables are constructed from the survey data. The first 
relates to the republic and the second represents types of national identity and 
identification. The republic dependent variable measures support or otherwise for 
an Australian republic at the 6 th November 1999 referendum (i.e. referendum vote). 
The dependent variable 'referendum vote' is taken from the question 'In the 
Constitutional Referendum held on Saturday 6 November, did you vote YES or NO 
for Australia to become a republic?' The 'referendum vote' dependent variable 
provides the basis for measuring the strength of nationalist sentiment that is 
attached to the respondent's vote for an Australian republic. As the 'referendum 
vote' dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic regression analysis is an 
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appropriate technique for the analysis (Agresti 1996). Odds ratios are presented in 
order to facilitate the interpretation of the logistic regression estimates. 5 
Nationalist sentiment variables are constructed from the national identity section of 
the ACRS data. Given the range of meanings attached to national identity, several 
aspects have been operationalised to reflect different forms of nationalist sentiment 
with the emphasis placed on ethno-nativistic and civic types. Initially, four national 
identity variables are constructed from responses to two specific questions. The 
first question addresses the importance respondents attach to 'being truly 
Australian', and the second question focuses on particular issues that engender a 
sense of pride in Australia's achievements as a nation. Variables that measure what 
it means to be truly Australian have been extracted from the question 'Some people 
say the following things are important for being truly Australian. Others say they 
are not important. How important do you think each thing is?' 6 
In order to examine the underlying dimensionality of these variables, principal 
components analysis is employed (using varimax rotation). Tables 3: la and 3: lb 
show the factor loading for all identity variables, as well as descriptive statistics, 
(i.e. range, mean) and scale reliability coefficients (i.e. Cronbach's Alpha). 
Principal components analysis of the 7 variables measuring what it means to be 
'truly Australian' resulted in two factors (Table 3: la). The first factor shows that 
'living in Australia' being born in Australia' and 'being Christian' load on an 
5 Odds ratios are calculated as the exponential of the logits produced from each logistic regression 
equation. The odds ratios for dummy variables in Table 4:5 are interpretable in relation to their 
respective reference group (i.e. the category omitted from the equation). For example, in Model 2 
Table 4:5, those born in countries other than Australia and the UK are 1.5 times al likely as 
Australian born respondents, to have voted Yes for a republic, as opposed to No. 
For the continuous identity variables, political ideology variables, postmaterial values scales, party 
ID scales and political leader scales, the odds ratios represent the difference between the extreme 
values or scores on each scale. Odds ratios for scale variables that are less than 1 indicate a negative 
association with the dependent variable. Odds ratios greater than one for scale variables indicate a 
positive relationship with the dependent variable. As an example of the interpretation of an odds 
ratio for a scale variable, postmaterialists are 1.2 times as likely as materialists, to have voted Yes 
rather than to have voted No (Table 4:5 Model 4). 
6 The responses to the question are 1) Truly Australian to be born in Australia; 2) Truly Australian 
to be citizen; 3) Truly Australian live in Australia; 4) Truly Australian to speak English; 5) Truly 
Australian be Christian; 6) Truly Australian respect law; 7) Truly Australian feel Australian. The 
response categories are very important, fairly important, not very important, not at all important. 
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underlying dimension, while the second factor contains 'Australian citizenship', 
'respect for the law' and 'feeling Australian'. The 'speak English' variable cross 
loads moderately on both Factor 1 and Factor 2 and is therefore omitted from 
further analysis. Reliability testing of the items loading on the first factor indicates 
on Alpha of .61. "Being Christian' loads only moderately on the first factor and 
reliability analysis indicates that the scale reliability will increase to .67 when it is 
removed. 'Living' and 'being born in Australia are, therefore, combined as an 
additive scale to measure an ethno-nativist form of identifying with the nation and 
the scale rescored to range from 0 (low importance) to 100 (high importance). 
The civic form of identifying with the nation is operationalised by selecting sub 
questions that signify the importance that respondents attach to 'Australian 
citizenship', 'respect for the law' and 'feeling Australian' (see Table 3: la). These 
variables load on the second factor. Reliability analysis, however, suggests that 
they would not form a reliable scale (Alpha=.55). A decision was therefore made 
on substantive grounds to omit the 'law' and 'feel Australian' variables from further 
analysis. Only 'Australian citizenship' was selected to represent aspects of a civic 
form of identity as this question was judged to have superior face validity. 
'Australian citizenship' has strong parallels with the culturally neutral requirements 
of identifying with the nation. Policy decisions that specifically relate to citizenship 
can therefore be plotted historically to represent changes over time. 
In addition to those two questions, further questions on pride in Australia's 
achievements are included in the analysis (see Table 3: lb). Pride in Australia's 
achievements is measured by the question 'How proud are you of each of the 
following?' 7 . Principal components analysis of the nine relevant variables again 
7 The choice of responses to the question include 1) Proud of Australian democracy; 2) Proud of 
Australian influence; 3) Proud of Australian economics; 4) Proud of Australian Social Security, 5) 
Proud of Australian Science; 6) Proud of Australian History; 7) Proud of Australian forces; 8) Proud 
of Australian sports; 9) Proud of Australian Art. The response categories are very proud; fairly 
proud; not very proud; not proud at all. 
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reveals two factors, and additive scales are constructed to form the following two 
scale variables: 'sporting and cultural achievements' and 'political achievement'. 
Items loading on the first factor form a reliable scale (Alpha = .70). These scale 
items include Australia's cultural and sporting achievements. 'Achievements' 
includes pride in Australian science, Australian history, Australian forces, 
Australian sport and Australian art. As a measure of a national identity type, 
sporting and cultural achievements are an indicator of respect for the cultural rather 
than the institutional. Sporting and cultural achievements are characteristically 
tangible, concrete and easily identifiable, but they tend to take a narrower or a more 
inward looking perspective of what constitutes nationhood. Sports such as cricket, 
tennis, Rugby League and Rugby Union, are established games that have become 
accepted as traditional Anglo-Australian sports and attract a large following. They 
provide opportunities for competition between nations and are instrumental in the 
formation of cultural bonds between individuals. Sporting and cultural 
achievements act as a mechanism for emotional inclusion into the 'national family' 
as defined by shared socio-structural traditions. Sporting and cultural events have 
the capacity to bring people together in an 'imagined community' by drawing 
together those who do not know one another, but are united when supporting their 
country in sporting and cultural events. That unity reinforces a sense of belonging 
to the nation conceived as a culturally specific people. It creates a sense of 
solidarity between individuals that Greenfeld (1992) describes as a 'national bond' 
and Mannheim (1952) sees as a foundation of 'actual generations'. 
An additive scale derived from the second factor measures Australia's political 
achievements. This scale combines 'proud of Australian democracy', 'proud of 
Australian influence', 'proud of Australian economics' and 'proud of Australian 
social security'. Reliability analysis, however, again indicates that if the item 
measuring 'proud of Australian social security' is removed the scale reliability 
increases from Alpha .66 to Alpha .72. Therefore the first three items are combined 
and referred to as 'political achievements'. The political achievement scale 
measures a more open civic form of nationhood, characterised by a respect for and 
identification with the institutional framework of society, rather than the cultural 
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attributes of the nation. It is assumed that political achievements emphasise those 
democratic ideals that take a more inclusive view of Australia as a nation. Those 
ideals tend to be intangible, subject to historical transformations and to shifts within 
the political arena. 
All four identity dependent variables are rescaled from 0 — 100, where 0 signifies a 
low level of importance and 100 suggests high importance (also see footnote 12). 
As mentioned earlier, identity measures 'born/live' and 'achievement' describe a 
more exclusive form of identifying with the nation, characteristic of an ethno-
nativist form of identity (Jones 1997). In contrast, a civic form of identity is 
represented by the variables 'citizenship' and 'political achievement'. The ethno-
nativist and civic constructed identity correspond and relate to recent empirical 
studies conducted in Australia (Jones 1997, Pakulski and Tranter 2000, Charnock 
2001). They provide an analytical springboard for further analyses in Chapter 4. 
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Table 3:la Principal component analysis with varimax rotation of 'Being Truly 
Australian' sentiment variables. 
'Being truly Australian' 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
'Born/live' Citizen' 
Live .78 .21 
Born .82 -.06 
Christian .57 .09 
Citizenship .29 .62 
Law -.03 .78 
Feel Australian .07 .72 
Speak English .51 .43 
Eigen values 2.45 1.25 
% of variance 34.99 17.89 
Range 0-100 0-100 
Mean 60.7 86.5 
Alpha .67 - 
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Table 3:1b Principal components analysis with varimax rotation of 'Proud of 
Australia's Achievements' sentiment variables. 
'Proud of Australia's achievements' 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
'Achievements' Political Achievement' 
Science .60 .26 
History .67 .12 
Aust. Forces .68 .22 
Sports .71 .03 
Art .69 .09 
Democracy .15 .75 
Influence .30 .71 
Economic .34 .67 
Social Security -.07 .71 
Eigen values 3.28 1.33 
% of variance 
Range 0-100 0-100 
Mean 77.7 62.6 
Alpha .70 .72 
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3:3 National sentiments and republicanism 
In order to demonstrate and assess the strength of the relationship between civic 
national sentiments and republicanism, bivariate and multivariate analyses of the 
survey data are undertaken. The predictor variables are arranged in logical groups 
and models are constructed to measure the explanatory power of the predictor 
variables. Before the models are constructed, however, bivariate correlation 
analysis (Pearson's r) of relationships between each of the predictor variables and 
the dependent variable (referendum vote), is presented. Bivariate analysis reveals 
associations between generational factors, place of birth, level of education, 
religious background, party identification and evaluation of political leaders on the 
one hand, and republicanism on the other. 
Percentages derived from cross tabulations are reported in Appendix A, Table 1. 
The independent variables for political leaders are continuous, therefore correlations 
rather than percentages are reported in Appendix A Table 2. The results for both 
tables reveal that several variables have a considerable impact on voting behaviour, 
in particular, - education, generation, income, religion, ideology and party 
identification. For example, 70% of those with tertiary qualifications voted for an 
Australian republic compared to 44% of non graduates, while 70% of those on the 
'left' voted Yes, compared to only 39% of those on the 'right of centre'. In 
addition, all of the leader variables, with the exception of 'Meg Lees', were 
moderately correlated with voting behaviour. What the bivariate analysis does not 
tell us, however, is the net contribution of each independent variable on pro-
republic voting. In order to provide such evidence, I use regression analysis to 
control for the mediating effects of the predictors. This allows for a more rigorous 
assessment of the impact of social location and other variables on the dependent 
variables. 
The regression models are constructed by arranging independent variables in four 
'blocks'. For the analysis of national identity types (i.e. Tables 4:1; 4:2; 4:3; 4:4), 
the independent variables are introduced into the regression equation in the 
following order: 1) social background, 2) personal achievement, 3) values and 
ideology, 4) political leadership (see Table 3:2 for a summary). 
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In regression Table 4:4 where the analysis shifts to consider republican voting, an 
additional block of variables for, 'national sentiment', has also been included in 
order to measure the 'core' relationship between different forms of identity and 
support for an Australian republic (see Appendix B for a breakdown of dependent 
and independent variables). That is, the four variables analysed in Tables 4:1 to 4:4 
as dependent variables, are later included in Table 4:5 as predictors of voting 
behaviour. In Table 4:5 the independent variables are introduced in the following 
order: 1) identity variables, 2) social background, 3) personal achievement, 4) 
values and ideology, 5) political leadership (see Table 3:3 for summary). 
Socio-historical factors such as mass immigration on changing forms of nationalism 
(operationalised as country of birth) are assessed as background data in Model 1. 
Model 1 also includes social background variables that represent gender, age (based 
on a generational perspective where Generation 1 includes those born before 1945, 
Generation 2 includes those born between 1946-1959 and Generation 3, those born 
after 1960), and the respondent's country of birth (representing immigration). The 
respondent's country of birth includes 'those born in the UK' and 'those born in 
countries other than the UK and Australia' 8 , which are contrasted with the 'born in 
Australia' reference category. 
Model 2 adds personal achievement variables and includes post secondary 
education, professional occupation (based on ASCO codes) contrasted with other 
occupational groups. Self-assessed middle class location versus working class and 
no class identity, income (income between $30,000 - $60,000, income over 
$60,000), with less than $30 000 as the reference category and urban versus rural 
location. 
Model 3 adds religious denomination as Anglican or no religious denomination, 
values and political ideology dimensions. Political ideology is measured on a self 
8 Countries other than the UK and Australia include New Zealand, Republic of Ireland, Italy, 
Germany, Greece, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Yugoslavia (former) Vietnam and Other. 
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identified left-right scale (10 = right, 0 = left) 9 and value orientations are 
represented by Inglehart's 3 item scale (materialist, mixed and postmaterialist). 
Inglehart's empirical analyses of the materialist/postmaterialist value distinction are 
based on four responses to a question on national value orientations 10 . Respondents 
who choose both the first and third options are considered to be 'materialist', while 
those choosing the second and fourth options are `postmaterialist' in their value 
orientations. Postmaterialist is a specific orientation toward participatory 
democracy and libertarian views (Ingelhart 1977). The remaining combinations 
form the 'mixed' category. In order to assess the impact of value orientations, 
Inglehart's (1977) four item value orientation battery is operationalised as a scale 
variable. 11 The third model also includes respondents' party identification 12 . This 
implies that party identification influences political attitudes and voting behaviour. 
It is based on the premise that the longer one identifies with a particular party, the 
less likely he or she is to defect from that traditional loyalty when it comes to 
specific issues (Campbell 1960: 185-187). 
Model 4, in addition to all of the above, includes 'political leaders' variables 13 . The 
logic of the 'Michigan Model' suggests that traditional party loyalties are sustained 
and reinforced depending on the appeal of the leader and the leader's attitude on a 
specific issue (Gow & Stenner 1992: 9). In the late 1990s, Kim Beazley and John 
9 Political ideology is taken from the question 'In politics, people sometimes talk about 'left' and the 
'right'. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 
means the right? The ideology scale ranges from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right) for regression analyses 
with missing values assigned to the mean. 
io If you had to choose among the following things, which are the two that seem most desirable to 
you? 
1 Maintaining order in the nation. 
2 Giving the people more say in important political decisions. 
3 Fighting rising prices. 
4 Protection freedom of speech. (Source: Inglehart 1977:28) 
Inglehart also uses a more elaborate 12 item questionnaire. The original, however, is better known 
and remains the most widely used measure of value orientations. 
11 The value orientation scale is coded 1=materialists; 2=mixed, missing values; 3=postmaterialists. 
12 Respondent's political participation is taken from the question 'Generally speaking, do you usually 
think of yourself as Liberal, Labor, National or what? The party id scale is scored 1=Coalition; 
2=minor parties, others, missing values; 3=ALP. 
13 Political leaders variable is taken from the question 'Again using a scale from 0 to 10, please show 
how much you like or dislike the following political figures. Again, if you don't know much about 
them, you should give them a rating 5. How do you feel about: Kim Beazley, John Howard, Meg 
Lees, Pauline Hanson. The leader scales were scored to range between 0 (strongly dislike) and 10 
(strongly like) for the regression analysis, with missing values assigned to the mean of each variable. 
53 
Howard as leaders of the ALP and the Liberal Party respectively, Meg Lees, as 
leader of the Australian Democrats, and Pauline Hanson as leader of the One Nation 
party all presented different views on the republic. All four played an active role 
throughout the republican campaign. 
The final regression analysis concentrates on the behavioural dependent variable 
'republican referendum vote' (Table 3:3). In contrast to the analyses of identity 
types, for the voting regression analysis five blocks of independent variables are 
employed. These blocks contain the variables included in the four models already 
described as well as an additional identity that includes the four identity variables 
previously analysed as dependent variables in Tables 4:1 to 4:4. 14 In the voting 
analyses (Table 4:5), the identity variables are introduced as independent variables 
in the first block in order to establish the association between the changing form of 
identity in Australia and the push for an Australian republic in the 1990s. The 
identity variables are included as the first block in order to examine their impact on 
voting prior to the introduction of other control variables. The identity variables in 
Table 4:5, Model 1 include 'achievement', 'born/live', 'political achievement', and 
'citizen' the key indicators of ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. Once the 
impact of the identity model has been established, Models 2-5 are added 
sequentially. As each block is introduced its effects are measured by monitoring the 
regression coefficients and R2 percentage of variance 'explained' by the model. 
The socio-demographic characteristics used in Table 4:5 include social background 
(Model 2), achievement (Model 3), values and ideology (Model 4), and political 
leadership (Model 5). 
Table 3:2 lists the blocks of variables employed for the civic/ethnic identity 
analyses displayed in Tables 4:1 to 4:4. Table 3:3 shows the variables used to 
analyse republican referendum voting in Table 4:5. The results of the multivariate 
analyses are discussed in Chapter 4. 
14 The identity variables were analysed in Tables 4:1 to 4:4 as dependent variables and were scored 
to range between 0 and 100. This allowed the interpretation of the OLS estimates as percentage 
changes on the dependent variables for a unit change in each independent variable. When the 
identity variables were included as independent variables to examine voting behaviour in Table 4:5, 
they were rescored to range between 0 and 1, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the odds ratios 
produced by the logistic regression models. 
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Table 3:2 Four Predictor Models for Civic/Ethno-nativist Identity 
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3:4 The interview data and analysis 
The interpretive analysis of the republican elite views was conducted using 
interview data. Forty-six interviews were conducted with 37 ARM leaders (some 
leaders were interviewed on more than one occasion). The leaders were key public 
intellectuals and leaders of the republican movement whose statements and actions 
affected the development of the ARM throughout the 1990s. The leaders gave a 
more coherent structure to public sentiments, and provided an organizational 
framework for the republican push. 
Qualitative analysis of these 46 semi-structured interviews identifies actors' 
motives, intentions, meaning, actions, and reactions (Weber 1947). It also provides 
'access to the multiple perspectives of the participants' and sheds light on 'long-
term interaction with relevant people in one or several sites' (Glesne & Peshkin 
1992: 6). The interviews were conducted face-to-face over a period of 
approximately three and a half years; from early May 1996 to January 2000. They 
were of 60 to 90 minutes duration, and were conducted in various locations: the 
offices of respondents, the ARM headquarters in Sydney, and on some occasions at 
respondents' homes. I conducted all interviews, analysed the interview data and 
used the same interview schedule throughout (Appendix D). Access to the 
interviewees was arranged through the Executive Director of the ARM. 
Both the Director and the (potential) respondents were informed about the 
academic nature of the study and about its main objectives. Their informed consent 
was secured before interviews were conducted. There was only a handful of 
refusals — all based on time constraints. The interviewees were selected on a 
positional basis supplemented by snowballing (Higley et al. 1979, Minichiello et al. 
1995: 161). This involved two steps. The initial list of republican movement 
leaders was drawn from the incumbents of the top positions within the ARM. 
Respondents selected that way were then asked to nominate other 'most influential' 
persons in the movement. These additional people were then added to the list of 
leaders if they were mentioned by more than two respondents. By relying on 
positional selection and snowballing, new and emerging leaders were included in 
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the study. Their presence reflected the changes that occurred in the composition 
and organization of the ARM as it responded to changes in the political arena. 
The respondents represented a broad range of intellectual occupations: -academics, 
authors, business leaders, lawyers, media personalities and political figures from the 
major parties. Their social profiles reflect a variety of social backgrounds. 
Approximately a quarter represented various non-British ethnic backgrounds. 
Though the majority of the respondents lived in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra, I 
also interviewed ARM convenors from smaller centres and rural areas (see 
Appendix C). At times, the intellectual occupations of respondents coincided with 
leadership organizational roles, and in some cases the leadership roles overlapped, 
reflecting the broader constituency of leaders and core activists of the movement. 
Many respondents occupied multiple roles within the ARM, such as that of State 
Convenor and Constitutional Convention delegate. Others occupied positions 
within the hierarchy of the organization, as well as having represented the ARM at 
the Constitutional Convention (see Appendix C). Overall, the composition of the 
leadership group confirmed Eyerman & Jamison's (1991) observations about the 
merging of leadership and intellectual roles in contemporary movements, and the 
centrality of 'mediating' roles. 
The formal positions held by the respondents included those on the national 
management committee, past and present executive directors of the ARM, and those 
who occupied senior positions in the hierarchy of the organization. Some occupied 
specialist roles, such as key strategists, public relations and media specialists. A 
number of movement activists who had played a key role in related political and 
social movements and who had provided expertise in the organization and 
mobilization of the ARM were also included through snowballing, as were figures 
from political parties. Also included were convenors in ARM branches — typically 
young people who gave the sample a generational balance. Some of those 
convenors were also members of the national management committee and 
represented the ARM at the Constitutional Convention. Most of those interviewed 
had been active as movement leaders since the inception of the organization. 
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The anonymity of respondents has been maintained throughout the analysis. This 
has been necessary, given the sensitive nature of some questions and the willingness 
of the respondents to give personal assessments on specific issues. Respondents 
were given code numbers, and these numbers are used in quotations in Chapters 5 
and 6. In a few cases certain details from the interview had to be deleted in order to 
preserve anonymity. Overall, however, an atmosphere of trust was established. 
The interviewees were assured that they could give 'off the record' comments 
because these comments would be presented in a way that would not identify them. 
The interviewees were located in Sydney, Canberra, Hobart and Melbourne. Those 
locations on Australia's eastern seaboard were targeted because of ease of access in 
terms of travel. It was also in recognition that from its inception, the ARM evolved 
slightly differently in each state. This meant that it was necessary to view each state 
as a semi-separate entity, subjected to different political pressures, parochialisms 
and regional biases. Those differences and tensions between states are explored in 
the study and issues associated with the regional organization are examined. 
Although the interviews were semi-structured, at times certain issues were explored 
at greater depth. The first area was the informal structure and development of the 
ARM from its inception in July 1991. The questions covered the formative events, 
the role of the ARM within the broader republican movement, the strategies and 
tactics of the movement, the strategic goals of the ARM, the key constituencies of 
the movement, patriotism, the type of national identity the ARM articulated and 
promoted, the role of, and attitudes towards political parties and the role of the 
media and 'mediating' intellectuals (see Appendix D). 
The respondents also mentioned — and I noted — some other important issues: the 
tactics employed by the ARM to overcome major obstacles and the strategies 
developed in order to accommodate changes in the social and political arenas. The 
interviews allowed an exploration of the issue of the perceived elitism of the ARM 
and the strategies introduced to counter that perception in the broader community. 
Politicisation of the ARM, strong affiliation with the ALP, and the ARM's ability to 
counter negative feedback were also explored. Discussions of programmatic 
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divisions concentrated on organizational aspects of the ARM and on the broader 
issues of the republican movement. They focused on the decision of the ARM to 
pursue a centralist and minimalist strategy and the question of whether, by choosing 
this approach, the ARM had placed itself in confrontation with, not only those in the 
broader republican movement, but also the leaders and activists within the ARM 
itself. 
Another prominent theme emerging from the interviews was the attitudes of 
respondents to various 'constituencies' that the ARM either appealed to or needed 
to convince. These included those born overseas, particularly those from non-
English speaking backgrounds, indigenous people, the rural population, the young 
and women. Social categories that were identified by the Civics Expert Group 
(CEG) 15 , established by the Labor Government in 1994 corresponded with those 
groups the ARM identified as 'problematic'. Those categories were described as 
the 'disengaged', the 'disenchanted' and included those with low levels of 
educational attainment'. Attitudes of the respondents to these 'problematic 
categories' and the perceived difference between respondents in terms of the 
strategies adopted by the organization provided insights into the links between 
leaders and activists. 
During the time in which the interviews were conducted a number of significant 
events occurred: the devolution of the ARM, the March 1996 federal election, and 
the Constitutional Convention. Those events caused significant change in the 
ARM. The interviews highlight the changes in leaders' attitudes and in the strategic 
manouvering that the ARM was involved in over this period. 
All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. The analysis was carried out 
by using the software data package ATLAS.ti, a workbench for the analysis of large 
bodies of textual, graphical and audio data. ATLAS.ti provided the tools to 
manage, extract, compare, explore and reassemble the interview material. The 
15  The Civic Experts Group was commissioned to prepare a strategic plan for a non-partisan program 
of public education on civic issues. The CEG viewed civic education largely in terms of knowledge 
about government machinery and process. From its national opinion survey the CEG made various 
recommendations to the government. 
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analysis included the segmenting of documents into passages to be indexed or 
coded. Then memos and annotations were added to facilitate the retrieval of related 
material and to connect selected passages and memos during the analysis. The 
analysis of all the interviews was completed with relevant codes and links that 
provided a concise representation of the relevant issues identified by the study. 
Building trust, establishing a rapport and countering bias were essential parts of the 
interviewing process. Specific questions prompted some interviewees to think 
about issues and evaluate situations that they had not previously considered. Many 
interviewees were willing to invest extra time in the interview process and to 
substantiate their position by providing published and unpublished documentary 
evidence. Where evidence of bias or contradictory statements was noticed, further 
probing provided valuable information and a necessary check. Issues of accuracy 
were also raised with subsequent interviewees in order to gain a balanced view of 
related concerns or questions and to place those concerns or questions in context. 
These issues are presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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CHAPTER 4 PRO-REPUBLICAN AND CIVIC NATIONAL SENTIMENTS 
4:1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first set of conditions of successful political reform — 
public or popular sentiments conducive to change. I use the concept of 'popular 
sentiments' in preference to 'public opinion' because of the rather vague and 
unspecific nature of the term 'public opinion'. 'Public sentiments' describes a 
readiness to adopt certain attitudes, an overall direction of value preferences that 
lend themselves to further elaborations (typically by opinion-making elites). The 
indicators of public sentiments are statements people make and symbols that they 
adopt. In this particular case, I infer the existence of specific public sentiments on 
the basis of responses to survey questions. More specifically public responses 
indicative of civic nationalism are seen, for the reasons discussed below, as 
conducive to the republican reform. 
Some of the points raised in Chapters 1 and 2 need to be reiterated here. In 
discussing the survey data certain concepts, such as popular national identifications 
and identities, are at times used interchangeably. The term 'identity' refers to an 
identification that affects a sense of self (e.g. I am white, I am male). In the 
sociological literature, 'identities' are seen as organizing principles of self, 
indicative of a strong feeling of belonging and the normative commitments that 
belonging implies (Jenkins 1996). Social identities link self with society. Their 
referents, such as nations or religious communities, are seen as special, unique and 
imbued with values. In other words, shedding a particular identity can be 
problematic, especially if it is considered a 'master identity', that is, an identity that 
governs all occasions in life. Master identities are subjected to historical processes 
and their changes impact on the way individuals locate themselves in various 
collectivities. Identifications are more rationally circumscribed, conditional and 
more flexible than identities. They do not permeate all aspects of self, and are 
'evoked' only occasionally. 
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The new civic nationalism, it is argued here, developed as a form of national 
identification rather than identity, and it took roots in the educated, cosmopolitan, 
urban strata of post war generations, especially among the European migrants and 
their children. It was harnessed for the purposes of the republican reform program 
by pro-Labor public intellectuals and the ALP political leaders. 
The shift in popular nationalist sentiments is described here as involving a changing 
balance between (mainly ethno-) national identities and (mainly civic) national 
identifications. What is described in the literature as 'civic identity' refers to a 
sense of belonging that is more circumscribed and rational 16 . This sense of 
belonging to the increasingly culturally plural 'nation-society' — a multicultural 
Australia — started to spread in the 1970s and 80s, and it gradually balanced and 
supplanted the sense of national identity anchored in ethno-nativism. The 
republican movement both articulated and promoted civic national identifications. 
The way movement leaders articulated civic national sentiments and directed them 
towards the issue of the republic is further revealed by the interview data analysed 
in the next chapter. Here, we look at the shift towards civic national sentiments, the 
key socio-historical determinants of this shift, as revealed by 'social background' 
variables, and the link between civic sentiments and republicanism. This is done 
primarily by analysing cross sectional survey data using multiple regression 
techniques. It is recognised that such analysis has limitations. Snapshot analysis is 
only a second best to time-sequence analysis. Moreover, the impact of socio-
historical events is assessed only indirectly through background variables that serve 
as 'proxies' of socio-historical events. Unfortunately, time-sequence data, more 
appropriate for such an analysis are not available. Thus while I conduct a 
'snapshot' analysis I am aware of these limitations, and of the fact that I make 
assumptions that this survey snapshot is reflective of socio-historical factors. 
Migration, as reflected by ethnic background of respondents, is perhaps the most 
important of these factors. Education has also been identified as a key causal 
16 The term 'rational' is used here in the Weberian sense — that is 'rational' as a non-value laden 
term as in 'legal rational' as opposed to 'value rational'. 
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influence, as has social and political leanings. Their impact, I argue, reflects 
specific generational experiences of Australians. Once the civic national and pro-
republican identities and identifications take root within generational segments, they 
become a part of the political and ideological setting, and catalyse the formation of 
the pro-republican civic nationalist movement. 
4:2 National developments and ethno-nativist identities — a historical outline 
At the core of ethno-national identity lies a sense of belonging to a culturally 
distinct nation with specific traditions. This is reflected in references to a common 
descent, shared ethnic origins, and common national heritage. In the Australian 
context, ethno-national sentiments have developed in response to particular 
historical developments. Their origins are British, and loyalty to institutions that 
derive from the Anglo-Saxon traditions remains central. Over time this sentiment 
evolved and acquired elements that relate to Australia as a distinct 'ethnie (people). 
The term 'ethno-nativist', therefore, is more appropriate; it captures a sequential 
process that includes vestiges of loyalty towards symbols that are British in their 
origin, as well as characteristics that are typically Australian. The shift towards an 
Australian (nativist) focus began in the mid and late 1800s when Australia began to 
establish a sense of its own autonomy and independence. For the supporters of the 
independence movement, Australia was no longer a colony of the British Empire 
but rather formed a separate ethnic entity, a new people able to control their own 
destiny; a nation in itself (Hancock 1930, Clark 1962-87, 1995, White 1981). 
The development of an Australian national identity has been mapped by historians, 
sociologists and social commentators. Over time Australia has conjured up a 
number of images that proffers a view of Australia as a nation of multiple and 
changing identities. For example, Hancock (1961, [1930]) describes an independent 
Australian Briton who provided a sense of justification for an Australian nationality 
evolving alongside a British nationality. Then there is the noble bushman as 
described by Ward (1966 [1958]). Ward and his followers portrayed 'Australians as 
independent, imbued with an ethic of mateship, laconic, irreverent, egalitarian, 
sharing, cooperative' (see Curthoys in Hudson & Bolton 1997: 29). In turn, those 
masculine images provoked a response by writers such as Marilyn Lake (1986) who 
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articulated an alternative set of images based on a feminist conception of citizenship 
and introduced a particular gender dimension to Australian nationalism. As Lake 
(1997) explains, 'Australian feminists invoked their status as citizens to promote a 
different understanding of rights and obligations', and highlighted the private 
domain as opposed to the public domain. The public domain was the preserve of 
modern Western men; a preserve that women challenged drawing attention to the 
multiplicity of citizenship traditions in Australia. Australian feminists brought the 
'rights discourse' into the private sphere of home and family. Through legislation 
feminists demanded that the state establish the right for women to exist as 
'independent economic units' (Lake in Hudson and Bolton 1997: 96-99). 
Clark's (1987) greatest contribution to research on national identity is encapsulated 
in his central idea of a 'shared sense of place', a 'shared sense of past', and a 
'shared love of the land that we live in'. A shared sense of place refers mainly to 
land that is common to us all and unites us all. In terms of imagery, Clark's sense 
of place also encompasses the characteristics of landscape, flora and fauna. It is 
about how Australia, with its unique landscape, may yet develop independently of 
Britain. Clark anticipated that 'the time was coming when an Australian voice 
would be heard telling the story of who Australians were and what they might be. 
A new discovery of Australia was about to begin' (1987: 494) 
Some authors developed a set of images based on the economic interests of the 
nation. These proved to be particularly powerful in providing a sense of unity 
which in turn reinforced a peculiarly ethno-nativist form of Australian national 
identity. As White (1981: ix) argues: 
Every powerful economic interest likes to justify itself by claiming to represent the 'national interest' 
and identifying itself with a 'national identity'. In this view of the world there is no room for class 
conflict, and sexual and racial exploitations are also obscured. The 'national interest' must appear to 
work for the good of all. 
National identity couched in such terms influenced the construction of a peculiarly 
Australian ethos. It was an ethos that promoted a distinctive and exclusively white, 
male-orientated, Brito-centric identity. Such an identity was a powerful construct 
that supported the nation's economic interests during periods of Australia's 
development as an independent nation. It masked, as critics noted, class and racial 
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divisions in Australian society. The dominant ideology of the period was justified 
by aligning Australia's progress as a nation to sound economic development. 
Initially, such development was seen as conditional on economic links with Britain. 
Later, it was perceived as dependent on 'national industries' that sustained the 
independent Australian nation — a new people. 
Australia's economic success, as the ideologists of national independence 
recognised, was initially based on a vibrant and powerful pastoral industry. The 
pastoral industry was an important construct in identity terms. It reflected Ward's 
(1966 [1958]) interpretation of what was considered to be typically Australian: that 
sense of rural mateship, and a spirit of cooperation. The pastoral industry was 
quintessentially Australian, representing the outback, the land, a particular way of 
life. At the same time it combined to prolong those ties to Britain by providing 
exports to the 'mother country'. 
The pastoral industry served the nation well from the late 19 th century, but by the 
mid twentieth century, competing economic interests began to emerge. Those 
interests provided the impetus for increased competition between different groups 
and had implications for Australia's national development. 'Australia's flocks were 
being challenged by Australia's factories' (White 1981: x). The older pastoral ethos 
depicted the bush as the 'real' Australia, but as the percentage of the labour force 
employed in primary industry dropped between 1933 and 1947 that image began to 
change. An image of Australia as an industrial nation became the dominant 
ideology. Australia began to be depicted as more urban, cosmopolitan and 
industrial. The expanding manufacturing sector meant that enterprise, development, 
progress and growth were increasingly woven into the image of the nation (White 
1981). It also meant that Australia needed to draw on a wider pool of workers to 
support an industrial sector that was expanding rapidly. Industries were more likely 
to be located near the major cities and ports — changing the locus of activity from 
the country to the city. 
The manufacturing industry's success depended on expanding labour. In the 
immediate post-WW H period that growing demand for labour prompted the 
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opening up Australia's immigration policy to migrants from non-English speaking 
backgrounds. This was a radical departure from the past Brito-centrism and needed 
to be handled sensitively. It was presented and defended on a number of levels. At 
times it was defended for its contribution to the economic and defence needs of 
Australia as reflected in the popular 'populate or perish' slogan. Australians were 
reassured that the cultural homogeneity of the nation would remain intact —`for 
every foreign migrant the government proposed to bring out ten from the United 
Kingdom' (Clark 1995: 277). The justification for such reassurances was based on 
the perceived need 'to protect the British predominance as well as to shield the 
foreigner from the veiled hostility of the native-born'. At other times, Australia's 
post-WW II immigration program was presented as a humanitarian duty not to 'turn 
away anyone who had the will to become a good Australian citizen'. It was 
accepted as a given that anyone who came to settle would become a `dinkum 
Aussie' (Clark 1995: 277). But perhaps the most convincing argument presented by 
the government was that couched in terms of the survival of the nation. 
We have not unlimited time to build our strength or plan our future. Our decisions now must be the 
right ones, else our Australian nation might not survive beyond the lives of the children of this 
generation (Calwell in Clark 1995: 277-278). 
For Australia's policy makers, however, it was clear that, due to the lack of British 
immigrants, Australia had to become increasingly dependent on immigrants from 
non-English speaking backgrounds. The influx of non-British immigrants meant 
that Australia's national identity and cohesion was under threat (Castles in Freeman 
& Jupp 1992: 184). To counter those fears the Government introduced the policy of 
assimilation: 'the doctrine that immigrants could be culturally and socially absorbed 
and rapidly become indistinguishable from the existing Anglo-Australian 
population' (Castles in Freeman & Jupp 1992: 184 — 185). The assimilationist 
policy helped to allay fears and at the same time continued to sustain a 
characteristically Australian identity. Migrants were expected to adopt the 
'Australian Way of Life'. Cultural differences were an affront to a society which 
demanded socio-cultural uniformity. The expectation of 'The Australian Way of 
Life' disguised a general intolerance of and distaste for cultural diversity — a 
powerful mechanism for reinforcing ethno-nativist sentiments (White 1981: 160). 
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Australia was able to retain a dominant ethno-nativist identity throughout the 1950s 
by reinforcing assimilation as a policy and continuing to retain close links with 
Britain. She still relied on Britain for her defence needs ( WW II had dented this 
reliance) and Britain continued to provide a ready market for Australia's exports. 
That close relationship between Britain and Australia continued until Britain 
entered the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s. As Ward (2001: 
107) claims, Britain's entry into the EEC was a turning point for Australia in that it 
marked the accelerated disentangling of Australian and British cultural identities, as 
well as their political and economic interests. It signaled the emergence of a new 
nationalism in Australia and a new identity that was heralded by pronouncements 
on such topics 'as the British connection, the treatment of the Aborigines, the White 
Australia Policy, liberation through relations with Asian countries and the 
distinctively urban nature of Australia' (Home 1989: 37). 
4:3 Ethno-nativist sentiments and identity 
A particularist form of this ethno-nativist identity exacerbated the traditional 
divisions within the nation. In the case of the Aboriginal population, British 
settlement meant that the indigenous people were alienated from their traditional 
lands and culture. A Brito-Australian 'ethnie meant that Australia acquired a form 
of nationalism that carried a strong colonial imprint. The indigenous people were, 
in fact, not considered part of the nation until much later. In terms of common 
descent, shared traditions and the occupation of a particular homeland, the 
Aboriginal population during this period could be described as an `under-nation'; 
separate from and subordinate to the dominant white Anglo-Australian population 
(Jones 1998: 5, Tatz 1995). 
The exclusive nature of an ethno-nativist identity was, until recently, sustained 
through ongoing discrimination in Australia's sporting and cultural events. In fact, 
the exclusive nature of sports such as cricket and rugby, meant that in many cases 
Aboriginal sportsmen were forced to pursue their sporting careers not in Australia 
but in the United Kingdom (Pilger 2002). A study of 1200 black sportsmen and 
women by Tatz (1995) reveals that only six Aboriginal sports people had access to 
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the same sporting facilities and opportunities as white Australians. That divide in 
public attitudes towards the indigenous population was highlighted more recently 
by Pilger (2002). With the lead up to the Olympic Games in Australia in the year 
2000, Australia's treatment of its indigenous people was documented as one of 
discrimination and exclusion (Pilger 2002). Tatz (1995) and Pilger (2002) argued 
that Australian sport and culture could not be accurately represented when many of 
the indigenous population's top athletes were not given the same opportunities nor 
were they considered as part of the national community. In other words, until 
recently, Australian sport was a closed domain, dominated by white, Anglo-
Australian males. It was selective and, as critics noted, perpetuated discriminatory 
attitudes. 
Under those conditions a white Anglo-Australian form of ethno-nativist identity 
flourished and established itself as the core element of the dominant culture. It was 
fuelled by public policy decisions such as the Immigration Act 1901 (commonly 
known as the White Australia policy). It embraced exclusion by refusing entry to 
Asian immigrants between 1901 and the early 1970s. It was 'a racist immigration 
policy, revealing a general fear, hatred and contempt for, specifically, Asians' 
(Home 2001: 207). Policies within Australia restricted the participation of the 
indigenous people in national institutions, and racist attitudes prevented Aboriginal 
involvement in the community and politics. Assimilation as a policy doctrine 
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markers are passed on from generation to generation. 
Ethno-nativists tend to be ambivalent about the `Australianness' of people from 
indigenous and non-British migrant backgrounds. While accepted as citizens these 
categories are nevertheless often seen as 'ethnics' who are 'not fully' or 
'conditionally' Australian. They are accepted so long as they embrace as an 
aspiration the Brito-Australian traditions and ways of life. If they do not, they are 
socially marginalised. For ethno-nativists, culture and tradition marks the boundary 
of the nation 'proper'. 
4:4 Recent studies of national sentiments 
The distribution of national sentiment identities amongst the Australian public has 
been the subject of four recent studies (Jones 1997, 1998, Pakulski & Tranter 2000, 
Charnock 2001). These studies, conducted between 1997 and 2000 identify how 
public attitudes to the nation coalesce, how these attitudes affect support for the 
republic and how support for the republic varies across segments of the population. 
Jones (1997) draws on data from the 1995 National Social Science Survey. It 
contains a module on national identity from which Jones constructs a typology that 
represents 3 scales of national identification 17 . The first involves ascribed attributes 
and measures an Australian ethno-nativism dimension 18 , the second measures a 
civic dimension 19 and the third acts as a behavioural bridge between the other two 
dimensions20. Jones identifies four national identity types: Dogmatic Nativists who 
show strong nativism and strong affective civic culture; Literal Nativists who show 
strong nativism and weak to moderate affective civic culture; Civic Nationalists 
who show a weak to moderate nativism and strong affective civic culture; and 
Moderate Pluralists who show weak to moderate nativism as well as affective civic 
culture (1997: 297). According to Jones, these types are not exclusive, and include 
a 'mixed' type. 
17 The three scales focus on questions that relate to 'what it means to be truly Australian'. 
18 Australian nativism includes questions regarding being Australian born, Christian and having lived 
in Australia most of one's life. 
19 A civic dimension includes questions based on feeling Australian and respecting Australian laws 
and institutions. 
20 Jones refers to this as an instrumental dimension and includes questions on the importance of 
citizenship and being able to speak English. 
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Charnock (2001) builds on Jones's study and addresses specifically the patterns of 
republican voting. He explains the impact of partisan influences and populist 
protest on republican voting, as well as the role of national identity and ancestry. 
By applying Jones's typology to the new data, Charnock (2001: 282) finds that the 
distribution of the four national identity types is almost the same as in Jones's 
earlier study21 . 
The study conducted by Pakulski and Tranter (2000) analyses data from the 
International Social Science Program (1995) which contains a module on national 
identity. In order to separate civic identity and ethno-national identity from 
`denizen22 identity', the study uses two additional questions: 'How close — how 
emotionally attached to Australia — do you feel?' and a question asking if 
respondents agree or disagree with the statement 'It is impossible for people who do 
not share Australian customs and traditions to become fully Australian'. Three 
forms of national identity are distinguished: civic, ethno-national identity and 
denizen. The remaining 26% of respondents who do not fit these types have been 
classified as a 'mixed type' (Pakulski & Tranter 2000: 211). 
The three studies share a similar analytic strategy, use similar survey-based 
materials and come to similar conclusions. The typologies they use serve as a 
model for this study. However, my typology is limited to ethno-nativist and civic 
nationalist types for reasons discussed in chapter 2. These two types are most 
theoretically salient and, as the above studies confirm, differentially located in the 
social structure and in 'actual generations'. 
21 The respective findings of the group sizes in the ACRS '99 data were Dogmatic Nativists 16%, 
Literal Nativists 6%, Civic Nationalists 39% and Moderate Pluralists 39%. Jones findings were 
Dogmatic Nativists 15%, Literal Nativists 8%, Civic Nationalists 39% and Moderate Pluralists 38%. 
22 Those who show a weak attachment to either civic or ethnic identity. 
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4:5 Socio-demographic 'location' of ethno-national sentiments 
Does the analysis of survey data confirm the above interpretation? Are the results 
consistent with the expectations (the hypotheses) derived from the proposed — and 
theoretically backed — account of change in public sentiment and national 
identifications? One would expect that those who adhere to an ethno-nativist form 
of national identity would tend to be Australian-born. Immigrants would be less 
likely to endorse such sentiments because of their exclusive implications. We may 
also expect to find expressions of such sentiment more frequently amongst older 
Australians especially those representing the 'war generation'. One could also 
expect the adherents of such views to have left school at a younger age and be less 
likely to have tertiary qualifications. Further, one would also expect to find ethno-
nativists differentially located in terms of occupation; that is, they would be less 
likely to be employed in the professions and in managerial positions. Partly 
because of the impact of education on political views ethno-nativists could be 
described as being right of centre in their political affiliation, less liberal in their 
thinking, and more inclined to approve of the views expressed by right wing parties 
such as One Nation. Given that the cultural underpinnings of the nation have been 
central in the formation of ethno-nativist sentiments, ethno-nativists would be more 
inclined to take pride in Australia's sporting and cultural achievements, rather than 
the political institutions of the nation. Culture provides a mechanism for individuals 
to form bonds and attachments that, in turn, reinforce their sense of belonging. For 
ethno-nativists Australia, is an ethno-nation, and those who subscribe to the nation's 
cultural and sporting achievements are expected to express that sense of pride as a 
reflection of their identity. 
These expectations or research hypotheses are tested first by conducting an analysis 
of the social correlates of various ethno-nativist national sentiments. Profiles of the 
characteristics of the ethno-nativist identity are examined and they confirm the 
expectations. More interesting and reported in detail below is the analysis of direct 
causal links using regression models discussed in Chapter 3. The results are 
reported in Tables 4:1 and 4:2. 
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The results of the regression analyses broadly confirm the expectations. The 
regression estimates suggest that those who regard being born and living in 
Australia as important, and are proud of Australia's sporting and cultural 
achievements, tend to be predominantly Australian-born. Those born in the UK and 
countries other than Australia are less likely to display ethno-nativist sentiments. 
Another distinctive feature of ethno-nationals is their social location in the war 
generation. Examination of the standardized regression coefficients (not shown 
here) suggests that one of the strongest correlates of ethno-nativism is being born 
before 1945 23 . 
Although place of birth and generational location are expected to be predictors of 
ethno-nativist sentiments, the analysis also reveals a number of differences amongst 
those born in Australia. For example, gender differences appear in the sense of 
pride in Australia's sporting and cultural achievements. Women are more likely to 
be proud of Australia's cultural achievements than males (b= -2.8). Such a finding 
is in fact consistent with Charnock's (2001: 284) results. He also found ethno-
nativism to be more prevalent among women. Pride in Australia's sporting and 
cultural achievements is less apparent among tertiary graduates (b= -3.5). There is, 
however, a disparity between the earning capacity of those who consider being born 
and living in Australia as important, and those who take pride in Australia's 
sporting and cultural achievements. Middle income earners are more likely than 
those on low incomes to be proud of Australia's sporting and cultural achievements. 
Table 4:1 indicates that those with less education and low income earners are most 
likely to be ethno-nativist. The non-tertiary educated, in particular, express a sense 
of pride in Australia's sporting and cultural achievements, although education has 
no statistically significant impact on the born/live dependent variable. 
Ethno-nativists also tend to be less liberal in their orientation, religious and right of 
centre in their partisan preferences. In these respects, they contrast with the typical 
23 In the tables I report the non standardised regression coefficients in order to show the net impact 
of each of the independent variables on the dependent variables. 
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representatives of the baby boom generation. The baby boomers are more likely to 
challenge traditional national sentiments and social values. They also tend to be 
politically active, hold strong party identifications, and sympathise with left of 
centre parties. By contrast, the war generation tends to be more traditionalist, 
conservative and supportive of a rural status quo. Such a contrast seems to be in 
line with Inglehart's (1991) claims that democratic liberal value orientations are 
more prevalent among those who have grown up in the post-war decades. Table 4:1 
in fact indicates that 'Materialists' are more likely than Postmaterialists' to be 
ethno-nativists24 . This is due, Inglehart (1977, 1990a) argues, to the fact that 
members of the baby boom generation have experienced unprecedented levels of 
material prosperity and physical security during their formative years. 
Consequently, the baby boom generation is more likely to give a higher priority to 
non-material needs and be actively involved in the left-libertarian social 
movements. By contrast, those born before 1945 are more materialist and less 
libertarian. They were also less likely to experience the benefits of education 
which, according to McAllister (1992) and Betts (1999), is the most powerful 
shaper of attitudes amongst mass publics. 
The results confirm these regularities. For example, young people and Meg Lees 
(the leader of the Australian Democrats from 1998 to 2001) supporters are less 
likely to be ethno-nativists (Table 4:1 b= -.61) than other categories. This is not 
surprising. As a relatively new political party, the Australian Democrats 
concentrate on issues such as the environment and an Australian republic — typical 
'baby boomer issues' and it attracts disproportionate numbers of baby-boom 
libertarians with pro-republican leanings (see also McAllister 1997). 
On the other end of the spectrum; supporters of Pauline Hanson and the One Nation 
party are more likely to be ethno-nativists than any other category (Table 4:1 b= 
1.09). They also support her views on immigration and the perception that 
Aboriginal Australians receive 'special' treatment to the detriment of other 
disadvantaged groups. These findings are consistent with my interpretation, as well 
as the findings of Jones (1997, 1998) who noted that Hanson's views tended to be 
24 The postmaterial values scale is scored: materialist = 1; mixed = 2; postmaterialist = 3. 
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echoed by persons adhering to an ethno-nativist identity. In the 1990s, the One 
Nation Party provided a voice for ethno-nativists by continuing a campaign of 
discrimination towards Australia's indigenous people and Asian immigrants. 
Clearly political leaders play an important role in influencing popular national 
sentiments. Political leaders provide the cues on how different groups respond to 
particular issues. If we assume that party-leader orientations affect views on the 
nation and the republic (which is a reasonable assumption considering the relatively 
recent mobilization of republicanism), political leadership emerges as an important 
factor reinforcing engrained loyalties and influencing the formation of attitudes on 
national and republican issues. 
One should also note some unexpected results. For example, pride in Australia's 
cultural attributes correlates strongly with gender. Women are more likely to 
embrace ethno-nativist sentiment and express a sense of pride in Australia's 
sporting and cultural achievements than men. Those who express such a sense of 
pride tend also to be middle income earners and their political preferences lean 
towards the major parties rather than the smaller political parties such as One 
Nation. 
Overall, a relatively consistent profile of ethno-nativists emerges. They are 
typically members of the war generation, Australian-born, 'materialist' in their 
orientations and right of centre in their party political leanings. They do not rate 
highly in terms of occupational achievement and tend to have lower levels of 
education. They are less likely to be employed in professions, and overall have 
lower than average earnings. Ethno-nationalism is in the main a sentiment of older 
and less economically secure Australians. 
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Table 4:1 The key indicators of ethno-nativist sentiment (Born/Live) 
OLS regression estimates for predictors for born/live 
Model 1 
Social Background 
Men 	 -1.3 
Gen. 2 (1946-'59)  
Gen. 3 (1960+)  
Born UK  












Degree -2.8 -1.9 -.8 
Professional occupation -3.4 -2.7 -2.1* 
Middleclass (self assessed) -.9 -1.3 -.9 
Income ($30K - $60K) _5.3*** -4.9**  
Income ($60K +) -8.4*** -8.1*** _7.5*** 
City (live in large city .4 -.1 -.4 
Values & ideology 
Anglican 1.1 .8 No religion -4.1  Political ideol. (+=right) .8** .6 
'Post Mat. Orientation' (+=post) -3.5** -3.1** 




Lees -.6* Hanson  
R2 Adjusted 	 .05 .07 .08 .09 
* <.05 	 ** <.01 	 ***<.001 
n = 3431 
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey 
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Table 4:2 The key indicators of ethno-nativist sentiment (achievement) 
OLS regression estimates for predictors for sporting and cultural achievements 
Social Background 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Men -2.9*** -2.9***  Gen. 2 (1946-'59) -1.0 -.8 -.2 .3 
Gen. 3 (1960 + ) -4.5*** -4.3*** -3.1*** -2.2 Born UK -4.2** -4.1** -4.2**  Born Other -5.8*** _5.5*** _5.9*** _5.9*** 
Achievement 
Degree  
Professional occupation -2.2* -1.7 -1.5 
Middleclass (self assessed) .7 -.9 -.7 
Income ($30K - $60K) 2.3 2.6** 2.6** Income ($60K +) 1.0 1.1 1.0 City (live in large city) -.4 .2 -.6 
Values & ideology 
Anglican .5 .3 
No religion _3.3***  






R2 Adjusted .03 .05 .07 .10 
<.05 	 ** <.01 	 ***<.001 
n = 3431 
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey 
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4:6 Civic national sentiments and identifications 
Civic nationalist sentiment differs from ethno-nationalist in that what unites people 
into a nation is not the cultural traditions but rather more universalistic social bonds. 
Civic nationalists recognize and accept cultural differences and multiple ethnic 
allegiances. It is a strong attachment to Australian society and its institutions that 
draws civic nationalists together. Entry to the national collectivity is seen as 
dependent on a respect for Australia's key legal and political institutions. 
Civic national sentiments sometimes coexist with ethno-nativist sentiments, but the 
two are associated with different images. The ethno-nativist identity stresses one 
culture, common traditions and common descent. Civic nationalists by contrast 
stress shared respect for the rule of law and an awareness of (as well as pride in) 
individual rights and democratic institutions. A civic form of identification 
transcends cultural markers; it stresses a sense of unity based on valuing cultural 
differences rather than similarities. 
One may hypothesize that in the 1960s the ethno-nativist form of identity that had 
sustained the nation for so long had began to show signs of weakening and 
fracturing. It began to be questioned by those intellectuals who could not relate to 
the images of Australia as a culturally uniform, white, British-derived nation. Civic 
sentiments started to spread because they had the capacity to engender a sense of 
belonging that was more inclusive and more in tune with a culturally diverse nation. 
Changes in popular sentiments and identifications in the post-WW II period have 
been attributed to a number of factors: mass non-British immigration, a growth in 
confidence in the economic prosperity of the nation, stability, and an expanding 
education system. As public sentiments began to change, citizenship rights entered 
the agenda of concerns and began to be defined in broader terms. Citizenship was 
no longer seen as just about being part of the cultural collectivity. It was 
increasingly seen as reflecting a culturally diverse nation. 
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According to most observers, those changes can be plotted historically as 
Australians began to adjust to changing circumstances. For example, up until the 
1960s immigration was tightly controlled by Australia's citizenship policy: 
Immigration policy is therefore a key part of citizenship policy because it controls those from outside 
the country who can become citizens, and it was used ruthlessly by Australia to keep out non-white 
people from access to citizenship until the 1960s (Chesterman and Galligan 1999: 9). 
Australia's citizenship policy was not only used to effectively prevent certain 
groups from entering the country, but it was also used as a mechanism for 
controlling the indigenous population. The policy denied Australia's indigenous 
population 'major social policy benefits such as the maternity allowance, old-age 
and disability pension' (Chesterman and Galligan 1999: 10). Aboriginal 
Australians were excluded from participating in the national collectivity by 
limitations placed on their citizenship rights. It was not until the White Australia 
Policy was abandoned in 1967 that Aboriginal Australians gained the same rights as 
white Anglo-Australians. Similarly, the assimilation policy doctrine was gradually 
replaced by a policy of integration followed by a policy of multiculturalism. 
Multiculturalism admitted that cultural difference was no longer something to fear 
but rather was something that was considered integral to nation building. In turn, 
the acceptance of Australia as a multicultural nation fuelled the emergence of what 
has been described by some as a form of 'new nationalism' (Home 1989, White 
1981). 
The new nationalism gained momentum with the election of the Whitlam 
government in December 1972. The introduction of multiculturalism provided the 
opportunity for the new Labor government to legitimise cultural diversity and 
promote a new nationalism. 'Multiculturalism meant that racial and cultural 
tolerance and the celebration of ethnic diversity were promoted as distinctively 
Australian symbols and that a new kind of nationalism could be built around the 
idea of the 'family of Australia' (Betts 1999: 164). Initially the concept of the new 
nationalism 'deliberately set out to help develop a national identity through artistic 
expression and to project Australia's image in other countries by means of the arts' 
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Throughout the 1980s those civic national sentiments continued to gain acceptance 
and reached a high point with the approach of the Bicentenary celebrations in 1988. 
For many Australians the Bicentennial celebrations highlighted the 
inappropriateness of Australia's head of state being from a 'foreign nation'. They 
convinced many 'that unless ordinary Australians spoke out against the monarchy 
and demanded that an Australian be our nation's Head of State, the change might 
never come about' (Turnbul 1993: 3). 
The late 1980s and the 1990s was a period where the new civic nationalist ideals 
and republican sentiment fused into one. Republican sentiments manifest 
themselves through deliberations about the most appropriate form of the state as an 
expression of civic nationalist ideals. Support for an Australian republic grew 
substantialy during this period. Opinion pol data, (see Figure 1) show that in the 
1980s just over four in ten voters were in favour of a republic. This increased to 58 
per cent in 1993 with an increase to 60 per cent in 1996 (McAlister in Galigan et al 
1997: 15-16). 
Figure 1 Public opinion towards the republic and the monarchy, 1967-96 
Source: McAlister 1997: 16. 
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The surveys also showed that this national identity was increasingly expressed in 
civic terms. What that meant was that 
you are an Australian not because you are 'British' or stereotypically Aussie or a hyphenated 'ethnic' 
but because you are a citizen of the Commonwealth of Australia, accepting the Constitution as 
determined by the people, the practices of a liberal-democratic society, the rule of law, the principle 
of toleration and a respect for the equal rights of Australians (Home in Hudson & Carter 1993: 218). 
The two major developments of the early 1990s that gave civic nationalism a 
coherent political shape included the formation of the republican movement and the 
embracing of republicanism by the political leaders of the ALP. The ARM was 
formed in 1991 and became the core of the republican movement. It provided a 
forum through which identity issues could be debated forging a link between 
expressions of civic national sentiments and demands for political reforms. 
Political reforms were very much part of the push by the Australian Labor Party 
when it adopted an Australian republic as a part of its political platform in 1991. 
For Paul Keating, the then Prime Minister, an Australian republic embodied 
landmark issues — 'our cultural diversity, our evolving partnerships with Asia and 
the Pacific, our quest for reconciliation with Aboriginal Australians, our ambition to 
create a society in which women have equal opportunity, equal representation and 
equal rights' (Keating in Ryan 1995: 175). 
In contrast, the Liberal Party responded by inferring that pro-republican intellectuals 
were responsible for 'creating a sense of crisis about identity'. John Howard, Prime 
Minister from 1996, argued that 'constant debate about identity implies that we 
don't already have one or, worse, that it is somehow inadequate' (Howard 1995:3). 
By separating the identity of the nation from an Australian republic and by adopting 
a populist strategy, the Coalition was able to break the connection and play down 
the issue by the end of the 1990s. Although civic nationalist sentiments had 
emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they were not considered by the 
Coalition as relevant for the nation. 
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4:7 Social location and historical sources of civic nationalism 
In order to test this account, it is necessary to translate these developments into a 
series of hypotheses that can be assessed empirically. For example, with the 
constant changes throughout the post-WW II period, one would expect that the 
social location of those who display civic national sentiments would contrast with 
the location of ethno-nativists. The expectation would be that civic nationalists 
would be over-represented among non-British migrants or those born of migrant 
parents. They would be more secular, hold higher occupational status positions, and 
would be more frequently found among the tertiary educated. At the same time, 
partly given the benefits of education, one would expect that their income levels 
would be higher, and that they would live in the city rather than the country. It 
would also be expected that civic nationalist sentiment would be more significantly 
influenced by the major political parties. Supporters of the Australian Democrats 
and the ALP would be more likely to express civic nationalist sentiments than 
supporters of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party or the Coalition. 
The results (see Tables 4:3 & 4:4) confirm these expectations. They show that civic 
nationalists, especially those who take pride in Australia's political institutions, tend 
to be younger, better educated, located in the middle to high income bracket (b= 
3.0, b= 2.1) and self identify as middle class. Although the relevance of class has 
been debated by a number of writers (MacGregor 2001, Pusey 2001, McKay 1997), 
self identification of middle class location is statistically significant. The specific 
generational location of those who take pride in Australian's political institutions is 
also accompanied by an affluence not found amongst those who adhere to ethno-
nativist sentiments. 
Given the ambiguity in defining citizenship rights and duties, it is not surprising that 
there are inconsistencies in the data (see Table 4:3). The results indicate that the 
perceived importance of citizenship is higher among those born before 1946. In 
spite of these inconsistencies, the results tend to substantiate the interpretation 
presented above and confirm the key hypotheses. Those who consider citizenship 
as important for being Australian tend to live in the city rather than the country (b= 
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2.8). The R2 results, however, in Table 4:3 also indicate that the empirical models 
account for very little variation in the citizen dependent variable with only 3% of 
the variance 'explained' in model 4. 
The explanatory power increases with the introduction of the political/ideological 
variables. Political leadership and attitudes towards the performance of political 
leaders on such issues as the economy and democratic ideals emerge as significant 
boosters of civic sentiments, as indicated by the increase in the R 2 from model 3 to 
model 4 in table 4:4. Howard and Beazley register positive impacts (b= 2.1, b= 1.1) 
while Pauline Hanson, not surprisingly, registers a negative impact (b= -.5). This 
result confirms the long term effects of party identification on respondents' identity. 
It is also consistent with the claims about the influential role of political party 
leadership in shaping different forms of national identity. 
The four blocks of variables used in the regression models in sections 4:5 and 4:6 
were — for 'social' variables — relatively good predictors of the political 
achievement dependent variable (Table 4:4). They 'explained' somewhat less 
variation (approximately 10 percent) for the ethno-nativist born/live and 
achievement measures. Although, again bearing in mind the nature of these 
measures, this is considered to be a respectable amount (Tables 4:1 and 4:2). All of 
the social and political independent variables combined, however, only accounted 
for approximately three percent of the variation in the 'citizen' variable. To an 
extent this lack of explanatory power indicates that citizenship is an important 
aspect of identity for all Australians, although these results are also due to the fact 
that our indicator of citizenship was not idea1 25 . Social background was the best 
predictor of the born/live measure accounting for over half of the variation 
explained by the full model, although background measures were relatively poor 
25 The other factor at play here is that because the citizenship variable is constructed from a single 
indicator (as opposed to the additive scales developed to measure other aspects of identity), it has 
less variation. 
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predictors for all other dependent variables. Alternatively, values and ideology and 
particularly political leaders, had by far the strongest impact upon the civic political 
achievement variable (Table 4:4), where seventeen percent of the variation was 
'explained' by the full model. These political variables are expected to have an 
even stronger impact upon republican voting behaviour explored in the next section. 
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Table 4:3 The Key indicators of civic national sentiment (Citizenship) 
OLS regression estimates for predictors for Citizen 
Social Background 
Men 













Gen. 3 (1960 + ) -5.0***  
Born UK -11.2*** -11.4*** -11.5***  
Born Other -2.6 -2.6 -2.6  
Achievement 
Degree -1.4 -.9 -.8 
Professional occupation -1.1 -.8 -.7 
Middleclass (self assessed) 1.7 1.1 .8 
Income ($30K - $60K) 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Income ($60K + ) 2.8 1.7 1.6 
City (live in large city) 2.6* 2.9** 2.8* 
Values and Ideology 
Anglican -.1 -.9 
No religion -.6 -.3 
Political ideol. (+=right) .3 .2 
'Post Mat. Orientation' (+=post) -2.1* -1.9* 






R2 Adjusted .02 .02 .03 .03 
* <05 	 ** <.01 	 ***<.001 
n = 3431 
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey 
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Table 4:4 The key indicators of civic sentiment 
(political achievement) 
OLS regression estimates for predictors for political achievement 
Social Background 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Men -1.3 -1.5* -1.4 -.8 
Gen. 2 (1946-'59) -2.4* -3.3** -2.6* -1.7 
Gen. 3 (1960 + ) -7.1*** -8.1*** -6.6***  
Born UK -.2 -.2 -.2 1.1 
Born Other -.3 .1 -.3 -.6 
Achievement 
Degree -1.2 -.9 -.2 
Professional occupation -1.1 -.5 -.5 
Middleclass (self assessed) 3.0*** 1.7* .7 
Income ($30K - $60K) 3.0** 3.3** 3.0** 
Income ($60K + ) 2.8** 2.8** 2.1* 
City (live in large city) .6 1.0 .5 
Values & Ideology 
Anglican -.2 -.3 
No religion -2.0* 
Political id. (+=right) 1.2 *** .7** 
'Post Mat. Orientation' (+=post) -1.0 






R2 Adjusted 	 .03 	 .04 	 .08 	 .17 
* <.05 	 ** <.01 	 ***<.001 
n = 3431 
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey 
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4:8 Civic nationalism and republicanism 
In order to assess the plausibility of the claims about the fusion of civic national 
sentiments with the republican program of reforms, I translate these claims into a 
series of hypotheses subjected to regression analysis. For example, civic 
identification should be strong among the supporters and weak among the 
opponents of the republican campaign. By contrast, an ethno-nativist form of 
identity is expected to produce the opposite pattern. 
Given the generational concentration of civic nationalism, one would expect support 
for an Australian republic to be high among the baby boom generation. Also in line 
with the interpretation presented in Chapters 1-3, those who were educated to 
tertiary level, identify as middle class, and were on higher incomes are expected to 
show strong support for the republic. Above all, one would expect that an 
Australian republic would be the preferred option for those born in countries other 
than Australia and the UK and for their children. The children of non-British 
immigrants should be far more likely to support a republic given that they were able 
to take advantage of multiculturalism, the educational opportunities and the 
economic security that Australia offered. 
How do these hypotheses square with the results of the survey data analysis? 
Again, a few 'anomalies' apart, the results support the interpretation outlined above. 
(see Table 4:5). Those who articulate a civic form of identity are significantly more 
likely to vote for an Australian republic, whereas those who express a nativist form 
of identity are significantly less likely to support the republic. The link between 
civic identity does not remain statistically significant, however, when controlling 
for other predictors, suggesting that civic identity is mediating the effects of other 
independent variables. The indicators of ethno-nativism have a stronger, although 
negative impact on republican voting, although, once again, they appear to be 
mediating social background and socio-political effects in the later models. 
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The analysis also confirms the significance of education (0.R. 1.6, model 5) and the 
importance of generations (0.R. 1.5, model 5). This seems to be in line with 
Inglehart's claims about a libertarian and pro-change orientation by the baby boom 
generation. Baby boomers were identified as more likely to challenge the status 
quo. This was stimulated by the fact that the baby boomers were in many cases 'the 
first generation of their families to acquire a university education' (Betts 1999: 80). 
In the case of Australia, they also embraced civic nationalism and 
disproportionately supported the republic. Moreover, civic nationalists, especially 
the most educated ones, are significantly more likely than ethno-nationalists to join 
the republican movement. Active support for the republic is also associated with 
professional employment and earning capacity, with those supporting a republic 
tending to earn in excess of $60 000 per year. Pro-republicans are predominantly 
educated, secular, city dwellers, who see themselves as 'middle class'. 
We hypothesized that those immigrants who came to Australia from the late 1940s 
onwards identified with the institutional framework of society rather than the 
cultural underpinnings of the Australian nation. They represented a challenge to the 
vestiges of an old nationalism that adhered to British symbols and an ethno-nativist 
form of identity. In line with this hypothesis, the results reveal the impact of 
migrant background (0.R. 1.4). Those born in countries other than the UK and 
Australia are strongly supportive of a republic — almost twice the strength of the UK 
born and 40% more than the Australian born. 
This may also reflect the increasing political activism of migrants. McAllister 
(1992: 61) argues that those from non-English speaking backgrounds (NESB) 
display higher levels of campaign activity than the Australian-born. The first wave 
of immigrants that came to Australia after 1947 belonged to a generation that 
experienced both physical and economic hardship. Most of them did not have the 
skills or education to enter politics and to challenge established values. The 
experiences of the second generation, children of migrants, differed significantly 
from the experiences of their parents. Many of them benefited from the 
accumulative advantage of economic security, political stability and expanding 
education opportunities. As Castles et al (1992: 201) suggest, children of migrants 
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who have 'been educated in Australia, understand the system well, and are often 
employed within the bureaucracy. They articulate the need of ethnic minorities not 
in cultural but in bureaucratic terms, as expressed in the catch-words of access and 
equity'. At the same time, those experiences have resulted in a greater level of 
political activism — and stronger support for republican reforms. 
The results, particularly the increase in the pseudo R2 , between models 4 and 5, 
confirm the centrality of political leadership. Very strong positive responses to Kim 
Beazley (0.R. 1.2 table 4:5 model 5) and Meg Lees (0.R. 1.1) increase the 
likelihood of the pro-republican vote. Anti-republican votes come 
disproportionately from those who evaluate John Howard and Pauline Hanson 
highly. Such a response pattern is hardly surprising. It reflects the influence of the 
leaders as well as the clarity of their views on issues concerning an Australian 
identity. 
The explanatory power of the overall regression model is very high (30% of 
explained variance in the dependent variables). In fact, the strongest impact on the 
referendum vote is exerted, not surprisingly, by the last two blocks of independent 
variables: 'values and ideology' and 'political leadership', with place of birth and 
identity formation remaining significant and consistent in the models. The role of 
intellectuals and political leaders in articulating a pro-republican stance is clearly 
confirmed by the results. 
89 




Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Pol Achievement 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.8 1.7 Achievement .3*** .3*** .5* .5 .6 Born/live .4*** .5*** .6** .6** .8 Citizen 1.5* 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.3 
Social Background 
Men 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2* Gen. 2 (1946-'59) 1.7*** 1.5*** 1.4** 1.5** Gen. 3 (1960 + ) 1.7*** 1.4*** 1.3 1.2 Born UK .7 .7 .8 .8 Born Other 1.5** 1.5** 1.5** 1.4* 
Achievement 
Degree 2.1*** 1.6** Professional occupation 1.3 1.2 1.1 Middleclass (self assessed) 1.1 1.5** Income ($30K - $60K) 1.2 1.0 1.0 Income ($60K +) 1.1 1.1 1.1 City (live in large city) 1.5*** 1.3** 1.3* 
Values & Ideology 
Anglican .7* .8* No religion 1.6*** 1.5** Political ideol. (+=right) .9** 1.0 




Lees 1.1*** Hanson .9*** 
Pseudo R2 	 .03 	 .06 	 .11 	 .21 	 .30 
* <.05 	 ** ‹.01 	 ***<.001 n = 3431 
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey 
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4:9 Conclusion 
Republicanism in the 1990s grew on the fertile soil of popular civic national 
sentiments. These sentiments were growing predominantly amongst urban, 
educated and politically active Australians. By contrast, the opponents of 
republican reforms typically shared ethno-nativist sentiments and they were located 
amongst the older, less educated segments of the population. At the same time, the 
analyses support the hypothesis that both forms of identification also reflect specific 
socio-historical developments. For example, the evidence clearly confirms the 
significance of the effects of Australia's post-WW II immigration program — as 
reflected in the impact of migration and ethnic background variables. Those non-
English speaking migrants who came to Australia in the post-WW II period and 
their children have been strongly supportive of an Australian republic. 
The findings are consistent with the interpretation proposed in Chapters 1 and 2, as 
well as the account by Jayasuriya (1990:25) and Castles (1992: 198-199) who argue 
that ethnic groups act as agents of change by challenging existing values in their 
demand for the expansion of citizenship rights. Those rights are linked to a civic 
form of identification and the pro-republican stance in the referendum. The impact 
of leadership, generation, education, and ideology are also confirmed. Paul 
Keating's position and that of his successor as Prime Minister, John Howard, helped 
in articulating and firming up public sentiments. As Higley and Case (2000:10) 
argue prime ministers play the dominant role in referendum matters. Attitudes of 
prime ministers then tend to have a spiraling effect on issues that are seen as 
challenging the nation itself. Paul Keating saw the issue of Australia's identity as a 
nation and an Australian republic as inextricably linked. John Howard, on the other 
hand, refused to consider the two issues as related on the grounds of engaging in 
identity politics. 
In the early 1990s the pro-republican position was embraced by the ALP under Paul 
Keating. This in itself was unusual as it represented a shift in the ideological 
orientation of the ALP. The party consciously re-modeled its very ideology and 
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appeals for support. It not only continued to accommodate its traditional 
supporters, such as the trade union movement, but also took on some broader social 
considerations. In the main these centred on articulating a sense of inclusiveness 
and the changing nature of Australia's identity as a nation. The ALP leadership put 
in place an agenda that was new, different, exciting and perhaps more relevant to 
the mass concerns of an educated urban social category and class. 
I argue throughout this thesis that in order to understand the dynamics of the 
republican movement and the results of the referendum we have to look at the 
broader socio-historical and socio-political picture. Public sentiment supportive of 
the republican program is only one condition of successful political reform. The 
second set of conditions has to do with an organizational framework and the role of 
public intellectuals in formulating and elaborating a specific program for political 
action. These conditions are anlaysed in Chapter 5. The chapter specifically 
focuses on the role of the ARM in articulating a program for change. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE AUSTRALIAN REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT 
5:1 Introduction 
The theoretical model presented in chapter 2 links shifts in popular identities and 
forms of nationalism to the mobilization of the republican movement in the 1990s. 
Changing public sentiments among urban segments of the post-WW H generation 
gave the impetus for republican reforms. The organizational framework for 
effective collective action developed in the form of the ARM, the republican 
movement's main organization and leadership centre. As stressed by all 
sociological theorists from Marx to contemporary actionalists, effective reform 
programs are carried by movements with strong organization and unified leadership. 
The emergence in 1991 of the ARM meant that the changing sentiments of the mass 
publics could be forged into reform programs and channeled into collective action 
by the movement organization and its leaders. 
The ARM can best be described as a movement organization aiming at political 
articulation of civic nationalist sentiments and their elaboration into a reform 
program. Its campaigns concentrated on one specific aspect of nation building - the 
most appropriate form of the state that represented a 'new' Australian nation. For 
the ARM leaders and activists, the republican form of the state epitomized the 
changes that had already occurred in Australian society in the post-WW II period, 
as well as the changes that that needed to occur in order to bring consistency 
between a 'new' Australian society and its political form. They stressed that the 
ethnic diversity of the nation and new aspirations for social inclusiveness and 
cultural tolerance as reflected in multicultural policies called for institutional 
change. 
This campaign triggered opposition from mainly (though not exclusively) the 
'ethno-national' camp. Civic nationalist and ethnic nationalist visions differed in 
respect to the functions and the role of the state. Ethno-nationalists considered the 
state as a guardian of the cultural integrity of the nation understood as a culturally 
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homogenous 'community of fate'. Civic nationalists saw the state as the guardian 
of civic rights and the guarantor of inclusive citizenship. For them, the nation was a 
society, a 'community of commitment' that includes a wide variety of culturally 
diverse 'peoples'. The state, according to civic nationalists, forms a shell where 
these different cultures can coexist in harmony, provided their carriers share 
commitments to the key national institutions (laws, polity) and their symbolic 
expressions. This political shell, the form of the state, regarded by the ARM elite as 
most appropriate, was republican. 
The central issue was a symbolic-institutional expression of the republic. An 
Australian head of state represented the changing nature of Australia's society and 
its institutions. It provided 'representation' for Aborigines, migrants and ethnic 
minorities forming a new multicultural nation — society. The ARM leaders had a 
strong sense of representing and articulating the changing substance of Australian 
popular sentiments. They saw their task as providing a new political framework 
that epitomized social and cultural changes and as paving the way for a political 
form of the state that would better fit the new patterns of national identifications. 
The ARM leaders, in other words, sought to restore the 'balance' between the 
cultural aspects of the nation and the political form of the state. 
Movement organizations and their leaders — public intellectuals and political elites — 
are central in formatting public sentiments and forging them into a program of 
political reform. The leaders form the collective identity or to use Eyerman & 
Jamison's (1991) term the 'cognitive praxis' that shapes social movement activity 
and identity. They provide the movement with direction and are responsible for 
consensus formation and mobilization. Movement organizations amplify movement 
influence and provide a framework for the systematic exertion of this influence in 
socio-political and socio-cultural domains. 
The initial success of the republican movement was due to the fact that it was 
coordinated by a single organizational centre — the ARM — and that the ARM was 
very effective in mobilizing social and political resources. The movement attracted 
high profile supporters with quite diverse political and ideological preferences but 
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relied mainly on left-leaning public intellectuals and ALP political sponsors. It 
coordinated donations thus amassing a considerable 'war chest' for the republican 
political campaign. The activists established networks with influential political 
groups, professional associations and universities. ARM outposts mushroomed in 
every state, and ARM activists appeared in all major organizations including the 
main political parties. Perhaps most importantly, the republican activists cultivated 
media interest in the republican issue and tirelessly 'fed' the media with relevant 
stories about the republic. It lead the campaign for an Australian republic 
throughout the 1990s with the vigour and determination typical of a 'new social 
movement'. It also capitalised on the liberal orientation of the educated segments 
of the baby boom generation by linking republicanism with the most popular left-
libertarian causes from civil rights to the environment. This process of resource 
mobilization started well before the official launching of the ARM in 1991. The 
organized republican push actually started in the 1970s with the formation of the 
Citizens for Democracy. 
5:2 The origins of the republican push — Citizens for Democracy 
Citizens for Democracy (CFD) represented the first sign of a generational voice that 
expressed popular identifications of the civic nationalist type. It articulated those 
identifications and sentiments by linking constitutional reform with the identity of 
the nation. This took the form of a republican push that started in the 1970s and 
was invigorated in the late 1980s by the Bicentennial celebrations and the 
ideological transformation of the ALP. Those developments acted as catalysts in 
the formation of the ARM. The republican organization relied on the formative 
experiences of those who had been involved in earlier republican organizations to 
provide leadership into the reform push (Hirst in Manne 1999, Horne 1992, 
McKenna 1996). Those intellectuals who had been active in Citizens for 
Democracy (CFD) provided strong leadership and strategic advice. In fact, the 
leaders involved in the 1970s constitutional reform program were the first 
representatives of the generation that formed the nucleus of the ARM. They were 
central in articulating the platform that the organization adopted in the 1990s. This 
point was stressed by most republican respondents during the interviews. 
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Two of the most influential leaders of the republican push were Franca Arena and 
Donald Horne. Arena had for many years agitated for a republican committee and 
was instrumental in the formation of the ARM (Keneally 1993: 71). Home was 
regarded by many as a 'pioneer republican' (Hirst in Manne 1999) who championed 
and continued to advocate a civic sense of identification (e.g. Horne 2001). As 
chair of the 'Kerr and the Consequences' meeting at Sydney Town Hall in 1976, he 
attempted 'to connect republicanism with national identity rather than the 
dismissal'. At the time, Horne declared that the 'Queen as Australia's head of state 
could only evoke two responses': 
One is the democratic statement about the political role of Australia's monarchic constitution and in 
particular the monarchic role of the Governor-General in our present democratic crisis; the other is a 
republican statement, or as I would put it, the Australian statement in our present crisis in national 
identity (Home quoted in McKenna 1996: 235-236). 
The CFD was formed in November 1975 as a result of John Kerr's dismissal of the 
Whitlam Government. This crisis drew attention to much deeper issues that had 
begun to surface in the early 1970s. In fact, many saw the advent of a new Labor 
Government as an opportunity to revitalise a civic nationalist vision for a new 
Australia. Intellectuals were attracted to the idea of a national republican renewal 
and social reform. With the sacking of the Whitlam government in 1975, much of 
the nationalist republican fervor generated in the early 1970s was subsumed under 
the push for constitutional reform. This shift was engineered mainly by the leaders 
and activist of the CDF. 
The CFD emerged as a group concerned with constitutional reform and at the same 
time it incorporated republicanism as a central part of its platform. It gained 
national prominence after a successful meeting held on the 20 th September 1976 at 
Sydney Town Hall organized by Donald Home and his wife Myfanwy GoIlan. 
After that meeting 'a small group of authors, academics, artists and politicians 
decided to adopt the title Citizens for Democracy to wage an ongoing campaign for 
a democratic Constitution' (McKenna 1996: 231). Interestingly, they explicitly 
recognized that they formed a generation unit, united by their exposure to shared 
formative experiences, especially during the 'Whitlam years'. The political reform 
program of the group did not, however, tap directly into broader public sentiments, 
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but was rather based on a particular grievance — the stalling of the reforms and the 
dismissal of their key political sponsor. The CFD did not, therefore, engage in a 
pro-republican mobilization of the public, but rather formed an embryo for the 
reformist movement. 
The embryo did not last long but generated a strong stimulus for the republican 
push. Some have attributed the disbanding of the CDF to the fact that 'by late 1976 
the dismissal and economic recession had actually dampened the nationalist fervour 
of the early 1970s' (McKenna 1996: 238). There was also a recognition that 
constitutional matters did not engage the media and failed to excite the public. 
Others within the ARM have argued that CFD attempted to do too much, that the 
organization was too weak and that its charter for reform was too broad (Interview 
13:21). In that sense the leaders of the ARM wanted to distance themselves from 
CFD. They were determined to present themselves as a 'new force' rather than a 
continuation of the 1975 debacle (Interview 27:24). In spite of these denials, the 
residue of the 1975 sentiments (and resentments) clearly persisted within the 
movement, though they were overshadowed by civic nationalist sentiment re-
ignited by the Bicentennial celebrations. 
5:2.1 The Bicentennial Celebrations 
What emerged in the intervening years was a growing sense among public 
intellectuals of a change in popular identifications. This was diagnosed by the 
leaders of the movement as a key 'political opportunity'. Therefore, the pro-
republican activism focused on the diversity of the nation, the emergence of 
Aboriginal movements and the role of Australia's political institutions in 
manifesting a shift in national identification (see also Spillman 1997). 
The Bicentennial celebrations provided the opportunity for the republican issues to 
be brought to the attention of the media and the public, and opened a window of 
opportunity for the ARM to bring the issue of the reform to the headlines. In the 
first instance, the celebration provided a catalyst for a number of high profile 
members of CFD to become active once again. Secondly, it focused attention on 
questions about the identity of the nation and the civic status of Aborigines and 
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immigrants within it. 
In turn, such action stimulated a wide-ranging debate among intellectuals and elite 
groups who found themselves propelled into the public spotlight by the occasion. 
The celebration also drew attention to the tension between Australia as a 
multicultural nation and its continued reliance on British symbols. The occasion, 
therefore, served as a catalyst for a 'new Australian spirit' that the media found 
attractive. The major cultural effect was to reinforce among elites and, to a lesser 
extent amongst the educated public, the discourse of republicanism as the proper 
expression of a new national spirit (Hutchinson 1994: 185-191). 
The celebration generated heated debates about the adequacy of our symbols of 
nationhood, the contribution of migrants and Australia's indigenous heritage. 
According to republican leaders, the suggested political reforms would 'complete' 
the long journey towards full national autonomy. 
5:2.2 The role of the ALP 
The republican push was given its greatest impetus when the ALP adopted the 
republican reform as part of its political program in the early 1990s. The party 
elites and particularly the then Prime Minister, Paul Keating, played a major role in 
supporting and publicizing the reform. The republic was represented as the 'proper 
institutional framework' for new national identifications. 
One can only speculate about the reason for this enthusiasm in the ALP for the 
republican and new identity causes. Certainly the collapse of socialism (symbolised 
by the 'fall of the wall' and the demise of the Soviet Union) created an ideological 
vacuum that needed to be filled by a popular cause. It is also plausible to suggest 
that Paul Keating was eager to distinguish himself from his Labor predecessor and 
sponsor, Bob Hawke. Republicanism and a new identification thus came as 
convenient opportunities to re-invigorate the Labor camp ideologically and to 
strengthen the political profile of its leader. 
Paul Keating acknowledged publicly that he attempted to bring about some sort of 
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consistency between Australia's political institutions and the reality of a 
multicultural society located in the Asian region. An Australian republic became 
synonymous with 'Australia's identity in the Asian region, multiculturalism and 
citizenship' (McKenna 1996: 254). For Keating, a republic would 'deliver a new 
sense of unity and national pride'. It would 'deliver a re-cast Australian identity 
defined by the commitment of Australians to this land above all others' which 
would unequivocally say 'to the world who we are and what we stand for' (Keating 
quote in Ryan 1995: 166). 
Strong leadership by ALP elites saw an Australian republic placed firmly on the 
political agenda for the remainder of the 1990s. During the 1990s the ALP put in 
place a number of programs to prepare the ground for the introduction of a republic. 
The Republic Advisory Committee was established in April 1993 to examine the 
issues and develop 
an options paper which describes the minimum constitutional changes necessary to achieve a viable 
Federal Republic of Australia, maintaining the effect of our current conventions and principles of 
government (An Australian Republic 1993: 1) 
In the following year, the Civics Experts Group (CEG) was formed by the Labor 
government 'to prepare a strategic plan for a non-partisan program of public 
education on civic issues' (CEG 1994: 3). With the approaching 1996 federal 
election, the ALP's platform outlined the process for delivering a republic. This 
included plans for an indicative plebiscite followed by a referendum on the issue. 
What was required in the early 1990s was an organization that would champion the 
reform and lead in realizing the plan. 
5:3 The emergence of the ARM 
It was no accident that the ARM was launched soon after the controversy that 
surrounded the Bicentennial celebrations and that the launch coincided with the 
announcement of the ALP political reform agenda. A number of prominent public 
intellectuals and politicians greeted the organization as an opportunity for engaging 
the public in the reformist push. For many of them, Australia was a nation that 'did 
not have sufficient confidence in its own identity' (Turnbull 1993: 89). The vision 
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of the republic was about Australians defining their nationhood by their 
commitment to the institutions and ideals of this country. The ARM leaders felt 
responsible for the formation and development of an organisation that would forge a 
program of reform and promote an identity that represented the changing face of 
Australia as a nation. This became the mission of the organized republican 
movement. 
This mission needs to be seen in the context of changing public sentiments. The 
1990s represented a period when public support for the republic was fast increasing. 
There was a resurgence of interest in Australia's identity — its form, content and 
dynamics (Phillips 1996, Phillips 1998, Warhurst 1993). There was also a readiness 
to embrace change. A number of those involved in CFD, and who later joined the 
ARM, were sufficiently influenced by the Bicentennial celebrations to question the 
adequacy of the monarchy as a political institutional framework for Australia. They 
were high profile individuals, predominantly baby boomers who formed a 'ginger 
group' to 'influence the influencers' (Interview 1:17). As a generation unit, they 
were also representative of the changing face of Australia in that they included 
Anglo-Celts, migrant intellectuals, academics, high profile media personalities, new 
political activists and young members of political parties (Keneally 1993, Turnbull 
1999). Characteristically, they were highly educated, urban and politically active. 
In fact, most of them explicitly acknowledged that their past experiences had a 
direct influence on the strategic decision of the ARM leaders to focus on a single 
issue and to adopt a minimalist reform platform. By focusing on the head of state, 
the leaders and activists avoided a charter that was too broad. They wanted to avoid 
problems associated with bringing about constitutional reform in Australia. 
Constitutional reform could be manipulated by political elites aligning themselves 
against the issue. Minimal change reduced the likelihood of this occurring. 
The interviews confirm that the reforms the ARM proposed appealed directly to 
new public sentiments and identifications. As one activist explained 
when arguing the case for a republic it's about identity, it's about a confidence 
about ourselves and our place in the world and it's about Australia; our sense of 
100 
purpose, direction and identity and how we project ourselves internally and 
externally (Interview 20:30). 
Others described a republic as 'leading to a more inclusive form of identity, an 
identity that would take account of what we are now; a new form of identity, 
whereas our present identity is very much that of a colony, inextricably linked to the 
mother country' (Interview 28:25). The symbolic representation of Australia's head 
of state as a framing mechanism was, therefore, strategically significant for the 
ARM in that it highlighted nationality as a key issue. Nationality, in turn, served 
the purpose of identifying the inadequacies of past policies. 
5:3.1 The development of the ARM 
Responsibility for the early stages of the development of the ARM's minimalist 
position has been attributed to a small group of high profile individuals located in 
Sydney. They belonged to a generation that voted for Whitlam and supported CFD. 
Those leaders and activists formed the nucleus of the organization and used their 
influence to convince a number of high profile politicians to support the reform 
program. Their role was to provide leadership and articulate the movement's 
identity — its cognitive praxis. 
Movement intellectuals included Franca Arena, the former New South Wales Labor 
member and the ex-Premier of New South Wales, Neville Wran. Both Arena and 
Wran have been credited with conceiving the idea of the ARM. Arena had long 
argued in the early stages of the republican push for the formation of a non-partisan 
national committee of prominent Australians to lead the republican debate 
(McKenna 1996:249). The successful development of the organization was the 
achievement of Malcolm Turnbull. 
From its inception the ARM leadership recognised the strategic importance of 
remaining politically neutral. Bipartisanship was seen as a primary objective and as 
a key condition for success. One leader captured it this way: 
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Look at the history of referenda in a Australia and you can see without 
bipartisanship you have got a very, very, very slim chance of geting not only a 
majority of people, but a majority of people in the majority of states (Interview 
15:16) 
It was for that reason that Nevile Wran chose to stay in the background (Turnbul 
1999: 3). He was recognised as a skilful negotiator and strategist and worked 
closely with Franca Arena in the seting up of the ARM and guiding the movement 
throughout the 1990s. 
The key actors understood that for the ARM to be a success they needed to energise 
the republican debate. Nevile Wran's proposal was that the ARM needed 'to put 
together a smal commitee of visible and markedly Australian people who would 
enunciate the republican credo' (Kenealy 1993: 79). Their reputation needed to be 
such that as a body they were representative and respected. The success of the 
organization depended, above al, on the mobilization of intelectual charisma, and 
strategic access to the media. The initial membership was, therefore, broadly based 
and representative. 
The author Tom Kenealy was to be chairman: he was joined by Donald Home and Geoff Duton, 
also authors and long-time republicans 	 • i. . 	 - . 	 • - Is. - d Mark Day. 
The business world was represented by myself, Franco Belgiorno, founder of the Transfield 
engineering firm, and David Hil, then the general manager of the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (ABC) (Turnbul 1999: 3). 
Tom Kenealy was ARM chair from 1991 to 1993: Malcolm Turnbul occupied the 
role from 1993-1999. Turnbul shaped the ARM by forging its program, writing 
books, debating the issue on the media and directing the strategic operations of the 
organization. His 'strength and intelect' was widely recognised, particularly within 
the ARM. He exhibited a certain intelectual charisma that appealed to the media 
and to the intelectual strata. In fact, he has been described as a 'very successful 
icon who was sought out by the media' (Interview 14). 
Although 'charisma' was seldom used to describe the intelectuals that made up the 
ARM, it has been acknowledged that what atracted many to the organization was 
the high caliber of leaders. They were described as 'generating a certain energy' 
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(Interview 17:18), as having 'powerful personalities' (Interview 19:18), 'strength of 
intellect' (Interview 9:36), and 'personal authority' (Interview 8:13) that were 
articulated through their political reform program. This recognition of leadership 
and charisma proved an important asset in the republican campaign — a key 
'resource' generated and mobilized by the ARM. 
5:4 The formal structure of the ARM 
By the end of the 1990s the ARM had evolved into a three tiered organization. It 
included a federal level, a state level and a national campaign level. The three tiers 
represented the outcome of a devolution process that continued in the ARM 
throughout the 1990s. 
Although, the three levels were hierarchical in an organizational sense, the chain of 
command between the various tiers has been described as loose and informal 
(Interview 12:99). The federal level included the Board of Directors. The Board 
provided the legal responsibility for the ARM but had no real power beyond its 
corporate statutory role. Those on the Board of Directors were represented on the 
National Management Committee, the ARM's policy making body. They included 
Franca Arena, Mark Day, Libby Greig, Donald Horne, Tom Keneally, Neville 
Wran, and Michael Ward. The National Management Committee also included the 
Chair, Tom Keneally (from 1991 to 1993) and then Malcolm Turnbull (from 1993 
to 1999), as well as the Deputy Chair, Manse Payne (from 1994 to 1997) and then 
Wendy Machin (from 1997 to 1999). The founders of the ARM were also included, 
together with a number of people who were co-opted on to the committee as the 
need arose (Interview 7:99, 12:99). 
The National Management Committee was not formally elected. Incoming 
members were usually selected and adopted by the Chair and the Committee 
worked on the basis of consensus. The role of the National Management 
Committee changed once state branches had been established and the Constitutional 
Convention accepted the ARM's model (Interview 9, 12, 13). 
Although up until 1994, the ARM leaders maintained tight control, the organization 
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began to expand as state branches became established; first in Melbourne in 
February 1992, closely followed by the ACT, then Perth and Adelaide in 1993. 
Those branches did not, however, become state incorporated associations until 
1994. From 1994, a new structure was established in each state; first in Brisbane in 
April 1994, followed by Adelaide, Perth and Tasmania. This structure gave more 
autonomy to the branches. Branches were also formed at the University of Sydney, 
University of NSW and the University of Adelaide. The University of Tasmania 
branch was part of the ARM state branch. The state and university branches were 
gradually formalised once their constitutions had been prepared. They were 
represented at the National Management Committee meetings by their leaders or 
representatives either in person or by phone. Often there would be a phone hook-up 
of state representatives before the National Management Committee met (interview 
9, 12). 
In the mid 1990s the ARM started to organize state forums — public meetings and 
campaigns. As forums began to be established, first in NSW and then in the other 
states, the movement took on a different level of development. By 1995, the 
National Management Committee was no longer the operational centre of the ARM; 
the focus had shifted to the states. The state forums transformed the ARM from a 
centralised organization to one that was fairly decentralised. The state forums were 
able to shape tactical moves, issue media statements when necessary, as well as 
being responsible for organizing functions, attracting members and renewing 
membership (Interview 9:99). 
The formal structure of the ARM increased in complexity with the introduction of 
the National Campaign. As the republican campaign gained momentum, the 
national campaign office took on greater responsibility. It was during this period 
that the ARM leaders recognised they could no longer rely on their volunteers and 
part time people and so appointed professionals in each state to lead the campaign 
(Interview 7:99). With the announcement of the referendum in 1999 the role of the 
states altered yet again. 
Once the membership of the government-appointed 'Yes' committee had been 
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announced in February '99, a smaller national campaign committee was formed 
which overlapped with the government-appointed committee (Interview 7:99). The 
group included Andrew Robb, Peter Barron, Karin Sowada and Malcolm Turnbull. 
Greg Barns was appointed ARM campaign director from June '99, and together 
with Neville Wran became an ex-officio member of the committee. In reality, the 
leadership group included six people who became the political strategists for the 
organization 'and had the blessing of the ARM and of the official 'yes' advertising 
committee' (Interview 7:99). Professional campaign managers were appointed in 
each state to work with the forums and direct the campaign. The state campaign 
managers worked closely with the smaller national campaign committee throughout 
this period. 
The formal structure of the ARM was thus shaped from above by the leaders in a 
number of steps. For the first four years the organization had a centralized structure 
and it was controlled from Sydney with a Board of Directors, Chair, Deputy Chair, 
and the National Management Committee. In 1994 branches became semi-
autonomous state-incorporated associations with their own constitutions and state 
committees. 
The leadership of the ARM introduced strategies that were designed to coordinate 
activities, to publicize the republic and to build consensus. The forums in particular 
were essential in making the republic relevant to the people. Forums provided a 
venue for leaders and activists to engage different groups in discussing the reform 
proposals. They were quite effective in reaching different segments of the 
population and promoting a new vision for Australia (Interview 32:10). 
5:5 The key activities — mobilizing political resources 
Although the ARM was initially established as a 'ginger group' and operated as a 
national management committee, the leadership acknowledged that the success of 
the reform program depended on the ability to involve the public. The ARM 
recognised that as an organization it was essential to move from a small group 
controlled by elites to one that linked with national constituencies. Strategically this 
105 
was a demanding period in the mobilization process. 
In the early stages the organization concentrated on gaining the support of the media 
and attracting those high profile individuals. Later, the efforts were directed 
towards broadening the appeal of the organization and gaining the respect and 
attention of the media. The media was seen as very important for amplifying and 
consolidating the republican issues (Interview 1:21). Many described the media as 
a major force in their push for a republic, particularly 'in getting a fair hearing for 
the ARM and vital in getting a successful referendum up' (Interview 13:30). 
This was the domain where the role of public intellectuals was particularly 
important. The major dailies were cited as the most supportive in mobilizing 
support for the issue. The Australian, in particular, was considered as a leader, 'a 
key player and a very important medium for bringing the debate to the people'. 
One activist described The Australian as presenting a 'national record of big picture 
issues as opposed to news, crime and local corruption and that the republic fitted 
neatly into that policy'. As a national daily they printed and published wide-
ranging opinion on stories about the republic and issues connected with the 
republic. They were 'interested in questions of national identity and Aboriginal 
issues. Aboriginal issues also fitted into that search for national identity and what 
an Australian republic could do for Australia'. In fact many felt that as a newspaper 
The Australian had 'tracked and fostered the republican debate more than any other 
media outlet' (Interview 32:29). Paul Kelly was cited as both influential and 
insightful and as having an 'incisive mind of the highest order' and providing 
leadership through out the period (Interview 32:30). 
Although the ARM leadership was effective in capturing the attention of the media, 
some within the ARM felt that the tendency to focus on The Australian and The 
Sydney Morning Herald may have been restrictive. They felt that their arguments 
were best presented in different formats and that there was a need to focus on 
newspapers such as the Telegraph Mirror. As one activist explained 
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such newspapers use a totally different language. Most of the people who read The 
Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald have already made up their minds; we 
are not going to shift a lot of people there but in the Telegraph Mirror  we are 
talking to a very different group. 
The same strategy applied to commercial television. Rather than taking a 
condescending view, some felt that it was important to present the republican view 
in a form the people liked, that was acceptable and that media commentators 
recognised. For the message to reach all the people, it was important to be 
genuinely interested in the way that people might think and react to issues. Many 
recognised that it was more comfortable and easier to go with the national dailies 
and the ABC 'because the journalists and commentators were by and large on side 
but for the ARM it was not where the debate was going to be won or lost' 
(Interview 22:44). 
There were also peaks and troughs in the media mobilization process. In the early 
stages of consensus mobilization the ARM attracted much media attention. The 
issue according to one leader had 'a heretical, sacrilegious, blasphemous zing to it. 
All of us were constitutional Salman Rushdies for a while and everyone wanted to 
talk to us' (Interview 2:20). With the change in government in 1996 came a shift in 
the 'fashionable edge of the issue'. The basic premise did not change but the 
'Liberal swing meant that the ARM would need to find different strategies to reach 
the people as well as the new government' (Interview 14:46). This period was 
described as 'a limbo', a waiting period for the ARM leadership as they took stock 
of the situation and anticipated which direction the government would take. 
The media campaign was supplemented by the setting up of forums in each state. 
This was an important phase directed at mobilizing supporters as well as generating 
financial backing through fund raising activities and an increase in membership. 
Although during this period the ARM 'was primarily an eastern seaboard 
organization, the fastest growing membership was in Western Australian and South 
Australia' (Interview 25:6). The membership base was not, however, as broad as 
that of the Environment or the Greens movement. While the leaders and activists 
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were passionate about an Australian republic, it was difficult to arouse the same 
degree of passion in terms of membership. It was also difficult to strike a balance in 
terms of consolidation and mobilization. As one activist explained 
The ARM has alway had to balance the tension that exists with mass movements, 
because if you want to have a large membership you can't afford to charge a large 
membership fee. If you don't have a large membership fee, say forty or fifty dollars 
a year, you are actually going to lose money servicing those members. If you 
charge people five dollars or ten dollars a year and send them a couple of 
newsletters, do any basic kind of servicing of them, you are actually going to lose a 
lot of money, so we have taken the view that we have just got to strike a balance 
between being a movement that has got a lot of members and is open to everybody, 
but also not creating this membership, administrative nightmare that we then can't 
afford to manage (Interview 7). 
During this period the ARM was also sustained financially through the key leaders 
within the organization. Many recognised the considerable support given by 
Neville Wran and Malcolm Turnbull and acknowledged that 'the ARM would have 
gone nowhere without their financial backing and the fact that they made their 
offices available '. It was their combined influence that generated a network of 
major names and an organizational structure that was able to sustain the movement 
until the referendum (Interview 19:00). 
Perhaps the most important stage in the mobilization process was when the ARM 
recognised how essential it was for the organization to move to a much broader 
church. The focus for this phase of consensus mobilization was to engage the 
people and win grassroots support. Broad public support was considered crucial if 
the republican reform program was to be delivered. As one activist explained 
It was important that the rest of the community saw the movement as supported by a 
broad range of people, people from different backgrounds, from different socio-
economic classes, from different ethnic backgrounds (Interview 16:8). 
At the same time the ARM was required to devise strategies that would appeal to 
various groups and social categories. That process resembled a ripple effect 
whereby the ARM targeted those close to the heart of the organization and then 
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capitalised on the skills of those individuals to reach out to groups in the 
community. For example, in the early 1990s, the ARM captured the imagination of 
a number of university students who were prepared to set up branches at universities 
in various states. They provided a voice for presenting and debating the issues with 
guest speakers from both sides. Some were invited to join the National Committee 
as the 'voice of youth', and then continued their work at various levels in the 
community. 
In its campaign to reach out to the people and mobilize consensus, the ARM was 
required to address the diversity of certain segments of the population. 
Strategically, the ARM leaders recognised that some groups were more likely than 
others to challenge the ARM's position. There were degrees of difference, with 
those who would always remain 'difficult to convince', to those who were 
supportive but required different strategies. For example, although the ARM 
remained confident that they could rely on ethnic minorities for support, they were 
also aware that they needed to treat the minorities with a degree of sensitivity. The 
ARM leadership acted cautiously — if the push was to come from migrant groups it 
could prove counter productive and create divisions in the community (Interview 
30:40). The representatives of ethnic minorities were also aware of how the debate 
could be misconstrued if the focus was on the ethnic composition of the nation. 
They responded by being supportive of an Australian republic, but not loud and 
overt in that support. In this case, the ARM leadership relied on ethnic leaders to 
mobilize 'quiet' support within their communities, and to assist in the ARM's 
campaign in the lead up to the referendum. 
The ARM also strategically targeted 'constituencies'. They included the young, 
the elderly, women, rural dwellers, as well as 'progressives' from both the major 
and minor political parties. Although young people were identified by opinion polls 
as the strongest supporters of a republic, many in the ARM recognised that they 
often lacked passionate commitment to the reform program (interview 27:20). 
The ARM leaders and activists also acknowledged that gaining the support of the 
elderly was problematic. The elderly belonged to a generation that still remembered 
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the Queen's tour in 1954, and they tended to be fearful of change (Interview 8:32). 
Older women also needed convincing — they were generally less educated and much 
more ambivalent about moving to a republic (Interview 11:22). The one group that 
was considered the most difficult to convince was the rural population (Interview 
14:24). In dealings with rural audiences the ARM leadership attempted to reassure 
rather than convince. They did this by identifying leaders within the ARM that 
those from the rural community could trust and identify with. They also relied on 
prominent people in the community, those whom the people respected (Interview 
21:9). 
In NSW, a number of Coalition supporters aligned themselves with the ARM's 
reform program They included Manse Payne, a prominent Liberal party figure and 
senator, who became deputy chair of the ARM in 1994. Wendy Machin, a former 
National Party cabinet minister in New South Wales joined the ARM and replaced 
Manse Payne as deputy chair in 1997. Andrew Robb, a former national director of 
the Liberal Party became involved with the ARM as founder of Conservatives for 
an Australian Head of State. He 'enlisted the support of many leading business 
figures and others on his side of the political spectrum' (Turnbull 1999: 82). 
With the lead up to the Constitutional Convention, the ARM also recruited a 
number of high profile figures from Victoria. They included Eddie McGuire, a 
celebrity and natural communicator, Steve Vizard, a corporate lawyer-turned-
television producer, Poppy King, the young lipstick entrepreneur, Mary Delahunty, 
the then ABC radio and television journalist and Lindsay Fox, the trucking 
magnate. Some made substantial contributions (Turnbull 1999: 30). 
The supporters in other states also included high profile figures who lead the ticket 
for the Constitutional Convention. They included Janet Holmes a Court from 
Western Australia, Michael Lavarch from Queensland, former Liberal Senator 
Baden Teague from South Australia and Julian Green, a farmer and former 
politician from Tasmania. They formed a strong network and gave a focus to the 
campaign in their state. 
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5:5.1 Making the connection 
The pro-republican elites centred their campaign on the symbolic representation of 
Australia's head of state, and ensuring that an Australian head of state was instituted 
by the Centenary of Federation. They conveyed their message by drawing attention 
to the fact that the current arrangement was out of step with social change, and that 
many Australians were uncomfortable with a foreign monarch being their head of 
state (Horne 2001: 265). Such a focus served the purpose of highlighting 'those 
very important symbols of identity' and avoiding the difficult issue of constitutional 
reform (Interview 20:15). 
As noted by Guibernau (1996) symbols are critical for nation building. They draw 
people together by inculcating a sense of belonging, and at the same time they 
reinforce the idea of belonging to a collectivity, a particular nation. The republican 
leaders also stress this point and refer to symbols as heightening 'people's 
awareness of, and sensitivity to, their community'. But symbols also reflect change. 
Symbolic representations are part of the cultural equipment for dealing with the 
future. In other words, symbols need to be constantly reinterpreted, and even re-
created, in order to avoid the danger of becoming stereotyped, decorative or 
meaningless. 
As one activist explained 
the ARM always recognised the importance of symbolism in demonstrating the 
change process, particularly changes such as cutting our ties with Britain and 
asserting Australia's place as an independent nation, able to stand on its own two 
feet — that is expressing a new vision for Australia (Interview 32:10). 
For the ARM leaders, the minimalist model was both pragmatic and fundamental in 
that it avoided the complexities of broader constitutional change. The minimalist 
model involved replacing the Queen with an Australian head of state elected by the 
parliament. Such a position, however, was at odds with some segments of elites — 
they expected greater and far more reaching changes. Despite the divisions in the 
broader republican movement, the ARM leadership kept promoting its minimalist 
model as 'consensual'. Such a strategy was effective in the political arena 
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(particularly with political elites in the ALP). It was less appealing to the public. 
The public had more radical expectations, and were leaning towards a popularly 
elected head of state. The ARM rejected the radical option of constitutional reform 
as too risky and too divisive and impossible to negotiate through the referendum 
(Interview 8:53). 
This highlighted a number of strategic and tactical dilemmas faced by the ARM 
leaders. Should they stick to the minimalist program and risk a popular backlash 
(coming from the radical republicans), or open the maximalist option, a popular 
election of president, and face a serious division within political elites? Should they 
continue the 'top down' mobilization and risk the perception of 'elitism', or 
embrace a more populist tactic (in the words of one activist 'put more pub into the 
republic') and risk losing control of the campaign? 
These tensions became more apparent as the ARM leaders began mobilizing 
grassroots support in preparation for the republican referendum. As the state 
branches became active and the ARM began to 'get to the people and get feedback 
from the people', the republican reform program gradually took on a greater level of 
complexity. This was particularly the case with the range of options and the level 
of grassroots input. Grassroots input revealed a multiplicity of voices: each state 
had its own local peculiarities, its different strengths and weaknesses that impacted 
on the ability of the ARM to establish programmatic coherence. The ARM 
recognised that 'grassroots membership was critical in those centres outside 
Sydney. They played a key role in generating local debate, getting leaflets into 
boxes, fighting the local battles and making sure the issue was represented 
accurately in the local media' (Interview 32:9). It also gave 'the people' an 
opportunity to voice their preference. 
What had begun as a grassroots campaign to bring the republic to the people soon 
started to manifest itself as a strategic tension. More involvement by the 'public' 
had the capacity to weaken the coherence of the reform program. Making the 
connection exposed a number of tensions that became increasingly difficult for the 
ARM leadership to resolve during the referendum campaign. 
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5:6 Conclusion 
As the republican push gained pace, the ARM became the strategic centre for the 
movement. It attracted the high caliber intellectuals who effectively publicised the 
republican issues, forged a coherent program of reform — a key aspect of their 
cognitive praxis — and publicised it through the mass media. Their stature lent 
credibility to the republican cause. Through an extensive network of state and 
regional chapters, the ARM mobilized wide public support, especially among the 
educated and young urban strata. Last but not least, the core ARM activists 
cultivated political connections and helped in collecting money for the campaign. It 
thus effectively mobilized political resources and utilized the opportunity structure 
provided by the Bicentenary celebrations and the ALP' s ideological re-orientation. 
The republican movement directed by the ARM leaders appeared, therefore, to have 
a very good chance in winning majority support in the referendum. On the eve of 
the referendum, however, it became fractured as the ARM leaders faced — and failed 
to resolve — the strategic and tactical dilemmas. 
The divisions within the leadership were initially played down and patched up. 
During the campaign, however, the tension arose and strengthened, due partly to the 
pressures coming from the opponents of the republic. The latter were championed 
by a powerful and influential figure — the Prime Minister. 
Chapter 6 analyses the forms and the consequences of the divisions within the 
republican elites. The chapter embodies the third set conditions necessary for 
successful political reform — that of consensual elite action. The republican elites, I 
argue, were unable to resolve the dilemmas of mobilization which further 
exacerbated the divisions within their ranks. Those divisions, in turn, opened the 
way for orchestrated campaigns by opponents of republic, and affected the ARM' s 
reform program in a number of significant ways. 
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CHAPTER 6 REPUBLICAN ELITES AND THE DILEMMA OF 
MOBILIZATION 
6:1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at 'elite' factors involved in the push for an Australian republic. 
It has three aims: to analyse the beliefs of republican elites, to demonstrate the 
strength of civic commitments among ARM leaders, the elite of the republican 
movement and to comment on the consequences of the unresolved 'dilemmas of 
mobilization'. The impact of these unresolved dilemmas on intra-elite consensus is 
discussed in the final section. 
The divisions that emerged within the republican camp and in the broader ranks of 
Australian political elite on the eve of the referendum critically affected the 
outcome of the republican push. The 1999 referendum did not deliver the expected 
majority support for the 'minimalist' republican option. The failure of the 
referendum to legitimize the republican reform was to a large extent an elite failure, 
a failure to resolve strategic and tactical dilemmas that arose during the successful 
pro-republican campaign. The strategic dilemma centred on the following: the 
republican leaders could either follow the radical-libertarian rhetoric of their 
campaign and propose an equally radical reform — but risk being bogged down in 
difficult constitutional changes, or they could tone down the radical rhetoric of 
mobilization and propose a reform that did not radically alter the constitution — but 
at the risk of disappointing many supporters and triggering more radical, populist-
libertarian dissent. They adopted the second option (in fact, this choice was made 
in the early stages of the republican campaign) and consequently faced the second 
horn of the mobilization dilemma. While this mobilization relied on a radical 
appeal for 'public appropriation' of the Australian republic and tapped into the 
widespread civic nationalist, libertarian and egalitarian sentiments, the proposed 
solution was a 'minimalist model'. The model was conservative and it was based 
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on political expediency. It was a cautious attempt at a minimal reform that stood in 
clear contrast with the radical rhetoric of republicanism. It was bound to disappoint 
the more radical libertarians and it made the ARM vulnerable to divisions and to 
manipulation by the opponents of the reform. 
Moreover, the republican leadership had problems with resolving a lesser tactical 
dilemma. While the republican rhetoric was populist, egalitarian and participatory, 
there was little attempt — apart from the decentralization of the ARM structure — to 
involve the mass public. This led to accusations of 'elitism' and facilitated the 
mobilization of the 'populist' faction under a demagogic slogan: 'No to the 
politicians' republic'. The irony, of course, was that this faction was lead by 
seasoned politicians. 
As noted in Chapter 2, significant political outcomes depend on elite consensual 
action within the parameters set by the orientations of mass publics. Therefore, the 
division within the republican camp, and the split within the broader political elite, 
was fatal for the outcome of the referendum campaign. It was not just a matter of 
divisions intensifying elite competition. Competition between elite groups is 
unavoidable and persistent. Issues can be manipulated and conflicts can be 
sharpened or defused. But a division over strategic issues, such as the republican 
reform, creates an intra-elite rift that is hard to bridge — and spells doom for 
reformist attempts. 
6:2 Beliefs and values of republican elites 
The beginning of the republican campaign was quite successful. The decision by 
the ARM to target the nationality of the head of state as the centre piece of its 
reform program drew public attention to the broader issues of nation building. It 
specifically highlighted the incompatibility between mass identities and the political 
constitution that accepted the British monarch as the Australian head of state. This 
was at the time when Australia's principal institutions and popular lifestyles started 
to reflect the cultural diversity of Australian society. As Jupp (1997) argued, the 
disputes over national identity were difficult to ignore, and they were couched in 
popular egalitarian rhetoric that reverberated well with the mass public and liberal 
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intellectuals. Republican leaders emphasised the growing cultural heterogeneity of 
the nation and they questioned the socio-political and socio-cultural hegemony of 
the British-derived majority. They focused on the right of all Australian citizens to 
aspire to the nation's highest office and emphasised the fact that many popular 
assumptions central to the old Brito-Australian national identity could no longer be 
sustained. For many it was moving away from an Australia characterised as Anglo-
S axon and Anglo-Celtic to an Australia that was inclusive. 
Many people cannot understand why someone who is not an Australian, never will 
be an Australian, will never live here, is our first citizen. The psychology of having 
an Australian who is our first citizen, who understands us and is one of us will have 
a huge impact on how we see ourselves. It will certainly bring the poles a lot closer 
together (Interview 25:22). 
The old position, it was claimed, was no longer sustainable because of the re-
orientation of Australian politics and economy towards the South East Asian region, 
because of the multicultural composition of Australian society and because of the 
recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples. Multiculturalism insisted on the 
salience of cultural difference and brought into question the very nature of what 
constitutes a 'true' and 'full' Australian identity. It 'played an important role in 
developing a distinctive "Australian" outlook freed from its British origins and its 
backward-looking nationalism' (Jupp in Stokes 1997: 143). The ARM reflected 
these changes. In fact many of the ARM leaders felt that 
an Australian head of state demonstrated Australia's growing sense of confidence 
and provided a mechanism for recognising the changing ethnic composition of 
Australia as a nation. It embraced those democratic values which made the idea of 
a monarchy less relevant. The monarchy was seen as obsolete and no longer 
capable of portraying a new Australian identity (Interview 8:63, 8:64). 
The form of identity that the ARM leaders expressed and promoted was based on 
civic foundations: on a multicultural Australia in which full membership of the 
national collectivity is open to all citizens who share a 'commitment to democracy, 
a commitment to a tolerant and a diverse society and who recognise the centrality of 
egalitarianism in those traditions' (Interview 7:15). Becoming a republic was 
therefore seen as a 'chance to show the world a tolerant nation state' (Home in 
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Hudson & Carter 1993: 218). Those sentiments were to appeal to the 'hearts and 
minds' of the Australian people, particularly to the young and idealistic baby 
boomers, liberal intellectuals, indigenous Australians, immigrants and ethnic 
groups. They were central to the personal beliefs and values of pro-republican 
elites. The interviews clearly reveal this centrality. 
The Australian Republican Movement represents a clear break from certain forms 
of identity, particularly that linked to Britain. From my involvement in the 
movement and from the people that I have met it's that sense of sharing, sense of 
belonging, a civic form of identity, rather than an isolationist, turning Australia into 
a fortress type of identity (Interview 21:19). 
The values expressed by the republican leaders were also embraced by political 
elites in the ALP, in particular, by Paul Keating, the then Prime Minister. Labor 
elites embraced the values expressed by the ARM leadership, and they supported 
the ARM's republican push and the minimalist reform model as a low risk' 
solution. This commonality initially gave strength to the republican campaign 
(particularly in the early stage of mobilization) and politically sustained the 
leadership of the ARM throughout the 1990s. 
The ALP connection, however, became a liability with the resounding victory of the 
Coalition in the 1996 federal elections. The republican program became associated 
with the defeated Labor elite in spite of desperate attempts to remodel it as bi-
partisan. Moreover, the socially conservative leader of the Coalition, John Howard, 
seized the opportunity to strengthen his conservative credentials by publicly 
opposing the republican reform as unnecessary, potentially disruptive and partisan 
in its inspiration. 
Initially, however, the push progressed well. Commitment to the ARM's reform 
program by political leaders and civic activists evoked a sense of national 
effervescence. The leaders felt an urge 'to fully participate in society — to help to 
create it and shape it; to share its benefits and to ensure that others were given the 
opportunity to share in its benefits' (Interview 18:36). Republican leaders 
encouraged this participatory civic spirit described as a 'strong moral obligation to 
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the state to which as a citizen you are bound by law' (Interview 36:27). Such a 
strong sense of civic obligation has also been described as a form of patriotism in 
which national identity 'takes precedence over a host of other types of identity, such 
as family, class, gender, even ... religion' (Taylor in Beiner 1999: 228). 
The republican campaign soon adopted a heady, radical rhetoric appealing to the 
highest values. In fact, the republican movement was described by some as 'a 
harbinger of a new values shift' towards a more tolerant and libertarian civic 
culture. In many ways the ARM encouraged such a description and cultivated an 
image of a 'value-driven movement'. The leaders and activists of the ARM saw the 
republic as a 'symbolic issue about people's values' and a new tolerant society. It 
was about 'putting in place a better constitutional arrangement and values system' 
more appropriate for such a plural and tolerant society (Interview 24:39). Many 
leaders recognised that going from a monarchy to a republic would mean a huge 
shift for those who benefited from the status quo, as well as undermining 
established political traditions. Despite this, they saw their role as articulators of a 
more universalistic ideology - a 'set of values that had come to the fore and that 
needed to be reflected in the constitution' (Interview 24:41). Those values were 
expressed in universalistic terms, as values for 'all Australians', as acceptable to 
people from different cultures and diverse socio-political backgrounds. 
The value repertoire evoked by the ARM leaders was quite broad - and in many 
ways vague, lacking a clear definition. The republican leaders declared a 
commitment to the notions of tolerance, inclusiveness and egalitarianism. This 
provided a platform for the integration of equality and unity as pre-eminent values 
of the movement, and as a value basis for the proposed institutional reform. One 
interviewee captured well that high level of commitment and involvement. 
To me it actually has the potential to be the surrogate for a really great possibility 
for unity and reconciliation, which doesn't mean that it's going to be effortless and 
it won't be without its moments of tension and conflict, but! actually think that it's 
headed towards [resolution] and it has got resolution marked all over it (Interview 
11:30). 
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Those sentiments resonated well with the public, as revealed by public opinion polls 
showing a steady growth of pro-republican attitudes. The republican cause 
provided a connection between an Australian republic and popular civic 
nationalism. Republicanism, in fact, was promoted as a popular idiom of Australian 
civic engagement and as an expression of 'national spirit'. 
6:2.1 What it means to be truly Australian 
There was agreement amongst public intellectuals and leaders of the ARM that 
what it means to be truly Australian had changed overtime. Those changes were 
attributed to the transformation of Australian society over the last generation. 
Today's Australia was far more 'outward looking', 'a multi-ethnic society' and a 
multicultural nation that had resulted in 'a maturing of Australia as a nation' 
(Interview 30:41). That change was credited to a combination of the political and 
economic re-orientation towards Asia, the diversity of people that had come to the 
country, recognition of the indigenous heritage, an increase in the education level, 
as well as a progressive weakening of Australia's 'umbilical' ties with Great Britain 
(Interviews 13:20, 21:35). 
Many identified social inclusiveness amongst Australians as an essential quality of 
being 'truly Australian'. In particular, they stressed the importance of accepting 
social diversity and being 'judged on the basis of what I do and how I perform, 
rather than where I was born or any class-based characteristics' (Interview 24:21). 
The interview data reveal a common theme of 'Australian egalitarianism, Australian 
casualness and the acceptance of equality — those characteristics that have made 
Australians distinctive' (Interview 27:33). There was also a strongly held view and 
appreciation of Australian's capacity and willingness to accept those from other 
than Anglo-Celtic cultures. Australia was described as a country 'that lacked very 
sharply divided ethnic tensions ... a country where no one ever asks 'where do you 
really come from?' (Interview 21:21, 19:50). One republican leader expressed the 
essence of being Australian this way: 
For me multicultural diversity is critical. I'm of that generation where Anglo-Celtic 
is no longer some overwhelming majority that I have to conform to. That sense of 
being Australian is so far removed from what I consider to be truly Australian. I 
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am very much part of the 90s generation so for me being Australian is inextricably 
tied to a multicultural, multi ethnic-society. (Interview 30:25). 
At the same time, many expressed a personal vision in which this cultural pluralism 
fused with 'core values' of democracy, tolerance and egalitarianism — all embedded 
in the nation's core institutions. Overwhelmingly, that vision was expressed in 
civic terms. Australian laws and political system should serve as a symbol of 
recognition and celebration of social inclusiveness. That civic commitment 
reflected the leaders' shared understanding of and expectation as to what the 
republican movement could deliver; it united them throughout the republican 
campaign in the 1990s and provided meaning to the organization and its supporters. 
The dominant view that prevailed among the republican leaders was that a republic 
would strengthen social unity and value consensus. This unity would be a truly 
'national unity' transcending all socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural 
divisions. Patriotism was expressed as a positive and unifying concept, as a shared 
commitment to the core liberal-egalitarian values that makes one 'truly Australian'. 
It was also seen as bringing a new strength to Australia's identity as a nation — a 
tolerant multicultural nation. For the leaders and activists of the ARM, such a 
'common value' perspective provided an emotional and rational drawcard for 
reaching out to the 'hearts and minds' of the people. It was a way of bringing 
people together and bringing the past and the present together. This civic-national 
value vision played a major role in mobilising public support for the republican 
cause among the educated and libertarian baby boomers. 
6:2.2 Republicanism and patriotism 
Patriotism is typically defined as a strong commitment to one's country and its 
interests. It 'characteristically involves a regard not just for one's own nation, but 
for the particular characteristics and merits and achievements of one's own nation' 
(MacIntyre in Beiner 1995: 209 — 210). To add to the complexity, 'patriotism' is 
often used interchangeably with 'nationalism'. A 'possible distinction being that 
patriotism implies an emotion while nationalism connotes a conscious ideological 
stance' (Penguin 1988: 261). 
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Although the interviewees expressed quite diverse views on the relationship 
between republicanism, patriotism and nationalism, there was general agreement 
that patriotism was a positive term. It provided a sense of justification and 
historical relevance for the story of Australia's progress as a nation. The adjective 
'national' was used with caution; it usually indicated the changing nature of 
national identification by large segments of the population. The ARM leadership 
felt strategically constrained in articulating the reform program as a form of 
nationalism. The term was too negatively charged, especially for libertarian 
audiences. Rather than engaging in 'nationalist' rhetoric, the republican leaders 
stressed `Australianness' and (less frequently) 'patriotism' and they relied on the 
symbolic representation of an Australian head of state to encapsulate the republican 
message. 
'Patriotism', like `Australianness', was articulated in civic terms. Patriotism 
provided an emotional link between the past and the present and, in the eyes of the 
leaders, gave the republican cause a sense of continuity and consistency. It was 
described as representing a synthesis of national experience. Such a view carried 
with it a notion that leaders had a specific obligation and responsibility to the public 
in articulating and synthesising socio-political changes. Patriotism recognised an 
emotional attachment to the nation, as well as a solidarity with co-citizens 
regardless of their cultural backgrounds and traditions. In statements of republican 
leaders, 'the citizen' takes precedence over other forms of identity. 
The ARM leaders recognised that in a culturally diverse society patriotism — a sense 
of civic unity — was instrumental in promoting a vision of Australian society as 
tolerant, inclusive and egalitarian. Multicultural societies such as Australia, 
therefore, reinforced the notion that 
political culture must serve as the common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which 
simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life 
which coexist in a multicultural society (Habermas in Beiner 1995: 264). 
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An expression of how an inclusive society was defined was reinforced by 
Australia's move to a republic. An Australian republic formed 'that central civic 
idea that defines Australians. A civic Australian patriotism becomes possible only 
with Australia becoming a republic' (Interview 1:13). 
Australian patriotism and republicanism were thus regarded by the ARM leaders as 
complementary. 'The idea of repatriating Australia's head of state to ourselves' 
was described as an 'opportunity to increase our level of patriotism' (Interview 
24:27). For some, appealing to patriotic ideals was seen as a catalyst for the ARM 
achieving its goal, as well as taking that final step in an evolving national identity. 
As one interviewee explained — 'for most people, if they vote for a republic, it will 
be essentially because it appeals to their love of country more than anything else. It 
appeals to their patriotism and their sense of where they are' (Interview 10:42). 
Linking the republic with a sense of Australian patriotism was strategic and tactical 
— it was seen as a mechanism for broad effective mobilization of public support and 
as guaranteeing the success of the reform program. 
Although many saw the issue of Australian patriotism and a republic as facilitating 
the change process and enabling Australia to evolve and develop as a nation, they 
were also aware of the dangers. They recognised that some would see an Australian 
republic as a threat to Australian traditions and symbols, and that an Australian 
republic had the capacity to divide the people along cultural-educational lines. 
They expressed those views in different ways: 
I think some do see republicanism as undermining patriotism, but I think they are 
generally older Australians who have seen the flag and monarchy and Australia as 
one. For them the danger that the republican movement represents is that those 
symbols of unity are now being threatened; they are beginning to be disassociated 
and separated (Interview 18:47). 
There was also recognition that an Australian republic might not only threaten 
certain segments of the population, but that it could be easily misconstrued. Some 
feared that republicanism may acquire sectarian connotations. It was in danger of 
being seen 'as a radical idea, even a Catholic idea, particularly amongst some older 
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members of society who still associated republicanism with Irish Catholicism'. 
Many accepted the fact that those opposed to an Australian republic would, include 
'many older Anglicans and that it would take time for those religious connotations 
to fade' (Interview 20:33). 
Despite those fears, the connection between patriotism and republicanism was 
regarded by the interviewees as a necessity, a tactical imperative. They depicted 
Britain's contribution to Australia's national identity as an important but superseded 
'building block'. 'What we fought for in the two world wars' was also described as 
'building blocks' that contributed to our current sense of belonging. They also 
described Australia's move to a republic as an update, a necessary modification and 
a valuable end product. For them national identification was an evolutionary 
process that represented something that was 'quintessentially patriotic'. 
I think an Australian republic will reinforce patriotism in the sense that it will make 
people feel that they have a reasonable destiny and a reasonable influence of their 
own in the world and in the region. That's already happening, but I think we are 
going to be immensely more credible when we are unambiguously our own people 
by self definition, by our forms and formulae, so I think it will increase patriotism 
(Interview 2:15). 
6:2.3 Patriotism and civic nationalism 
The connection between patriotism and nationalism has been described by Taylor 
(1997) in terms of civic nationalism providing the intellectual underpinning for 
patriotism, and patriotism providing the emotional fuel for nationalism. He argues 
that this can be done in two distinct ways. The first is by thinking 'of patriotism as 
a strong citizen identification' in terms of a political allegiance based on 'ethnic, 
linguistic, cultural, or religious identity'. Patriotism is therefore engendered in 
terms of ethno-national factors. The second connection that can be made between 
nationalism and patriotism is directed at politically defining the `patria'. Patriotism 
is therefore defined in terms of 'I love my fatherland, and what makes it essentially 
mine is its laws' (Taylor 1997: 40). The connection in the second case can be 
attributed to an understanding of patriotism in relation to the political circumstances 
of one's nation. In this sense, patriotism blends with civic nationalism the latter 
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being a form of national identity appropriate for a 'new Australia'. 
As noted above, the key actors of the ARM expressed the changing form of 
Australia's identity as a nation in terms of the political, cultural and demographic 
transformation of Australian society since WW II. They embraced cultural 
difference and recognised the potential and strength of couching an Australian 
identity in civic terms. A culturally diverse society exposed inconsistencies in 
Australia's political institutions that needed to be addressed. By identifying 
symbols that related to a new identity, the ARM leaders saw themselves as sending 
a powerful message to different groups: you are an integral part of the nation, a core 
element of a 'new Australia' and your task is to adjust the political institutions to 
this new socio-cultural shape of the Australian nation. 
An Australian republic was in the eyes of the leaders, instrumental in differentiating 
between past forms of nationalism and a new form of nationalism that emphasised 
different aspects of 'new Australianness'. 'The issue of Australian patriotism, of 
Australians standing up for their country and wishing to be part of it, links very 
nicely with that situation'. Republicanism did not in anyway reinforce that 
nationalist chauvinism of Australia's past - that male and white Anglo-Saxon 
nationalism that existed during the first fifty or sixty years of Australia's 
development as a nation (Interview 13:25). 
There were some, however, who expressed a degree of ambivalence or uneasiness 
in describing an Australian republic in national-patriotic terms. They wanted to 
distance themselves from a nationalist rhetoric that implied the extremes of 
nationalist fervour and insisted on clearly distinguishing between those old 
connotations of Australian nationalism and a new form of Australian civic 
nationalism. 
... It depends on what you mean by nationalism. The problem with the word 
'nationalism' is that it has negative connotations, but if by 'nationalism' you're 
saying when people think about Australia and Australians that instead of connoting 
124 
a British country still linked to the queen, you think Australia, a young country in 
the South East Asian region, a land with people who are committed to notions of 
ethnic diversity, tolerance and equity; then that sort of nationalism I'm not 
uncomfortable with (Interview 19:34). 
Many explained the link between republicanism and nationalism 'as a new form of 
nationalism', that reflected a 'much deeper understanding of our place in the world'. 
It reflected 'a community of interest with our Asian neighbours, and a much less 
fearful nationalism'. There were a number of negative perceptions associated with 
an old form of nationalism that the leaders and activists wanted to clearly move 
away from. They expressed the 1890s form of republicanism as 'what we are not':- 
We want to get away from all the old connotations of the old 1890s republicanism 
and nationalism and focus on a nationalism that is more in keeping with the nature 
of our civic identity. We want to highlight the fact that we don't believe people 
should have positions by virtue of birth or background; those sorts of very powerful 
egalitarian identity symbols are not part of the old form of nationalism (Interview 
19:33). 
Similarly, 
It is our challenge for this nationalism not to become a type of chauvinism, or to 
become a kind of grand idea of us being a kind of super. I think that is our 
challenge, but we have got to give it a name; it is nationalism. We must be proud of 
being Australian, not because we are better than anybody else, but because we are 
Australian ... What binds us together is our nation and that's what I mean by 
nationalism (Interview 4:31). 
In this formulation, the difference between patriotism (an emotional commitment) 
and civic nationalism (ideological rationalization) blurs. The form of nationalism 
the ARM promoted stressed a sense of belonging and tolerance, which was a type of 
bond that contrasted with the 'old inflexible nationalism'. The 'old nationalism' 
was the antithesis of the 'new nationalism'. It was described as intuitive and 
imitative:- 
very much a male-dominated pale imitation of the British Empire; white, Anglo-
Saxon, keep the race pure, a very traditional role for women and basically Britain 
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being the decider of issues of national significance and Australia falling into line, 
including any participation and support of world wars and smaller conflicts. I think 
that is very much the old nationalism. White, male-dominated, increasingly 
independent, but essentially supportive of decisions made in Whitehall (Interview 
13:28). 
The leaders described the 19 th century style nationalism as 'almost an addiction to 
identity that didn't recognise the existence of other people; their identity and 
validity'. It was exclusive and carried with it a clear message 'that others had no 
right to that identity and that a narrow sense of identity was superior in some way'. 
Many expressed the view that they felt that Australians had a much saner perception 
of Australian identity and that an Australian republic would act as a catalyst in 
symbolically reinforcing that identity (Interview 2:16). 
Linking the identity of the nation to an Australian republic had the emotional pull to 
mobilize support and to tap into the hearts and minds of the people. The linkage 
between Australianness, civic nationalism and republicanism provided (to use 
Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) term) a 'cognitive frame' that reverberated well with 
the sentiments of the post-WW II generation and the new ideological directions 
adopted by the Labor elite. Paul Keating described the republican reform program 
as 'a chance which few other countries have' to 'give expression to both our best 
traditions and our current sensibilities and ambitions'( Keating in Watson 2002: 
586). 
6:3 Egalitarianism and radicalism — the dilemma of mobilization 
The notion of civic egalitarianism clearly imbued in the beliefs and values 
articulated by the ARM leaders. It was embedded in their views on being 
Australian — that is being equal to all other Australians. The egalitarian principles, 
however, caused a dilemma for republican elites in the latter stages of the 
republican mobilization. As the referendum approached and the republican 
campaign drew to a close, the republican elites were forced to face a difficult 
choice: either embrace a radical path — and risk the entanglements of constitutional 
changes — or tone down their radicalism and embrace a moderate reform — thus 
risking alienation by many supporters who expected to 'appropriate the republic'. 
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For the pro-republican public, the values of egalitarianism and tolerance were an 
important part of what the republic could — and was expected to — deliver. Whilst 
the ARM leaders' personal commitment was couched in those terms, those values 
did not translate into how the public interpreted its reform program. The minimalist 
model was conservative and rejected radical change; it simply replaced the queen as 
Australia's head of state. The ARM's model was not about making radical changes 
to the constitution, but about reflecting those changes by making minor adjustments, 
without disrupting the constitution and without changing the key political 
institutions. 
This created the danger of a public backlash — something clearly sensed by the 
republican leaders. They sensed that the mobilization of egalitarian values was 
interpreted by many people as their right to take greater ownership of the republic 
and elect the head of state. As the campaign gathered momentum and different 
players entered the arena, it became increasingly difficult for the ARM leadership to 
convince the public of the merits of its minimalist program. Consensus among the 
republican leaders also became more difficult to sustain, because the republican 
elites themselves were unable to resolve the dilemma and reconcile their 
differences. Public demands for a 'popularly elected head of state' became louder 
and introduced a serious challenge to the ARM's political reform program. 
As a result, a split appeared within the ARM itself. Some saw it as a failure on the 
part of the organization, a failure to 'reach the public'. Others attributed it to 
insufficient persuasion. They felt that the minimalist model did not adequately 
represent the change process in a way that was easily understood by different 
segments of the population. One prominent ARM leader expressed the issue this 
way 'having a president doesn't give you an identity, it gives you an Australian 
head of state. It helps but it is not sufficient' (Interview 18:32). Although many 
considered the minimalist position a good starting point, they wanted the 
organization to publicly acknowledge a far more reaching plan for change. Despite 
those concerns, the leaders of the ARM continued to support the minimalist option 
and remained overtly united in their position. In the end, that unity came at a cost. 
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The political reform program became more vulnerable to attacks not only from its 
opponents, but also from 'radicals' within the republican movement itself. The 
issue was often represented as a rift between minority elites and the masses of 
'ordinary Australians'. It was then that the notion of civic egalitarianism became a 
force operating against the ARM. 
The ARM leaders had not prepared themselves for this turn. It became increasingly 
difficult for the elites to convince the people and the radicals within its ranks that 
the minimalist model was the most appropriate and that a popularly elected head of 
state posed 'too serious' a problem for constitutional reform. Some segments of the 
public found the complexity of the issues difficult to comprehend and suspected the 
leaders of `exclusivism' and 'elitism'. For many it was about having a sense of 
ownership of the republic — as reflected in a popularly elected head of state - which 
they found engaging and attractive. The constitutional complexities that the elites 
stressed in the justification of the minimalist model were received with growing 
suspicion. As the more perceptive leaders acknowledged, the minimalist option ran 
the danger of being seen as a 'cop-our . 
6:4 Political opportunism 
The republican campaign, especially in its early stages, embraced the notions of 
government by the people and of the people, including ethnic minorities, being part 
of the governmental process. It focused on those participatory democratic ideals 
that reinforced the notion of popular sovereignty and civic engagement. This 
triggered a growing tension: the minimalist model was increasingly perceived as 
opportunistic, a betrayal of a radical cause. As the republican campaign became 
more intense, not only did the opportunism of the minimalist model become a 
divisive accusation, but the implications of a directly elected head of state began to 
dominate the headlines. 
Desperate attempts by the ARM leaders to defend the minimalist program as 'safe', 
'realistic' and 'prudent' proved unsuccessful. In order to mount an effective 
defence, the republicans had to acknowledge that republican reform carried a risk of 
'constitutional chaos' and political instability. The ARM leaders could not change 
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direction for this reason. It would mean losing the support base and it would 
weaken bipartisan support. As a consequence, they exposed themselves to 
accusations of opportunism and elitism. 
The alternative radical model of a popularly elected head of state also posed serious 
difficulties. It drew attention to such issues as the codification of the reserve 
powers and the competition between the President and the Prime Minister. 
Concerns about the reserve powers were also expressed by many of the ARM 
leaders. They were concerned about the scope of the President's power, especially 
vis-à-vis the Prime Minister and the foundations of the power, especially in a 
popular election. 
We need to put all our cards out on the table so that if we are as citizens of this 
country voting for one of us to represent the rest of us, then we ought to know what 
powers we are investing this person with. I think it is very important for the reserve 
powers to be spelt out (Interview 16:13). 
Those concerns, however, were not articulated and the differences were not 
resolved within the republican elite. The process had already been set in place with 
the release of the Republic Advisory Committee Report to formulate a 'common 
position'. Although a number of models had been advanced the minimalist model 
was favoured by the then Prime Minister Paul Keating. It was seen as easier to 
implement and the least disruptive constitutionally. At the end of the day political 
pragmatism ruled the day. One activist summed it up this way 
Codification is a difficult process. It's not impossible, but it's one that takes a of 
hours of discussion and fine print detail and I think that at the Convention we are 
going to have to convince people that direct election is not just a simple rhetorical 
issue of people having their say. It's not like that. It has ramifications for the 
balance between the different branches of government and it is also something that 
you can't just say I will directly elect and leave it at that. If you codify powers, you 
have to do all these other things. I think a lot of people do not realise that it is a 
very complex issue. So that's the biggest issue. Pushing through our model is 
going to be hard but not impossible (Interview 30:17). 
In turn, both John Howard and Peter Costello strongly opposed a process that 
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included a public system of nomination. Neither was prepared to back any proposal 
that would relinquish the Prime Minister's power of appointment. Peter Costello's 
view was that the Prime Minister should have the power to make his own choice 
and not be impeded by public nominations (Costello in Turnbull 1999; 63-64). As 
the debate became embroiled in constitutional detail, the public became 
disenchanted and disengaged. Many of the arguments were lost on large segments 
of the public. The situation began to resemble the tensions that had plagued CFD 
nearly twenty five years earlier. 
As a result, some republican groups and leaders began to distance themselves from 
the ARM, and the grassroots support that the ARM relied on began to wither away. 
Although the organization remained formally united in their support for the minimal 
reform program, the populist program had greater appeal for the majority. The 
republican push now became a radical push which went against the intentions of the 
ARM leaders. 
The ARM leaders could not accept populist radicalism for a very simple reason — 
they saw it as 'too difficult' and 'unrealistic'. Those who wanted a more radical 
change did not have a program in place that could deal with the constitutional 
complexities the radical change process engendered. Groups opposed to an 
Australian republic were therefore able exploit those tensions by mounting an 
effective campaign that exacerbated the divisions in the republican camp. They 
used the argument that the republican reform was dangerous and potentially 
destabilizing, and that it was controlled by 'the politicians'. 
6:5 Internal divisions and tensions 
The rift that centred on the overall strategy brought to the fore a number of 
associated issues. Perhaps the most significant that the interviews revealed was a 
tension between those who saw republicanism as naturally allied with the Labor 
Party, and those who attempted to mould it as a truly bi-partisan and a 'de-
politicised' cause. 
From its inception in the early 1990s one of the most contentious issues for the 
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ARM was its close association with the ALP. That association proved difficult on a 
number of fronts and had the potential to threaten the ARM's bipartisan position. 
Many within the organization were ambivalent in the way they described their 
relationship with the ALP. For some it was 'a mixed blessing', 'a double-edged 
sword'. Others were more circumspect. Although many recognised that it was 'a 
great help to the movement to have a Prime Minister pushing for a republic' others 
referred to it 'as a hindrance'. They felt that as Prime Minister, Paul Keating's 
involvement 'had damaged the movement by personalising and politicising the 
republican issue' (Interview 5:3). Some felt that under Paul Keating the issue had, 
in fact polarised the two major parties to the extent of having lost any prospect of 
consensus that was necessary for constitutional change. Others felt compromised in 
the sense that the Labor government had made the ARM the official republican 
movement by appointing Malcolm Turnbull to chair the Republican Advisory 
Committee. At the time the Republican Advisory Committee was part of the 
process instituted by the ALP when in government. It was established in 1993 in 
order to examine the minimum constitutional changes necessary to achieve an 
Australian republic. It included a number of prominent names that had become 
closely identified with the republican cause — Malcolm Turnbull, Nick Greiner 
(former NSW Liberal Premier) the academic Dr. John Hirst and media presenter 
Mary Kostakidis. 
The committee cemented even further the links with the ALP. In many respects it 
was not surprising that the ARM's position up until 1996 was closely aligned with 
the ALP. They were both promoting the same cause and focused their message on 
Australia's identity as a nation as well as supporting the minimalist model. The 
ARM had benefited from a government that had placed an Australian republic high 
on the political agenda. This was attributed to Paul Keating's 'public espousal of 
the cause'. As the leader he had considerable power and therefore gave the issue 'a 
credibility and profile that it had not had before' (Turnbull 1993: 196). But at the 
same time and perhaps more importantly he irrevocably associated an Australian 
republic with the ALP which in itself politicised the ARM in a partisan manner. 
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The response by the ARM leadership to the change of government in 1996 
exacerbated tensions further. The leadership was divided on the issue of how to 
deal with the new situation. Initially, some felt that the Coalition would only have a 
minor impact on the movement. Others expressed a degree of uncertainty and 
apprehension. Although a sense of gratitude still remained towards the ALP, many 
realised that by definition it was the role of the opposition to oppose the 
government. This was what the Coalition had done up until 1996 which made it 
difficult to anticipate the direction that the Coalition would take on the republic. At 
the beginning, the ARM leadership 'deliberately adopted a policy of not confronting 
the Howard government'. Many felt reassured by the fact that 'Howard had 
promised he would implement a democratic and consultative process' (Interview 
7:21). Constant speculation, however, caused rifts within the ARM with some 
leaders confident that John Howard could deliver a republic, whilst many disagreed. 
Some held strong views about the direction that John Howard would take and 
believed that Coalition leaders would do everything in their power to steamroll the 
republic, that the Prime Minister was hostile to the issue and that no convincing 
could make him accept a republic (Interview 19:12). Others went so far as to 
predict that 'John Howard would have stymied the debate by 2000' (Interview 
10:34). 
The decisions made by the Coalition to re-direct the republican debate had far 
reaching consequences for the ARM. The Liberal Party's formal position on a 
republic was announced in 1995, when John Howard committed his party to a 
Constitutional Convention — an alternative reform path. The leader and the deputy, 
Peter Costello, took opposing positions on the republican issues. As a result they 
were unable to reach a consensus, which in turn, set the stage for a progressive 
fragmentation of views within the elite and a concomitant proliferation of 'reform 
options'. 
The ARM leadership had to grapple with the fact that John Howard openly opposed 
the republican reform. Howard had on previous occasions accused the Labor party 
of 'asserting that the only nationalism worthy of the name [was] republican 
nationalism' and that 'Mr. Keating had been engaged in an attempted heist of 
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Australian nationalism' (Howard 1995: 2-5). He distanced himself from the 
previous government's sympathetic position on the issue of reform. In fact, on a 
number of occasions he sought to distance his government from what he termed 'the 
identity debate' claiming that 'although Australians shared a common national 
identity, governments ought not intervene to shape it' (Howard 1995: 3). Such a 
position spelt a mortal danger for the republican campaign that had up until then 
successfully relied on the identity argument and the sponsorship of the political 
elite. 
6:5.1 Republican elite factions 
The differences between elite sections widened as the republican campaign became 
more intense. These divisions occurred along partisan sympathy lines as well as 
programmatic options. Roughly, the pro-Labor sections of the ARM remained 
committed to the minimalist reform as a more realistic way forward. The 'bi-
partisans' by contrast, were more open-minded, more inclined to consider rapidly 
changing 'alternative paths'. To bridge these differences, ARM leaders adopted a 
number of 'consensus building measures': negotiating, convincing and facilitating 
the change process. Those measures made little impact as it became increasingly 
difficult for the ARM to gain the necessary support for its minimalist model and at 
the same time to maintain cohesion and unity. Their reform program was subject to 
attack by opponents within the republican movement, among political elites and in 
the broader community. The opponents were effective in highlighting 
inconsistencies in the minimalist program and attacking the ARM's 'elitism'. The 
ARM leadership were well aware of the dangers that the 'elitist tag' posed for the 
organization. One activist summed it up this way 
One of the biggest obstacles for the ARM is being perceived as an elitist 
organization. If the leaders are seen as being beyond the reach of and not relating 
to ordinary people, it is going to be very difficult to spread the word. If we want 
the message to get out we need to relate to people on a more personal level 
(Interview 21:5). 
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The opponents of the republican reform were quick to exploit the 'elitist tag' and 
they labelled republican activists as belonging to a Chardonnay set. They also lead 
a well organized and effective campaign by focusing on divisions and differences 
within the movement, concentrating on the constitutional and legal aspects of the 
reform program and sidelining the issue of patriotism and the identity of the nation. 
It was a confrontation between not only two visions of the nation and its political 
institutions, but also between two agendas of reform. 
The Coalition and the Monarchist camps proved to be astute opponents in the lead 
up to the referendum. They achieved their goal by employing tactics that 
concentrated on technical debates and tapped into widespread cultural prejudices. 
What the ARM leaders did not foresee was the ability of its opponents to tap into 
the anti-elite, anti-political, anti-intellectual and anti-change sentiments of the 
general public (Hirst 1999). Another significant factor that the leadership of the 
ARM did not anticipate was the strong campaign mounted by an important section 
of the political elite that included its most influential opponent of the republican 
cause — the Prime Minister who brought to the fore a powerful argument: Australia 
does not need reform, her political institutions are fine, do not fix 'what ain't 
broke'. 
The ARM leaders acknowledged that they could not compete with the counter 
argument that capitalised on those 'old Anglo traditionalist sectors of society' 
(Interview 20:9). The opponents of the republic tapped into 'the innate 
conservatism of the Australian electorate' (Interview 5:1) and skilfully exploited a 
campaign based on fear of disruption. In the end as one activist predicted 'it is the 
doubters and the fearful, those that fear change that are our biggest challenge. They 
need to be convinced that an Australian republic will not mean a change to our 
system of government, to a democratically elected government and our 
parliamentary system' (Interview 20:20). 
The second divisive issue concerned tactics and questioned the role of public 
opinion in the debate. Should the issues be decided by 'experts' (constitutional and 
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political) or by public preferences? Factions that embraced expert views were 
accused of being removed from 'ordinary Australians'. They couched the debate in 
a specific language and used complex terminology which made it difficult for the 
mass population to grasp, engage with and feel a part of. The Constitutional 
Convention illustrated the process. 
Although the impetus will come from the Convention the real problem for the ARM 
is that it has been perceived as an elite, a Chardonnay group. The ARM leaders are 
seen as gatekeepers of public opinion. Although they have successfully brought the 
issue to this point, the real problem is translating the issue to the broader public 
and making the public feel part of the process (Interview 19:22). 
As the referendum approached, the debate became more intense and immersed in 
the merits of the different models and variation on different models. At the same 
time, the public was losing interest in the outcomes; focus on technicalities reduced 
public interest and played into the hands of those opponents of the republic who 
criticized the reform as irrelevant to the average Australian. 
Concentration on the different models also exposed the conservative and radical 
factions within the republican movement itself. Although many were antagonistic 
towards the ARM's minimalist model, a number of allies emerged from unexpected 
quarters. One such ally was the conservative support network headed by Andrew 
Robb titled 'Conservatives for an Australian Head of State'. The group included 
not only a number of leading business figures but also academics such as Greg 
Craven, the Perth-based constitutional lawyer. At the federal level the ARM gained 
another ally in Peter Costello who threw his support behind the minimalist model 
and campaigned for a Yes vote in the referendum (Turnbull 1999: 82-83). 
The opponents of the republic included the Prime Minister, John Howard, Nick 
Minchin a conservative monarchist, Liberal senator and Special Minister of state 
assisting the Prime Minister on Native Title and constitutional issues, and Tony 
Abbott, a NSW Liberal member and former executive director of Australians for a 
Constitutional Monarchy. The latter group was formidable in the tactics employed, 
first in the Constitutional Convention and then in the referendum process itself. 
Initially, Nick Minchin attempted to abandon the Convention by claiming that it 
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was not a 'core promise' of the newly elected government. After a series of public 
meetings around the country that 'challenged Howard to give the people a say' 
cabinet decided to uphold its promise. Nick Minchin, however, was successful in 
introducing a voluntary postal vote rather than a compulsory, secret attendance 
ballot. Such a strategy was designed to downplay the event and 'reduce the 
participation from groups Howard and Minchin saw as sympathetic to the republic' 
(Turnbull 1999: 19). It had a significant effect on one particular group. They 
were the 14 per cent of Australians whose first language was not English. Even if you had enough 
English to get by at work and socially, it was quite another thing to understand a package of material 
about the Constitution. The government refused to provide translations of the electoral material 
(Turnbull 1999: 19). 
The ARM gained much needed support in facilitating the passage of the 
Constitutional Convention Bill from the ALP and the Democrats. But in the end it 
was two Tasmanian senators, Bob Brown and Brian Harradine, who voted for the 
Bill on the 28 th  August 1997 which made the Convention a reality (Turnbull 1999: 
23). 
Another aspect that caused division was the actual process of the referendum itself. 
From the early stages of the campaign the ARM leadership flagged the need for a 
proper series of questions. They recognised that the very framing of the referendum 
questions was extremely important (Interview 24:17). As one activist foreshadowed 
At the end of the day, if the government wants to sink the referendum process, all 
they need to do is to ask the most complicated questions imaginable. That would 
have the desired affect. The public would treat the process as a nonsense, or worse 
they would not be able to either comprehend or understand the questions and vote 
'no' (Interview 24:18). 
As predicted, the Coalition was successful in significantly altering the process. 
While the ALP's stand was to have an indicative plebiscite to test the public's 
support followed by a referendum, the Coalition entered into a period of 
consultation with the Constitutional Convention. This was followed by a 
referendum based on the preferred model for a republic. Such a process 
successfully managed to avoid testing the public's support for an Australian 
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republic and at the same time effectively ignored the public's readiness for change. 
The Convention supported 'in principle, Australia becoming a republic', and the bi-
partisan model of a parliamentary elected head of state which was carried by 73 
votes for and 57 against (Turnbull 1999: 74). Although the Convention paved the 
way for the referendum, what followed was a series of events that generated 
misinformation and exacerbated fears. Examples included pronouncements by 
Tony Abbott that a 'Yes' vote would usher in a Weimer Republic, that republicans 
were engaged in ethnic cleansing and that an Australian republic would mean a 
change to the flag (Turnbull 1999: 173). Such remarks were designed to frighten 
the elderly who saw the republic as a real threat to political order. 
By November 1999 the referendum debate was focusing on complex constitutional 
issues far removed from a vision of a new form of national identification that the 
ARM had intended. The elite divisions that had developed towards the end of the 
1990s meant that the political reform proposed by the ARM had little chance of 
success. 
6:6 Conclusion 
On the eve of the 1999 referendum campaign the ARM leadership was fractured by 
unresolved tensions and dilemmas. Although they formed a common front in public 
pronouncements, behind the façade of programmatic unity there was the reality of 
growing rifts. Moreover, large sections of the political elites opposed the 
republican reform and they had a strategic advantage in that they had a powerful 
and influential spokesman — the Prime Minister and Prime Ministers, as Higley and 
Case (2000) argue, play a vital role in the successful outcome of referendums in 
Australia. 
Despite the fact that the ARM leaders capitalised on political opportunities and 
attracted key public intellectuals, they were unable to get a majority vote at the 
referendum. Radical sections of the public wanted to appropriate the republic and 
clearly stated their preference for the 'populist model' of a popularly elected head of 
state. The ARM had to also deal with another segment of the population who were 
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fearful of 'disruptions' the reform could bring. That split amongst the elites and the 
accompanying public rift, was the most critical factor in the failure of the republican 
push. The final chapter poses the most obvious question: What does this outcome 
mean for the future of republicanism in Australia? 
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CHAPTER 7 THE FUTURE OF CIVIC NATIONALISM AND 
REPUBLICANISM IN AUSTRALIA 
The political reform model proposed in Chapter 1 suggests that the key ingredients 
of successful political reform include widespread mass orientations conducive to 
reform, well organized articulators of the reform program in the form of a social 
movement organization and, elite consensus about the strategies and tactics for 
implementing the reform. Such a model reflects the Weberian theoretical 
framework and research tradition that combine analyses of social structures with 
studies of meaningful actions of key social actors. The framework is applied here to 
the study of the mass configuration of nationalism, the republican social movement 
and the orientations of the key actors, in particular, the pro-republican leaders of the 
ARM. The methodology of the study combines a quantitative analysis of survey 
data and an interpretative analysis of interview data. The former identifies public 
configurations of nationalism and sources of organized support for an Australian 
republic. The latter gives insight into the views of the key actors concerning the 
strategies and tactics of the ARM on the eve of the 1999 referendum. 
The analysis in previous chapters helps in resolving the 'puzzle' of a sudden - and 
largely unanticipated - arrest of the republican push. It confirms the initial success 
of the republican campaign in mobilizing public support for the republic. The 
orientations of the public, especially the educated middle class baby boomers, were 
conducive to the reform; they were strongly influenced by the spread of civic 
nationalism and the pro-republican campaign. Civic nationalism was also strong 
among Australians with ethnic backgrounds, particularly among non-British 
immigrants who came to Australia in the post-WW II wave and among their 
children. Tertiary education was another key factor that influenced civic sentiments 
and pro-republican sympathies. Those sympathies were reinforced by those with 
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pro-Labor leanings and they were endorsed by Labor leaders. The fact that the ALP 
championed the republican cause strongly boosted the republican campaign in the 
early 1990s, but became an obstacle after the defeat of the ALP in the 1996 federal 
election. 
What the analysis reveals is the unanticipated convergence of civic nationalist ideals 
with the populist position on the Australia republic. For Donald Home civic 
nationalism was personified by Australia's move to a republic. The preferred form 
of the republic for Home was minimalist. What emerged, however, was a populist 
backlash parading under a banner of democratic right of ordinary people to choose 
their own head of state. That banner was soon identified with popular nationalism 
that helped to split the republican camp. 
The study also shows the centrality of the ARM as the core social movement 
organization. The movement was successful in attracting the support of public 
intellectuals who played a central role in forging the reform program. The ARM 
mobilized political resources and successfully mobilized public support for political 
change. Therefore, the conclusions here differ from the assessment offered by 
Robert Manne. It is suggested that the ARM was, in fact, quite successful in 
galvanizing civic public sentiments and orientations. Certainly the division between 
the 'materialists' (minimalists) and the 'democrats' (populists) became a serious 
issue in the latter stages of the campaign, but as the core movement organization, 
the ARM was instrumental and successful in putting the republic on the political 
agenda. What was missing, especially in the late 1990s, was the third ingredient of 
success — elite consensus that would galvanize public support for the reform. Major 
political reforms require the strategic and tactical consensus of key political actors 
because these actors are the most effective public persuaders. As Higley and Chase 
confirm, the weakness of elite political consensus in the late 1990s was the major 
cause of the failure of the republican push. This analysis confirms and extends this 
diagnosis. It reveals that the failure of the republican push was due to a combination 
of political elite and republican elite division. There was not only a lack of 
consensus but also claims of 'elitism' that extended to the republican 'leadership 
core'. Those labels were used very successfully by the republicans opposed to the 
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minimalist position, as well as those who were against the republic. Together both 
groups fractured the debate and placed the ARM leaders in an untenable position 
which resulted in the demise of the republican push. Under such conditions the 
referendum was deemed to fail. 
Since this failure, the republican push has lost momentum. The spread of pro-
republican sentiments has been arrested and public interest in the republic has been 
overshadowed by a wave of security concerns. The sense of civic identification that 
galvanized the republican push in the 1990s seems much weaker in the new century. 
Although survey data are not yet available, one is tempted to conclude that national 
identity has been shifting in the ethno-national direction, as reflected by popular 
support for restrictions on immigration and access by culturally foreign asylum 
seekers. As one critic observed, Australia has become a nation where 'tolerance 
looks frailer and xenophobia more robust' (Keating 2002: 2). 
As suggested in Chapter 2, events that impact on the security of the nation influence 
different generations in different ways. They have the capacity to affect value 
priorities of cohorts coming of age. Inglehart claims, for example, that the baby 
boomer generation was postmaterialist in their value orientations. They were a 
generation that embraced change and were prepared to challenge the status quo. It 
is difficult to predict the value orientations of the current ascendant generations — 
particularly the 'generation Xers' and the `millennials'. Given the current security 
concerns as well as heightened terrorist fears, there may well be a generational shift 
towards a materialist values priority. If this happens the civic sentiments and pro-
republican orientations may also weaken. 
On the other hand, the social locations of civic national sentiments and pro-
republican attitudes may contribute to their further spread. They are strongest 
among the educated, urban, affluent, middle class strata that are growing in absolute 
size and proportion to the population. Such predictions seem to be in line with the 
more recent Newspoll (2002) data that show that strong pro-republican sentiment 
continues to prevail. Public support remains at a high 51 percent. This level of 
support is in keeping with (and at times slightly higher than in) the period preceding 
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the referendum in 1999. Furthermore, 80% of respondents were in favour of a 
referendum on the republic being held in the next 5 years. 
The more recent scandals and the ensuing resignation of Australia's Governor 
General, as well as the publicity regarding the method of appointment of the 
Queen's representative are factors that may lead to a resurgence of interest in the 
republican reform program. Critics of the present system point to the fact that this 
program envisages more effective public and parliamentary control over the 
selection and appointment of the head of state. 
Since the 1999 referendum the ARM has made an effort to rebuild the organization. 
It is now smaller and includes 'eight members directly elected by the whole 
membership, a youth member elected by the whole youth membership and eight ex-
officio state and territory conveners heading elected state and territory councils' 
(Warhurst 2003: 7). The leadership structure has changed. Malcolm Turnbull, who 
occupied the position of chair, has been replaced by John Warhurst an academic 
from the Australian National University. There are now two new deputy chairs - 
Susan Ryan and Richard Fidler. 
Flagging membership is another challenge for the republican movement (Warhurst 
2003). Since the 1999 referendum the ARM's membership has fallen from 8000 to 
1500. The new leaders are attempting to boost membership by concentrating their 
campaign on the less densely populated areas outside the inner metropolitan areas, 
especially those areas that showed a low support in the 1999 referendum. Gaining 
the support of women continues to pose a challenge to the new leaders. Women are 
less supportive of a republic than men with 46% of women compared to 57% of 
men in favour of a republic (Newspoll 2002). 
Since the referendum there have been signs of a growing consensus within the 
ARM leadership. Many republican leaders are now more accepting of the direct 
election model. This is more in line with public opinion that remains steadfast in its 
preference for this model. Just under 80 percent of republicans support direct 
election 'with virtually the same support among monarchists when pressed to 
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nominate a preference' (Kelly 2002: 11). There is by no means universal agreement 
about this model. For example, the continued strength of commitment to the 
parliamentary election (minimalist model) was clearly apparent at the November 
2002 Constitutional Futures seminar. Conservative republicans, such as Greg 
Craven from Notre Dame University, made it clear that no 'form of direct election 
is acceptable' (Kelly 2002: 11). 
There are some other signs of attempts at consensus building. The ARM leaders 
have proposed a national plebiscite rather than a referendum —`a non-binding 
expression of national sentiment on the principle of monarchy versus republic and 
then a vote on preferred republican models' (Kelly 2002: 11). This is reminiscent 
of that proposed by Paul Keating in 1996 whereby the people signal their readiness 
for change. If the vote is a clear majority, then a referendum is proposed for the 
public to choose their preferred model. For the ARM the most difficult part of the 
process is to present a model that is 'able to resist arbitrary political interference' 
and at the same time be 'democratic, expedient and conclusive' (Fowles 2002: 1). 
The revival of the republican push is, however, complicated by Australia's 
constitutional configuration. Australia has a constitution that is regarded as one of 
the most complex among English-speaking parliamentary democracies. The 
implication of fear that constitutional change tends to generate is understandable 
when considering that Australia combines a Westminster parliamentary system and 
a federal system with a bicameral parliament with two equally powerful chambers. 
The upper chamber (the Senate) represents the interests of the states and it is rare 
for the same party or party coalition to control both upper and lower chambers. A 
further impediment is the still unresolved question of the, relationship between the 
prime minister and a president. The reserve powers remain uncodified, which 
means that the governor-general has the power to dismiss a prime minister, grant or 
refuse parliament's dissolution and issue election writs. Such complexities makes 
the constitution very difficult to change, and tends to exacerbate divisions 
particularly when political interest favour the existing system (Higley & Chase 
2000). 
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The next stage of the republican push is therefore likely to centre on the capacity of 
republican elites in tackling constitutional complexities and the unresolved 
strategies and tactical dilemmas that unfolded throughout the 1990s. This has a 
number of implications for the future of the republican cause. At the parliamentary 
level the role of the Senate is likely to become critical. The Senate is beyond the 
control of the government and has the power to create deadlocks. And given that 
there is 
no formal separation of executive and legislative powers that would enable government functioning 
to continue, and with no fixed parliamentary terms, parliamentary deadlocks in Australia may have 
to be resolved by the Queen's representative, the governor-general, decreeing a "double dissolution" 
of parliament and a new election of both chambers' (Higley & Chase 2000: 6). 
The position taken by the Prime Minister is also likely to be critical. If John 
Howard retires, as many expect him to, the successor is likely to be pro-republican 
Peter Costello; this may open a 'window of opportunity' for the republican 
movement. If a popularly elected head of state is considered as an option, however, 
the reserve powers of the president would need to be carefully codified. This is 
because an elected president would have considerable impact on the role of the 
Prime Minister. The president's 'reserve powers' would need to be clearly spelt out 
in regard to what the president could and could not do in the event of a 
parliamentary deadlock or, as was seen more recently, in the event of political 
damage to the office of Australia's head of state. 
Another event that is likely to influence elite views on the republican reform is the 
controversy triggered by the appointment of Peter Hollingworth as Governor 
General. Recent events have highlighted a real flaw in the process of selection and 
appointment with many top politicians and commentators drawing attention to the 
fact that the much used adage 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it' has been proven wrong. 
The current system where the appointment of Governor General relies on the Prime 
Minister's discretion is widely seen as inadequate and in need of repair. Although 
the current Prime Minister remains opposed to any change in the selection process, 
this view seems to be shared by only a few of his senior colleagues. 
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This brings into consideration a factor of 'party in power'. While the republican 
issue divides both major parties, the Coalition camp, as a whole, stands behind its 
anti-republican leader, John Howard. As long as Howard leads the Coalition and 
the Coalition stays in power, the prospects for successful republican reform will be 
impeded. 
Of the three key factors essential to the success of the push for republican reform, 
both public sentiments and organizational factors continue to favour republicans. 
What remains is the key impediment: lack of elite consensus as to the shape of the 
reform. The key task for republican elites therefore is to strengthen their tactical 
consensus and to win support from a broader range of political leaders, especially 
the Prime Minister: If this is achieved, Australia may well become a republic. 
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Table 1 Results of bivariate analysis (percentages) 




Chi-Squared 	 P= .085 
Generation 
Generation 1 (born before 1945) 37.4 
Generation 2 (born between 1946-'59) 55.0 
Generation 3 (born after 1960) 53.4 
Chi-Squared 	 p= .000 
Country of birth (Respondent's) 
Born in Australia 47.1 
Born in UK 38.8 
Born in other countries 56.4 
Chi-Squared 	 p= .000 
Achievement 
Non graduate 43.8 
Degree 70.2 
Chi-Squared 	 P= .000 Professional 63.9 
Other 45.4 
Chi-Squared 	 P= .000 Upper class 50.3 
Middleclass 53.6 
Working class 43.3 
None 44.0 
Chi-Squared 	 P= .000 
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(Continued) 
Income 	(under $30 000) 42.7 
Income 1 ($30 000 — $60 000) 51.3 
Income 2 ($60 000 +) 57.1 
Chi-Squared 	 p= .000 
Anglican 36.6 
Other religion 46.1 
No religion 63.4 
Chi-Squared 	 p= .000 
Rural 38.8 
City 52.9 
Chi-Squared 	 p= .000 
Political ideology (0-10) 
Left 	 (0-3) 69.8 
Centre 	(4-6) 47.2 
Right 	 (7-10) 38.6 





Chi-Squared 	 p= .001 
Political identification (Respondent's) 
ALP 63.1 
Liberal 35.9 
National Party 23.0 
Democrats 70.0 
Greens 63.3 
One Nation 23.9 
Chi-Squared 	 p= .000 
n = 3431 
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey 
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APPENDIX A 
Table 2 Results of bivariate analysis (correlations) 
Pearson's correlation for leaders with the yes vote. 
Political Leadership 	 Correlation 
Beazley 	 .31* 
Howard  
Lees 	 .08* 
Hanson  
* <.01 
n = 3431 
Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey 
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APPENDIX B 
Means, standard deviation and range for dependent and independent variables 
Dependent Variable Mean Std. Deviation Range 
Vote .48 .50 0-1 
Political Achievement 63.6 18.7 0-100 
Achievement 78.0 16.6 0-100 
Bornlive 60.9 28.7 0-100 
Citizen 86.9 23.5 0-100 
Independent Variable Mean Std. Deviation Range 
Political Achievement .64 .19 0-1 
Achievement .78 .16 0-1 
Bornlive .61 .29 0-1 
Citizen .87 .23 0-1 
Men .48 .50 0-1 
Generation 2 .27 .45 0-1 
Generation 3 .33 .47 0-1 
Born UK .08 .28 0-1 
Born Other .12 .32 0-1 
Degree .16 .37 0-1 
Professional .16 .36 0-1 
Middleclass .46 .50 0-1 
Income 1 .29 .45 0-1 
Income 2 .25 .43 0-1 
Anglican .26 .44 0-1 
No Religion .20 .40 0-1 
City .65 .48 0-1 
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(Continued) 
Ideology (Left-Right) 5.26 1.77 0-10 
Postmaterialist 1.97 .58 1-3 
Respondent's Party id. 2.01 .86 1-3 
Beazley 5.65 2.77 0-10 
Howard 4.97 3.05 0-10 
Lees 4.47 2.14 0-10 
Hanson 1.95 2.62 0-10 
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APPENDIX C 
List of interviewees 
Name Date of interview 
   
Arena, Franca 	 13/6/'96 
Co-founder of ARM, Director and member of National Management Commitee 
Blackwel, Nina 	 22/1/'98 
11/9/' 98 
National campaign manager ARM from '98 
Boyce, Peter 	 10/7/'98 
Academic and Republican Tasmania 
Burns, Wayne 	 17/9/' 97 
Responsible for communications and public relations. Media Director for the 
referendum campaign 
Cassidy, Frank 	 19/1/'98 
Convenor ACT, elected ARM delegate to Constitutional Convention 
Colins, Peter 	 13/6/'96 
Republican and Liberal Leader of the Opposition in New South Wales, 1995-98. 
Cormack, Judy 	 12/9/'96 
15/12/'99 
National Management Commitee, responsible for seting up forums 
Coroneous, Peter 	 31/3/'96 
Tasmania ARM convenor - 1994-96 
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Day, Mark 	 17/9/'96 
Board of Directors, National Management Commitee 
Derriman, Frank 	 16/1/'98 
Balarat ARM convenor 
Doogue, Geraldine 	 11/9/' 96 
ABC journalist and member of National Management Commitee 
Elvey, Anthony 	 18/9/'96 
National Management Commitee 
Fitznead, Joan 	 22/61'98 
Tasmania ARM convenor 1997-'98 
Fulilove, Michael 	 1O/9/'96 
National Management Commitee, ARM. Responsible for seting up republican 
club at University of Sydney 
Greig, Libby 	 16/9/'96 
Board of Directors, National Management Commitee 
Greiner, Nick 	 12/6/' 96 
Former New South Wales Liberal Premier; republican and member of the 
Republican Advisory Commitee, 1993. 
Grogan, Peter 	 15/9/'97 
New South Wales ARM convenor and elected ARM delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention 
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Hannon, Cecilia 	 09/9/'98 
National Office volunteer 1994-1996, ARM Executive Officer / National 
Administrator May '96 — March'99 
Hil, David 	 12/6/'97 
National Management Commitee 
Hirst, John 	 31/1/' 98 
Academic historian and Convenor of the Victorian branch of the ARM 
Home, Donald 	 11/6/' 96 
Author, academic, former chair of the Australia Council and founding member of 
the ARM 
Irving, Helen 	 10/9/'96 
Legal academic and ARM candidate for the Constitutional Convention 
Jones, Brendan 	 13/6/'97 
National Management Commitee and ARM webmaster 
Kenealy, Tom 	 11/6/' 96 
Author, founding Chair of the ARM, Board of Directors, National Management 
Commitee 
Kirner, Joan 	 05/6/'97 
Former Victorian Labor Premier, republican and Chair of The Centenary of 
Federation Advisory Commitee 
Kostakidis, Mary 	 18/9/'96 
SBS television journalist, republican and member of the Republic Advisory 
Commitee '93. 
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Machin, Wendy 	 18/8/'97 
ARM deputy chair, former National Party cabinet minister in New South Wales and 
elected delegate to the Constitutional Convention, National Management 
Commitee 
Payne, Manse 	 14/6/' 96 
Prominent Liberal Party figure in New South Wales, Senator from 1999 and deputy 
Chair of the ARM, 1994-97 
Pooley, Tony 	 12/9/'96 
04/1/'00 
ARM Executive Officer Sept. 1991-1993, National Management Commitee 
Puplick, Chris 	 16/9/'97 
Former Senator (Lib.) for NSW 1985 —'90 and republican 
Sowada, Karin 	 23/1/'98 
Former Democrat Senator 1991-93, elected ARM delegate to Constitutional 
Convention and member of the 'Yes' campaign Commitee 
Thompson, Elaine 	 11/6/' 97 
Academic, author and republican 
Tsang, Henry 	 16/9/'97 
Deputy Lord Mayor Sydney, republican 




Prominent lawyer, Chair of Republic Advisory Commitee 1993, Chair ARM 
November '93-'99, Board of Directors, National Management Commitee, 'Yes 
campaign' and 'Commitee of four' 
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Executive Director ARM March '94 - Jan. '96, Board of Directors and National 
Management Commitee 
Wiliams, Robert 	 06/4/'96 
University of Tasmania ARM convenor 
Witheford, Anne 	 20/1/'98 
ACT convenor '98-, elected ARM delegate to Constitutional Convention for the 




1. In your view, what is the Republican Movement about? 
(Having a republic involves many things - what are the steps 
that need to be taken to achieve a republic? What is the most 
important?) 
What are its aims? 
What are the strategies and tactics? 
Where do you see the major obstacles? 
Whom do you see as your major supporters? 
Who do you see needs convincing? 
What do you regard as the key conditions of success? 
2. Do you see the ARM as a vehicle for expressing a new form of national identity? 
What is this identity? 
3. What does it mean to you to be Australian? 
4. What sort of impact do you see the major political parties having on the ARM. 
5. Do you think the ARM is politicised and partisan? 
6. In your view will Republicanism undermine Australian patriotism? 
7. How do you see the role of intellectuals and the media in the republican debate? 
1 
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